

# News from behind the **IRON CURTAIN**

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## About this Publication . . .

NEWS FROM BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN, published monthly by the Research and Publications Service of the National Committee for a Free Europe, is distributed to a limited mailing list of those who have expressed specific interest in events and developments in Communist-dominated Europe. This bulletin is a compilation of material collected by the Committee for the use of Radio Free Europe and its other divisions and is being made available to representatives of the press and other media, to universities, churches, libraries, and research centers, and to other groups of citizens who want to know more about "Communism in practice." The publication is not an organ of editorial policy; wherever possible direct quotations have been used with a minimum of connective commentary. However, the Committee believes that accurate information contributes to an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the Communist system, and hence to the ability of the free nations to combat this system.

## About the National Committee for a Free Europe . . .

The National Committee for a Free Europe was founded in 1949 by a group of private American citizens who joined together for direct action aimed at the eventual liberation of the peoples of the Iron Curtain countries. With the help of endowments and public contributions to the Crusade for Freedom, the Committee has set up, among other activities, Radio Free Europe. The Committee's efforts are focused on the captive countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In these efforts the Committee counts among its active allies the democratic leaders—scholars, journalists, political and economic experts, and men of letters—who have escaped from the Communist enslavement of their native lands.

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# Area Trends

THE massive red pendulum, made of steel cable and barbed wire, weighted by a hammer, has swung ponderously to the right for the second time in a quarter of a century. The Communist cuckoo popped out of its box and clucked "Collective leadership!" — "Concessions!" — "Amnesty!" As the pendulum moved and the cuckoo clucked, the hour struck hard for Lavrenti Beria and his lieutenants. It struck, more softly, for Matyas Rakosi. There may be others. In the lands on which the Red Star shines, Time reaps bumper political crops—not with a scythe, but a sickle.

The clock has struck; the pendulum has swung. This time the captive peoples helped to push it: starving men and women in Czechoslovakia, in East Germany; tobacco workers in Bulgaria; peasants in Romania and especially Hungary. Together they helped move it—barely, yet perceptibly, to the right.

But it is still the same pendulum, made of the same steel cable and barbed wire, weighted by the same hammer.



## HUNGARY

**Reorganization:** Radical Party and Government changes and an apparent softening in economic and political policy gave Hungary the look of a Kremlin-controlled experiment. In a move to transplant the current collective leadership phase of Moscow's internal power struggle, the old Stalinist Hungarian Party structure was altered and the post of Secretary General replaced by a secretariat composed of former Secretary General Matyas Rakosi and two other Communists. This, plus the fact that Rakosi resigned from his post as Premier and was replaced by Imre Nagy, indicates that, while by no means quenched, Rakosi's former power has considerably diminished. Consistent with the Kremlin's new "soft" nationalities line, dissolution of the former five-man Jewish ruling clique and the emergence of many hitherto relatively unknown non-Jewish nationals, looked like a sop to Hungarian anti-Semitic elements.

Concurrent with the Party and Government changes, a new "investment in moderation" program launched by Premier Nagy strikingly demonstrated that Hungarian heavy industrialization had reached the point of diminishing returns. The revised policy involved proposed economic concessions to the peasants, workers and intelligentsia as well as weazle-worded political "concessions" to the population as a whole. The new economic program, based on a shift of emphasis from heavy industry to light industry and agriculture, is designed to prop up the country's dangerously

low living standard. Peasants were promised that they could leave cooperatives in the fall if they wanted to, the carrot of norm reductions and a "reconsideration" of wages was held out to workers; retailers were pledged more aid, and the intelligentsia "greater consideration." Nagy's speech precipitated such a volume of work stoppages and departures from cooperatives that both he and Rakosi were forced to make follow-up speeches warning the people that the new measures would be introduced slowly and cautiously and that any "willful misinterpretations" of the proposals would be severely punished.

It is obvious that the controlled experiment in Hungary was a Moscow brainchild and nourished partly by the riots in East Berlin, and partly by lack of labor discipline, rising sabotage, popular discontent and industrial and agricultural failures within Hungary itself. To what extent the measures will actually be carried out, and whether the new policy will spread to other areas of captive Europe, remain to be seen.

**Purge:** According to latest reports, Zoltan Vas, one of Rakosi's five former colleagues, seems slated for final elimination. A victim in the anti-Semitic campaign last fall, Vas reappeared in January as head of the Komlo coal mines. However, he has now been viciously attacked by the Communist youth paper, which accused him of making young coal miners work too hard under intolerable living conditions. The alleged result of this is that one half of the 546 young miners in Komlo have fled. It should be pointed out

that Vas' strictness is in line with Rakosi's recent speech about increasing labor discipline and improving heavy industrial output. This was declared necessary in order to raise the living standard.

## **POLAND**

**New Policy?:** In the past few weeks there have been signs that the regime intends to increase its production of consumers supplies. Several press items have stated that more attention should be paid to individual farmers, who comprise the majority of agricultural producers. This was also mentioned by Prime Minister Bierut in his Independence Day speech, although he qualified his statement by attacking "kulaks." Other press reports hinted that more clothing will be made available on the market and that independent artisans will be given Government support so that consumer needs can be "better satisfied". It is probable that if these changes are carried out, it will be by the present Government and that no radical personnel reorganization comparable to the shuffle in Hungary will ensue. It also appears that the concessions will be fewer than those promised by Hungarian leaders.

**Catholic Press:** In March the publication of *Tygodnik Powszechny*, only remaining independent Catholic weekly, was stopped. Now the newspaper has suddenly reappeared and seems to have been taken over by so-called progressive Catholics cooperating with the regime. The former editor-in-chief has been replaced by a three-man editorial board, and the former publisher, the Office of the Archbishop, has been replaced by an Editorial Committee. An article on the first page of the issue, which was dated July 12 and lacked a publication number, stated that Catholicism "should not be based on emotions" and that Catholic writing should be orthodox, but at the same time "modern and connected with community life." The editorial also declared that Catholics should understand and support Government policy, particularly with regard to economic plans, international peace and West German attempts to revise the Oder-Neisse frontier. It was further stated that the Catholic press should help believers "coordinate" their loyalty to the Church with loyalty to the State.

## **BULGARIA**

**Demonstrations:** Worker demonstrations in Haskovo and Plovdiv had to be quelled by the police. On May 12, tobacco workers in both cities organized demonstrations under the slogan "Bread and Freedom." Many were arrested; nine were sentenced to death.

In order to appease the peasantry in general, the regime organized a June 14 celebration in the memory of Agrarian leader Stambolisky, who died in 1923. The occasion was used to publicize the Party's "liberal" intentions. So far, however, the Chervenkov regime has not followed the example set by the Hungarian Government in making specific concessions to the people. Greater supplies of foodstuffs have been promised and, as elsewhere in the region, the current theme of propagandists is the Party's "deep concern for the welfare of the people."

## **ROMANIA**

**The Party:** Following Moscow's line, current emphasis is on the monolithic unity of the Party to the exclusion of any specific Party leaders. This indicates that the way is being left open for a possible leadership shuffle (if one has not already taken place). Should there be an imminent Party purge, it is not clear which of the men in power will remain. At any rate, it is evident that none of the Romanian Communist bosses are independent and that all derive their positions from Kremlin patronage.

**Concessions:** The economic plight of the country continues to be a major problem. Gheorghiu-Dej tried to placate at least a small minority by granting certain privileges to a number of Stakhanovites and workers. Other changes in accordance with Moscow's "soft policy" include promises of greater food supplies to the cities and cancellation of peasant crop quota arrears. The first measure cannot be expected to have any lasting effect, and the second decree is clearly a device: it would have been impossible for the Government to collect this produce in any case, since it existed only in the Government's account books.

## **CZECHOSLOVAKIA**

**Currency Reform:** There are signs that the currency reform and abolition of rationing, designed to increase worker output and reduce consumption, have already proved unsuccessful. It was necessary for the Government to exercise immediate control of purchases on the "free market" and to introduce an ordinance curbing labor fluctuation and absenteeism. Although the latter was revoked after six days, probably in accordance with Moscow directives for a new, "soft" policy, it is clear that labor discipline remains poor. Furthermore, only a fraction of the 4,000 "first class" brigade workers for hard coal mines, who should have been recruited from among the "best functionaries and trade union members," have been organized.

**Shortcomings:** Failure is not restricted to the economic field. The Party press publishes daily complaints that local administrative organs have failed in their ideological, cultural and economic tasks. The same applies to the Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship League and the National Society for the Promotion of Political and Scientific Knowledge. The Youth League has not recruited a sufficient number of young people, and students at Government training centers are "succumbing to influences entirely alien to our people." In addition, activities of the paramilitary Union of Cooperation with the Army are unsatisfactory, and the Party press has suffered a considerable loss in circulation.

**Slovak Congress:** The Tenth Congress of the Slovak Communist Party consisted of the usual eulogies of the Communist Government and the USSR as well as anti-West attacks. The main speakers stressed the advantages derived by Slovakia under the present regime, and also criticized economic failures. No mention was made of "bourgeois nationalists" Husak and Novomesky who, since the purge of their friend and colleague, Clementis, have been awaiting liquidation.



# Right Oblique—March!

## I. THE DONKEY AND THE CARROT

For the first time since Moscow's absorption of Eastern Europe, important concessions arising entirely from internal factors in the Communist orbit were granted, last month, in one of the Satellite states. On July 2 the Hungarian Government headed by Matyas Rakosi, veteran Stalinist and "salami" dictator for nearly nine years, "resigned." Two days later, while Americans were celebrating the Declaration of Independence with firecrackers and pin-wheels, Hungary's new Premier, Imre Nagy, held out a big carrot to his countrymen. In his inaugural speech, Nagy promised more constitutional government, more "legality," increased personal security and greater tolerance in religious matters; a rescaling of economic plans to bring them in line with national resources and capabilities; a period of grace for capitalist remnants, and a sharp rise in the living standard. Most startling of all, Nagy's speech included the pledge that peasants could leave cooperatives in the fall, if they chose to do so.

In at least two specifics, the scope and importance of these structural and policy changes inside Hungary exceeded those previously announced in East Germany: the dictator himself was forced to step aside; and major concessions were promised in the realm of police, security and deportation policy. The most important difference, however, lay in the Kremlin's basic motivation. Whereas the East German concessions arose, at least in part, from the Soviet international objective of a reunified, neutral Germany with all the implications this holds for the Western defense program, the Hungarian concessions marked a definite retreat necessitated solely by the critical internal situation within the Soviet Empire itself.

### Motivation

Politically, the bitter struggle for Stalin's inheritance undoubtedly helped father the new policies; but they were mothered by economic conditions which have been gestating ever since 1947, when Moscow first began accelerating

the forced heavy-industrialization of Eastern Europe. Throughout the Communist bloc, shortsighted and arbitrary recruitment of villagers drastically reduced food supplies to the ever-swelling town populations. The remaining peasants, harshly taxed, forced against their will to farm for State collectives, grew frightened and resentful. They lacked confidence in their local regime and in its currency, and they neither harvested nor willingly planned for the future. In the factories, the everlasting upward revisions of production norms, unremitting pressure to fulfill Moscow-directed economic plans and bureaucratic management caused widespread unrest. Severe shortages of consumer supplies intensified this discontent: everywhere prices were high, food and clothing scarce. Workers, able to eat and buy less and less, were being forced, bribed or cajoled into working more and more.

Driven to extremes, workers in East Germany and Czechoslovakia rebelled, forcing the Kremlin to face the fact that it had seriously miscalculated in overextending the Satellite economies with regard to their industrial base. Throughout the area, heavy-industrialization and collectivization programs had reached the point of diminishing returns.

### Alternatives

Few roads were open to the Kremlin to extricate itself from this dilemma: it could prop up the failing Satellite economies with loans and investment funds; it could initiate a radical reversal of policy and seek substantial loans from the West; or it could relax its investment program in heavy industry.

The first choice was unfeasible. Russia, with her own insufficient petroleum production, poor quality industrial goods, woefully inefficient transportation system and barely adequate food supply could not, even if she were willing, pick up the check for Satellite industrialization. She would not have been draining all available East European resources at an ever-increasing tempo since the end

of World War II had she not been faced with serious economic problems at home. The second alternative was far too dangerous and might have involved the Kremlin in many difficulties and compromises as well as caused greater internal strain. The solution, therefore, had to be a relaxation of the Satellite industrialization program.

It is against this background of spreading popular discontent and continued economic failures that the new Hungarian "investment in moderation" must be considered.

### The Shape of the Carrot

Actually, it is not so much of an "investment" as appeared at first. Only by comparison with the old Stalinist mouthpiece, Rakosi, did the new, post-Stalin voice of Imre Nagy sound like an MC on some incredible give-away program. On closer inspection, it became evident that the reality of complete Soviet control remains unchanged.\* There is no reason to believe that Imre Nagy will not be just as faithful to his Kremlin backers as Rakosi was to his: Moscow has merely tried to impress the Hungarian population with the sincerity of its intentions by installing a partially new gang. Complete control by the Hungarian Communist Party remains unimpaired. The basic machinery of tyranny is intact. Prisoners "endangering public and State security" are not included in the recent amnesty. And, unlike East Germany, there is no mention of arms reduction. The promised changes are basically economic, but even the economic concessions are riddled with loop holes—qualifications which the Communist regime will interpret as it sees fit.

The major qualification, as is apparent from the July 11 speeches of Rakosi and Nagy, is that all the concessions proposed must hang fire until the workers fulfill their production quotas and the peasants their delivery quotas. In agriculture, the government still considers collectivization to be the major goal. Furthermore, no agricultural concessions are to be effected until next fall, after the harvest. Finally, Deputy Chairman of the Presidium, Daniel Nagy, in a July 4 speech, warned that the new changes regarding "kulaks" do not mean that "the working peasant should fold. The kulaks," he said, "are observed." In other words, kulak persecution will not end.

In industry, no wage raises were announced, and "increased production, plan fulfillment and widespread socialist competitions" are emphasized as much as ever. New work pledges to celebrate the new concessions have already been announced.

### It's Still A Carrot

In spite of the basically fraudulent nature of the new line in Hungary, there is a line, and it is new. It could not have been launched without Kremlin approval, and was probably done at Soviet direction. When all the brush

\* Indeed, the appointment of General Bata as Minister of Defense increased the element of direct Soviet control. While born in Hungary, Bata was brought up in the USSR and regards himself as a Soviet citizen and Red Army General—which, in fact, he is.

has been cleared away, and all the fraudulence uncovered, this much still remains: a de-emphasis on the heavy-industrialization program with a view to raising the living standard; a shift to "collective leadership"; a modified nationalism, implied in the favor shown to ethnic Hungarians in the new leadership positions as contrasted to the former "cosmopolitan" Jewish ruling group; and, perhaps most important of all, loud overtures to the peasants. Going beyond the Hungarian example and beyond Eastern Europe, the new line is part of the Soviet "peace offensive" (witness the recent dramatic events at Panmunjom and the trade overtures and general softening towards the West): an "offensive" which may be at least fifty percent defensive.

What then, does this new line stem from? What nourished the Hungarian carrot?

Available information is spotty and sometimes contradictory, but the conclusion which seems to answer the most questions is that Russia's leaders are afraid. This fear arises partly from their own vulnerability during the present struggle for power; partly from a realistic appreciation of economic weaknesses, both within the USSR and throughout its East European empire. It is a fear confirmed by riots in Czechoslovakia and East Germany—the first resulting from "hard" policies, the second from "soft."

Leading from fear, Moscow has deliberately attempted to turn weakness into strength, disadvantage into advantage. In the international sphere, Communist leaders have tried to divide the West, to reduce the threat of free world solidarity, and at the same time to stop up the Korean economic drain. In the Soviet Union itself, an amnesty, price reductions, "collective leadership," and a "soft" nationalities line are designed to keep the Russian people quiescent until the struggle for power is settled (see *Calendar of Events*, pages 6-7). In Eastern Europe, the peace offensive-defensive, most dramatically launched in Hungary but also manifest elsewhere, is designed simultaneously to keep the captive populations quiet and to ward off potential Titoism.

### Beria

It now appears unlikely that the Kremlin's new "soft" disguise was directly connected with the fall of Lavrenti Beria or that his purge signifies a re-reversal of the Hungarian experiment. There is a strong probability that the decline in Beria's fortunes, and perhaps even his arrest, ante-dated the events of early July in Budapest. In the final analysis, Beria's ouster seems not really a question of moderate policy versus Stalinist extremism, but simply a question of naked power.

The "collective leadership" and "softer policy" themes have been pushed throughout Eastern Europe. In Romania, Gheorghiu-Dej wrote in an editorial in the *Cominform* newspaper, *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy*, that entry of peasants into collectives should be purely voluntary. In July, the Romanian Council of Ministers declared that increased food supplies would be made available to the population and that cereals would be taken out of State reserves (as has been done in East

Germany) for this purpose. In Albania, certain concessions were made to the peasants: forgiveness of past State debts, lowering of delivery quotas, and the like. In May, the Czechoslovak Cabinet granted three amnesties covering criminal court and administrative cases. And in July, both Radio Prague and Radio Bratislava announced the sudden revocation of a decree punishing labor fluctuation and absenteeism. While Imre Nagy's inaugural speech outlining the Hungarian policy changes got slight play in most parts of the area, *Rude Pravo* (Prague) commented in a number of articles and characterized the developments as an "intensification" of the Czechoslovak regime's current policies.

### Why Hungary?

Because Czechoslovakia has given more propaganda space to the Hungarian changes than have any of the other Satellites, there has been some speculation as to why Hungary was originally picked as the "pilot" country—the state which the Kremlin chose to launch its controlled experiment. A possible reason is that although the Hungarian workers are certainly oppressed and disaffected, they are not—because of their small numbers in relation to the overall population—as dangerous to a Communist regime as those in some of the other captive countries. While the crisis in Hungary is industrial, it is primarily agrarian in size and character.

For these reasons Soviet leaders having learned in East Germany that a tyranny which appears timid by making concessions is opening itself to great dangers of revolt—may have decided to try out the new program in Hungary where, they thought, there was less risk of worker revolt. By introducing a new program, the Hungarian Communists have promised much, but they have left themselves ample room to give nothing. In the meantime, they are pointing out that these "concessions" do not flow from worker resistance, but from the bureaucratic top as "noblesse oblige." The Communists can now introduce these policies in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere without having it look as if concessions were extorted by the workers.

### Hungarian Reaction

Whatever the true purpose of the Communist planners in Moscow and Budapest may have been, the native reaction to the first Nagy speech can hardly have pleased them. There is no good evidence for mass demonstrations and widespread violence following Nagy's speech, but it is clear that there was a general collapse of industrial and agricultural discipline. Peasants, emboldened by the abolition of the "kulak list," deserted the kolkhozes in the midst of the agricultural campaign. Workers, particularly in the mines and metallurgical plants, abandoned their posts, inspired less by militant trade unionist sentiments than by the simple conviction that it was now safe and opportune to return to the land.

Most significantly, the Party cadres suffered a severe weakening of morale due to Nagy's ostensible lapse from orthodoxy and the prospect of the liquidation of the "Socialist victories" of the past five years. The Party was con-

fused by the new policy and afraid of leadership shifts. But the major pressure and major reason for fear and confusion within it has been the unanticipated extent and seriousness of the people's resistance.

The best proof for these conditions lies in the events and official pronouncements in the days following Nagy's first speech. To quiet the country, and particularly to allay the panic fear in the rank and file that the new economic policies coupled with recent personnel changes spelled a Government-Party split and a new purge, Matyas Rakosi was called from the shadows to address a hastily summoned meeting of Communist activists in Budapest on July 11. On this occasion, seconded by Nagy, the former unchallenged dictator made a great show of solidarity with the Government program, confessed errors of "wrong leadership," invoked the Muscovite principle of "collectivity," and assured his listeners that the ousted politicians, his former colleagues, all were alive and had jobs. Little of Rakosi's speech was "hard"; such threats as there were appeared in the concluding paragraphs, after the conciliatory mood had been well-established. Nagy's speech, which followed immediately after, was less amiable; but even here the demands for discipline were tempered with reassurances.

Nevertheless, in addition to the somewhat tougher language and an increased emphasis on the importance of maintaining work discipline, there were at least three significant differences between the July 4 speech and the speeches of July 11: the earlier concessions to the free practice of religion were not repeated; it was explicitly stated that collective and not independent farms were the best and proper solution to the agrarian problem; and the promise to permit independent retail trade was ignored, apart from brief mention of village craft shops. To this extent, the second set of speeches may have marked a retreat from the Government's earlier stand. While the basic concessions were confirmed, the iron fist of the Communist control behind them was clearly shown.

### The Donkey's Kick

Although ideologically and propagandistically the July 11 speeches in Hungary showed a certain swing back to Stalinism, it is unlikely, considering the present economic and political predicament within the Soviet Empire, that the Kremlin has any intention of re-reversing its new peace offensive-defensive in the near future. It will take some little time to clear up the Soviet power struggle, to revitalize agriculture, transport and all the other weak spots in the Communist economies.

Certainly, the changes in Hungary, and their partial spread to the neighboring Satellites, are tactical rather than strategic. Even if the Kremlin wanted to make a strategic "de-Communization" (a patently absurd assumption), the Red Army, which alone prevented overthrow in East Germany and whose influence is likely to increase as the power struggle continues, would in all likelihood oppose giving up military production plans. No matter

(Continued on page 8)



# Ten Month Calendar of Events

**October 15, 1952** . . . 19th Congress of Soviet Communist Party, ideologically based on Stalin's *Economic Problems of Socialism*, announced enlargement of Presidium (i.e., dilution of power concentration), 14 members to 25 excluding alternates. Secretariat enlarged from 5 to 10. Dominated by Stalin, Malenkov, Krushev. Foreign policy line stated by Malenkov and Stalin, based on Lenin's capitalist imperialism dogma predicting break-up of Western unity. Mention of peaceful coexistence among nations. Krushev credited with revised Party statutes emphasizing "collective leadership," "democratic centralism," "criticism and self-criticism"—all of which indulged in since Beria's purge.

**November 20** . . . Czechoslovak Government announced trial of "Slansky and Co." on charges of Anglo-American-Zionist-Titoist-Imperialist espionage; 11 of the 14 defendants Jewish; Clementis, "Slovak bourgeois nationalist," also indicted.

**January 13, 1953** . . . *Pravda* announced "Doctor's Plot": confessions by nine doctors that they "shortened the lives" of Zhdanov, Scherbakov, 3 Red Army generals. "Joint," Jewish relief agency, directly implicated in charge; trial planned.

**January 13—March 5** . . . Campaign demanding purges, increased vigilance. Army leaders only group not exhorted. Chief alleged victim of "Doctor's Plot" was Zhdanov, Malenkov's ex-arch rival; plot "exposure" also a clear slap at Beria's negligent Security apparatus.

**January 17** . . . Arrest of Lajos Stoeckler, head of Hungarian Jewish community. Accused of being a "Joint" agent.

**March 6** . . . Soviet communique announces Stalin's death, allegedly on March 5. Beginnings of Malenkov build-up.

**March 7** . . . USSR Council of Ministers' unity plea, calling for "defense against all confusion and panics," virtually admitted internal controversies for the first time. Malenkov (already Secretary General of Party) installed as Prime Minister. Beria No. 2 man; Molotov No. 3; Army firmly represented. Presidium decreased from 25 to 10, reversing 19th Congress revision.

**March 9** . . . In funeral speeches Malenkov conciliatory,

Molotov aggressive towards West. In both, Stalinism to live on. Leadership to be collective. Session of Supreme Soviet called for March 14 to legalize State and Party shuffle.

**March 12** . . . Red General Chuikov in West Germany vigorously protested to Western powers on air clashes.

**March 14** . . . Unexpected death of Czechoslovak President Gottwald.

**Mid-March** . . . Communists softened voluntary repatriation stand on Korean war prisoners; truce talks resumed and made progress; internal Soviet campaign on vigilance and "Doctor's Plot" purge unexpectedly ended.

**March 15** . . . Session of Supreme Soviet convened, having been postponed one day. Reorganization and consolidation of ministries approved. Informal acceptance speech, Malenkov launched "peace offensive" saying: "There is no dispute or unresolved question that cannot be settled peacefully. That applies to our relations with all states including the United States of America."

**March 18** . . . General Chuikov conveyed sympathies to British for dead pilot and offered to summon air traffic conference.

**March 21** . . . Week-late announcement that on March 14 Malenkov, "at his own request," was relieved of First Secretaryship CPSU; Krushev (See October 15, 1952) appointed to replace him. Malenkov build-up slackens noticeably.

**March 21** . . . Antonin Zapotocky elected President and Viliam Siroky appointed Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia.

**March 27** . . . Over name of Chairman Voroshilov, Presidium of Supreme Soviet announced amnesty for non-dangerous prisoners. Basic instrumentalities kept entirely intact.

**April 1** . . . Cut in USSR retail prices effective ("voluntary" State loan followed shortly afterwards.)

**April 4** . . . Romanian amnesty announced. Provisions similar to those announced in USSR, March 27.

**April 6** . . . *Pravda* announcement that the arrest of the doctors had been a mistake and that those responsible for this error would be penalized. (Release list included 8 new names and omitted 2 originally implicated). This reversal touched off a



series of minor purges, beginning with State Security Minister Ignatiev and chief MVD investigator Ryumin. Purges ran through provincial Party organizations, where a number of security officials were dropped on charges of being "unduly severe." In each case, Ministry of State Security (Secret police) absorbed into Ministry of Internal Affairs (forced labor camps), with new man appointed to head parent ministry. Evidence of new concern for nationalities. Ryumin accused of attempting to "kindle in the Soviet people . . . a feeling of hostility."

**Mid-April . . .** Stalin's name less in foreground. Emphasis on collective leadership policy. (*Pravda*, April 6, 7, 16; Slepov's article: "Collectivization is the Most Important Principle of the Party.") Also, conciliatory attitude towards West more in evidence. US newspaper publishers allowed to visit USSR. Apologies extended to British for shooting down Lincoln bomber. Negotiations for exchange of sick and wounded prisoners in Korea concluded. This part of Soviet "peace offensive."

**May 3 . . .** Three Czechoslovak amnesties announced.

**May 15 . . .** William Oatis freed by Czechoslovak President Zapotocky.

**May 17 . . .** Elections to Hungarian Parliament.

**May 30 . . .** Czechoslovak Government announced drastic currency reform and abolition of the rationed market. These moves designed to make labor work harder to maintain same living standard. Serious worker strikes and demonstrations resulted, particularly in Pilsen and Ostrava.

**June 9-10 . . .** SED switched the trend in East Germany and ordered a reversal of Sovietization. Agricultural collectivization was halted, work norms lowered. Other important concessions offered. This was partly explained at the time by the Communist desire to bring about a unified, neutral Germany.

**June 12 . . .** Dismissal of Leonid Melnikov, chief of Ukrainian Party, on charges of harsh enforcement of Russification.

**June 13 . . .** Congress of Slovak Communist Party in Bratislava. Emphasis on progress made by Slovakia under the Communist Government.

**June 16-17 . . .** East German workers, spotting regime's show of weakness, demonstrated by uprisings and strikes. Almost complete tie-up of public utilities and transportation. Soviet Army obliged to intervene.

**June . . .** Throughout the month, unconfirmed reports about worker demonstrations in other parts of the

Satellite area. Tobacco workers' strike in Bulgaria admitted.

**June 22 . . .** Quota arrears of Albanian peasants cancelled.

**June 27-28 . . .** Central Committee meeting of Hungarian Workers' Party. Reorganization along Soviet lines. Abolition of post of General Secretary. Matyas Rakosi appointed a member of a three-man Secretariat. Politburo reduced from 14 to 9 members.

**June 28 . . .** Beria absent from performance at Bolshoi Theater, which was attended by top Soviet leaders.

**June 30 . . .** Prague Government issues decree (actually dated June 3) announced fixing severe penalties for labor fluctuation and absenteeism.

**July 2 . . .** Reorganization of Hungarian Government. Rakosi resigns from Premiership. Numerous prominent Jewish leaders replaced by ethnic Hungarians. Emphasis on collective leadership.

**July 4 . . .** New Hungarian Premier, native born non-Jew, Imre Nagy, launched a new policy designed to conciliate masses. Announced that policy of "too rapid industrialization" would be abandoned and that more emphasis would be placed on light industry and agriculture in order to raise the workers' living standard. Promises made to workers, peasants and intelligentsia for better treatment. Peasants told that they could leave cooperatives in the fall if they so desire. Other promises included the abolition of internment camps, more constitutional government and an amnesty for prisoners.

**July 4 . . .** Romanian Government releases food supplies to ease lot of consumer.

**July 4 . . .** Deputy Chairman of the Hungarian Presidium Daniel Nagy made a speech stressing continued plan fulfillment and anti-kulak line.

**July 6 . . .** Revocation of Czechoslovak decree on absenteeism.

**July 10 . . .** Soviet announcement of Beria's purge. Accusations that he was an "imperialist lackey" and tried to take over the Soviet Government.

**July 11 . . .** Follow-up speeches by Hungarian Premier Nagy, and former Premier Rakosi, stating that the proposals of a week before did not mean a national "free for all." This was necessary because the first Nagy speech was used as a springboard for work stoppages and departures from cooperatives. Both men stressed importance of work discipline and need to increase output necessary to effect promised rise in living standard. Workers were praised; Party cadres reassured that demotion of former leaders did not foreshadow a purge.

what the other members of the present Soviet coalition may wish to do to carry on the "peace offensive" they probably cannot, without a decisive struggle, persuade the Red marshals to be content with any real cuts in manpower and material. Being thus forced to continue maintenance of large armed forces and a high level of military-type production, the USSR won't be able to make economic concessions for the betterment of civilian life within her own borders. It follows that the fundamental strategy of Satellite exploitation must continue.

The present Hungarian "investment in moderation" is, then, a temporary tactical shift. But it is a tactical shift "in depth," and on a relatively long-term basis. For if it is true that the Soviet military leaders make a basic retreat from Stalinist orthodoxy impossible, it is also true that resistance on the part of the Satellite peoples makes an immediate and complete return to Stalinist exploitation highly dangerous. The Hungarian example is a particularly impressive case in point, for there the peasants, not just the workers, have begun mass resistance on an unprecedented scale.

## II. GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS

Evidently no amount of peace propaganda or anti-West attacks could reassure the captive peoples of Communist benevolence. Finally enraged by appallingly low living standards, food scarcities, hard, unrewarding work and severe repression, workers in East Germany and Czechoslovakia demonstrated against the Kremlin's satraps, giving vent to the widespread popular hatred boiling under the relatively quiescent surface of Eastern Europe. Occurring at a time of a power struggle in the USSR, these signs of unrest were especially ominous for Moscow. Further, they made it clear that Satellite economies were sinking under their own weight. Seeing that steps had to be taken to allay internal discontent, the Kremlin designated Hungary as the testing ground for a new, milder policy, and gave the signal for press assertions throughout the area that the common man is the Communists' primary concern.

Probably setting the tone for the whole region, Hungarian leaders promised eased-up collectivization and improved living conditions, to be brought about mainly by greater investments in agriculture and light industry at the expense of heavy industry. Political promises included more constitutional government, abolition of prison camps and greater tolerance in religious matters. Although similar proposals on the same scale were not made by any other Satellite regime, minor concessions were granted: the Czechoslovak Government revoked an ordinance fixing harsh penalties for absenteeism and labor fluctuation; the Romanian Government promised to release additional food supplies; and the Albanian regime wrote off peasant debts to the State.

Needless to say, despite these concessions, commentaries on the Berlin riots took the form of anti-West attacks. They were denounced as an imperialist plot to hinder the unification of Germany. Similarly, Satellite reports on Beria's

purge claimed that he had "betrayed the Communist cause to become a mercenary of international imperialism."

Other events behind the Iron Curtain included a Congress of the Slovak Communist Party, Polish celebrations of Sea Day, Bulgarian celebrations in honor of Georgi Dimitrov, and Hungarian celebrations of the anniversary of the Workers' Party. The Czechoslovak press condemned Communists who failed to support the Government after the currency reform was announced, and the Polish Government denounced hostile forces in all strata of society and emphasized the importance of the "class struggle."

### Hungarian Reorganization

Following the example set by the Soviet Union after Stalin's death, Hungary recently abolished the post of Secretary General of the Communist Party, dissolved the Organburo, reduced the size of the Politburo from 14 to 9 members, and introduced large-scale personnel changes within the Government. These events signify a switch to the collective leadership policy first advanced by the USSR, and appear to mark the end of Matyas Rakosi's uncontested control of the country. Accompanied by a simultaneous revision of domestic policy along "softer" lines, the reorganization may be intended to underscore an alleged reversal of the harsh Rakosi program.

Although Rakosi still retains a prominent position in the Party, the former five-man Jewish ruling clique has virtually been destroyed: out of Rakosi's four closest associates, only Erno Gero has kept his former power. Jozsef Revai and Mihaly Farkas suffered serious political setbacks and Zoltan Vas was demoted several months ago. The most notable feature of the reorganization is the emergence of new, relatively unknown Party members to supplant the Rakosi group.

This was first evident in changes announced at a June 27-28 meeting of the Party's Central Committee. The seven-man secretariat was replaced by a three-man secretariat composed of former Secretary General Matyas Rakosi and two young Parliament members, Lajos Acs and Bela Veg, who has hitherto played an insignificant role in the Party's history. The new Politburo line-up includes Matyas Rakosi, Imre Nagy, Erno Gero, Andras Hegedus, Istvan Hidas, Istvan Kristof, Rudolf Foeldvari, Lajos Acs and Mihaly Zsofinyecz. Istvan Bata and Bela Szalai are alternate members. Missing from the Politburo are such Party stalwarts as Jozsef Revai, Mihaly Farkas, Marton Horvath, Sandor Ronai, Istvan Kovacs, Karoly Kiss, Arpad Hazi, Antal Apro, Istvan Szabo and Zoltan Vas.

Following the Central Committee meeting, a radical reorganization of the Government was effected, presumably as a "normal" sequence to the May Parliamentary elections. Premier Matyas Rakosi resigned from his post on July 2, and shortly thereafter Imre Nagy was elected to replace him. Nagy, a trusted friend of Rakosi, was formerly a Deputy Premier and is second in rank after Rakosi in the Party's present Political Committee. Erno Gero, previously economic dictator and named First Deputy Prime Minister last fall, has been elevated to the post of Minister of

Interior. Andras Hegedus, former Minister of State Farms and Forests, was named Second Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture. Other members of the new Government are as follows:

Minister of Foreign Affairs—Janos Boldoczky, former Ambassador to Prague  
 Minister of Defense—General Istvan Bata, formerly Chief of Staff  
 Minister of Finance—Karoly Olt, as before  
 Minister of Justice—Ferenc Erdei, former Minister of Agriculture  
 Minister of Smelting and the Machine Industry—Mihaly Zsofinyecz, as before  
 Minister of Heavy Industry—Istvan Hidas, former Deputy Prime Minister  
 Minister of Light Industry—Arpad Kiss, as before  
 Minister of Commerce—Jozsef Bognar, former Minister of Internal Commerce  
 Minister of Food—Ivan Altomare, as before  
 Minister of Crop Collection—Jozsef Tisza, as before  
 Minister of Construction—Lajos Szijjarto, as before  
 Minister of People's Culture—Jozsef Darvas, former Minister of Public Education  
 Minister of People's Education—Tibor Erdei-Gruz, former Minister of Higher Education  
 Minister of Transportation and Postal Services — Lajos Bebrits, as before  
 Minister of Health—Sandor Zsoldos, as before

Bela Szalai was named Chairman of the National Planning Office, a post previously held by Zoltan Vas. Istvan Dobi, leader of the former Smallholders Party, was re-elected President of the Presidium, and Daniel Nagy, also a member of the former Smallholders Party, was re-elected Vice-President. The second Vice-President is Jozsef Revai, who replaced Istvan Kovacs. Sandor Ronai was re-elected Chairman of the National Assembly, and Arpad Hazi, hitherto a Deputy Premier and Politburo, was elected a member of the 17 man Presidium, as was Antal Apro, former Minister of Building Materials.

## A New Policy

The reorganization of the Party and Government was accompanied by promises of radical changes in domestic policy designed to conciliate the masses. This new, "soft" program, which has the look of a controlled experiment, was at least partially the result of steadily mounting passive resistance within the country at a time when the political and economic implications of widespread hostility to Communism were demonstrated in open rebellions in East Germany. Realizing that their so-called link with the masses was wearing dangerously thin, and that forced industrialization had reached the point of diminishing returns, the Communists introduced these innovations with assertions that the Government's main concern "is for the welfare of the people," and that any neglect of their interests is a basic violation of Socialist principles.

On July 4, in the first of two speeches to Parliament,

Premier Nagy launched the new economic and political policy, promising workers, peasants and the intelligentsia greater consideration and better living conditions. The nation's future economic program would, he declared, be based on a shift of emphasis from heavy industry to light industry and agriculture with the aim of raising the living standard and increasing consumer supplies. As explained by Nagy, this program amounts to a "decrease in the rhythm of our economy." This means, first of all, greater investments in agriculture and light industry, with a corresponding slowdown in collectivization and a lowering of heavy industrial targets. It also entails more aid to independent farmers and retailers and an eventual reduction of prices. One of the most striking concessions to the peasantry is the promise that they can leave cooperatives in the fall if they choose to do so:

"It is well-known that our agricultural production rests to a decisive extent on individual farms, whose produce is not only indispensable to the country, but whose productive development is in the general interest. The Government therefore regards it as its foremost task to help individual farmers and to provide them with means of production. . . . In order to strictly maintain the principle of free choice, the Government will insure that those members of producer cooperatives who want to return to individual farming because they think this might promote their prosperity can leave [them] at the end of the economic year. In addition, the Government will permit the dissolution of those producer cooperatives in which the majority of members want this done."

To increase the food supply, investments will be continued in producer cooperatives and the free leasing and renting of land will be permitted. Other segments of the population were also granted concessions: workers were promised relaxation of norms and a reconsideration of wages; small tradesmen were given permission to engage in private undertakings; and intellectuals, "particularly the old-time intelligentsia," were promised more appreciation of their work.

## Political Concessions

Nagy then announced concessions in the political field. These included assurances of greater tolerance in religious matters and promises to liquidate internment camps and to draft an amnesty for "criminals whose guilt is not grave enough for their release to endanger State security." Furthermore, the Government will regulate the position of deportees and enable them to select homes "in accordance with the rules binding for all citizens." However, in making these promises, the Prime Minister stressed that, despite the regime's "spirit of clemency," not an inch of space nor a minute's respite would be granted enemies of the regime. The Government will allegedly prevent previous abuses of individual freedom, but it will also adopt a harsher policy toward "hostile forces":

"The consolidation of legality is one of the most urgent tasks of the Government. We must make sure that our courts, our police and the local councils are firm pillars of law. They must protect to an increasing extent the



interests of our working people. They must more vigilantly guard State security . . . and fight more energetically against the stubborn enemies of our democratic order, against whom the full severity of the law must be brought to bear."

Nagy also underscored the principles of collective leadership, stating that the Government must rely more on Parliament, "the Supreme Agency for guaranteeing constitutional rights and liberty," and see to it that the Council of Ministers is the responsible organ for directing affairs of state: ". . . Ministers will have a larger sphere of action and more responsibility. This will take us a long way on the road to the democratization of our national life." Nagy said that, in addition, legislation will be introduced to separate the police from the judiciary, so as to "eliminate this heritage of the old regime." The implementation of these measures, he emphasized, would be a severe blow to the enemy:

"Our program marks a new chapter in the construction of Socialism. All our objectives are within the framework of the great cause of peace. . . . It is my conviction that under the leadership of the Hungarian Workers' Party and on the basis of its proposals, we shall advance more securely than ever toward prosperity, the well being of our people, a splendid future, and Socialism."

### Reaction

The psychological reaction to Nagy's speech was apparently more violent than the Government expected and was expressed by immediate work stoppages and departures from cooperatives. It is reported that Hungarian farmers, particularly those in the eastern part of the country, demanded the return of their fields appropriated for collectives and proceeded to enforce their demands with pitchforks and sickles. Furthermore, in some quarters, the fact that it was Nagy rather than Rakosi who introduced the new program was interpreted as a sign of a split between the Party and the Government. This response made it necessary for both Nagy and Rakosi to deliver speeches a week later in which they asserted the unity of Party and Government and carefully explained that the new measures would be introduced slowly and cautiously. Both men made it clear that the new proposals in no way signified that the plan was to be totally and abruptly abandoned, or that hard work was unnecessary. In fact, Rakosi laid particular stress on the importance of increased worker discipline.

In general, the former Prime Minister's address was a confession of past mistakes, an affirmation of Nagy's new program, and a warning to those who interpreted the new policy as an opportunity for a "free for all." Rakosi admitted that the Party leadership had made a serious error in emphasizing heavy industrialization at the expense of the workers' standard of living and said that the gravest mistake had been made in February 1951 by fixing industrial targets of the Five Year Plan too high. In assuring the workers of better treatment in the future, Rakosi pointed out that although the new policy had been intro-

duced by the Government rather than by the Party, as is the custom, the Party's Central Executive approved Nagy's program. This statement was probably required to quench rumors of dissension among the nation's leadership:

"The experience of the last few days shows that it is better to restate clearly on behalf of the Party on this occasion, the tasks to be carried out, because a number of Comrades were not certain whether the proposals submitted to the National Assembly by Comrade Nagy had been worked out on the basis of decisions of the Party's Central Executive."

Rakosi then denounced the "enemy reaction" to Nagy's speech—the "attitude that the plan is no longer in force, that norms need not be observed, that discipline is unnecessary, and that with the elimination of fines every factory worker can do as he pleases." Rakosi emphasized that it is impossible to raise the standard of living if work discipline is not strengthened, production increased and costs cut: "I repeat, one has to declare war on the authors of those hostile maneuvers who want to hamper the execution of these measures . . . by lack of discipline, confusion, excesses in the execution of just measures or by misinterpreting them."

Rakosi said that the plans in progress must be carried out because if they are arbitrarily changed without being "coordinated in the interests of our national economy," confusion will result. In this respect, he warned against the expectation that conditions will improve immediately: ". . . We must beware of nourishing excessive hopes. Every effort must be made conscientiously, and so, the raising of the living standard of our population is bound to take time."

### Warnings

Following the same line as Rakosi, Imre Nagy reasserted the Government's "good intentions," affirmed the solidarity between Party and Government, and promised severe punishment to those who attempted to thwart the State's decisions by acting illegally, pressing demands and misinterpreting the new regulations.

As proof that the Government intends to keep its promises, Nagy said that steps had already been taken on the proposals made a week before. One of these measures was a decree of the Council of Ministers abolishing fines imposed on peasants and producer cooperatives for delivery arrears. According to the decree, those individual farmers and producer cooperatives which comply with their delivery obligations for the current year will have their quota arrears cancelled. Another decree reduced by 10 percent every kind of delivery obligation for cooperatives, and for 1, 2, 3, type producers, with the condition that those who leave the cooperative or group repay the concessions. Nagy also stated that the Council of Ministers had been ordered to submit a draft decree regulating the precise conditions under which peasants could leave cooperatives in October.

After thus reasserting the Government's good will, Nagy stressed that any violations of law will be severely penalized: "He who heeds the voice of the enemy instead of



that of the Party and Government, he who abandons legality and enters the road of lawlessness should not count on the assistance of the Party and Government. This applies to those who, without awaiting October, intend to leave the cooperatives in the middle of the summer and who try to use this right improperly and not at the time stipulated by the Government":

"Furthermore, this applies to those who interpret the extension of rights . . . and concessions as if they now have no obligations to the State either in taxes or the surrender of produce. It applies not in the least to those kulaks who reply to the Government's measures by an anti-democratic and anti-Government attitude, by violations of law and by abusing the working people. Let them not count on mercy. They will feel the full force of the law."

It is clear that the Hungarian regime has effected a temporary and tactical shift in domestic policy without abandoning its permanent economic goals. How the new program will work out in practice remains to be seen, but that it was necessitated by widespread discontent with the appallingly low living standard and shortages of food and other consumer goods is obvious. Threats, attacks against the "class enemy," and severe penalties for lack of work discipline and sabotage failed to crush passive resistance or to bring about vital improvements in the quantity and quality of production. Therefore, the regime had no other choice but to acknowledge its own "mistakes" and to reaffirm its so-called alliance with a working class that is apathetic, demoralized and hostile because of its pitifully impoverished condition. The purpose of the new program is to give the average worker and peasant incentives to raise production. This intent is apparent in all Communist editorials hailing the new policy: the main theme is that a "happy future" can be realized only by greater worker contributions to the economy.

Promises in the political field are less convincing, and it is doubtful that the Government will pursue a policy of leniency despite assurances of an amnesty and the liquidation of internment camps. These concessions, like the ones above, are designed to prove the Government's "deep concern for the people," just as the emphasis on collective leadership and the "democratization of the State" are intended to persuade Hungarians that the days of tyranny are over. However, it is obviously impossible for the Communists to alter the oppressive and dictatorial essence of their rule without running the enormous risk of suffering total defeat.

### Decree Punishing Absenteeism Revoked

Following the changes in Hungary, the Czechoslovak regime also adopted a more conciliatory attitude toward labor. This was indicated by a revocation of a June 30 Government ordinance intended to curb widespread absenteeism and labor fluctuation in industry by fixing severe penalties for both "crimes." The ordinance was made public one month after the currency reform which resulted in a number of worker strikes and rebellions.

According to the ordinance's provisions, announced over Radio Prague, any worker who stayed away from his job one day without justification would be reprimanded by his boss and union leaders; if he was absent a second day, the reprimand would be made publicly before his fellow workers; if he was absent a third day without justifiable excuse, he would be demoted to lower paid work; and if he was absent a fourth day, he would be reported to the public prosecutor (procurator.) In lighter offenses, the procurator could restrict himself to giving the accused a talk. In more serious cases, where the accused was a well-known "shirker and migrator," he would be passed on to the courts and punished either by "corrective measures" or by a prison sentence. The corrective measures were to consist of making the accused work for less pay and without certain benefits given to regular employees.

The ordinance also forbade labor departments of national committees to dismiss workers or to agree to the dissolution of labor contracts without the manager's permission: "Breach of contracts with workers will come exclusively within the power of the factory director or manager of a department . . . [although] the signing of a contract with workers should . . . take place with the consent of the labor department of the national committee." Managers were instructed to restrict fluctuation and to report every arbitrary departure to the procurator.

In the first five days after its promulgation, the ordinance was "hailed" by Government spokesmen and trade union leaders as an "indispensable instrument to protect the interests of honest and conscientious workers." However, on July 7, the Czech Home Service announced that the ordinance had been revoked. According to the broadcast, the Presidium of the Central Trade Union Council (CTUC) had published a resolution stating that worker and employee efforts against absenteeism and labor fluctuation proved that "the working class is capable of introducing firm, voluntary discipline without aid from public prosecutors or other officials. . . . The Government is convinced that the working people will be able to deal with violations of labor discipline and has, therefore, in accordance with the proposal of the CTUC, cancelled the Government ordinance against absenteeism and labor migration."

In connection with this reversal, it is especially significant that Czechoslovak commentaries on the Hungarian changes were the most enthusiastic in the area. While the Polish and Bulgarian press mentioned them briefly in news releases, the Czechoslovak press and radio devoted much space to praise of Hungarian developments. In a July 12 broadcast, Radio Prague queried: "What is the essence of the new provisions of the Hungarian regime?" and gave the following answer:

"Economic reconstruction will proceed in harmony with the economic resources of the State. . . . The Hungarian Government will not exceed its strength and capacity. . . . With these measures, [it] has abandoned its efforts for economic independence and will rely more on the fraternal aid of other countries in the camp of peace, particularly on the heavy industry of the Soviet

(Continued on page 14)

# The Hungarian Politburo

**Matyas Rakosi**, born at Ada, Hungary, in March 1892, is the son of a Chandler and grocery store owner. In 1910 he joined the Communist youth movement, and from 1911 to 1913, lived in Germany and England, studied Marxism and worked with various Communist movements. In World War I, he served in the Austro-Hungarian Army, was captured on the Russian front, and sent to a prisoner of war camp at Tschita. In 1917, he went to Petrograd, where he met Lenin. He took part in the Bolshevik Revolution and was sent to Moscow as a specialist in organizing Party cells. Transferred to Hungary in March 1919, at the outbreak of the first Communist Revolution, he became Deputy People's Commissar for Commerce and Transportation and, later, People's Commissar for Production. At the fall of the Commune on August 1, he and Bela Kun fled to Austria where they were imprisoned. In 1920, he was expelled by the Austrian authorities and went to Russia, where he attended the Second Comintern Congress. Between 1920 and 1924, he toured Italy, Belgium, Great Britain and the US as a Comintern Secretary. Traveling under assumed names, he organized Communist activities in these countries. In 1925, he and Zoltan Vas were ordered by Moscow to return to Hungary and organize the illegal Communist movement. In September, he was arrested and sentenced to eight years in prison. In 1935, before the completion of his prison term, he was again tried and sentenced to life for offenses committed in the 1919 revolution. Moscow intervened in his behalf, and in 1940, he and Zoltan Vas were exchanged for Hungarian relics of the 1848 War of Independence. From 1940 until December 1944, Rakosi lived in Moscow and worked for the Hungarian Section of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. He became a Soviet citizen and married a Russian who held a high Party post. In 1944, he returned to Hungary under Soviet protection, and became Secretary General of the Communist Party. In November 1945, he became Deputy Prime Minister and held this post until August 1952, when he was made Prime Minister. Rakosi, a highly educated politician, with a knowledge of many languages, is considered the guiding light of the Bolshevikization of Hungary.

**Imre Nagy** was born in 1896 into a peasant family of Calvinist persuasion. Serving in the Army in World War I, he was captured by the Russians and taken to the Soviet Union, where he participated in the Bolshevik Revolution. He returned to Hungary in the early 1920's, but fled to the Soviet Union in 1929 in order to avoid being arrested for his Communist activities. Until the end of World War II, he worked for the Soviet Agrarian Institute as an expert on Soviet land reforms. In December 1944, he returned to

Hungary, and ever since has held prominent Government posts. In December 1944, he was appointed Minister of Agriculture, and in November 1945, Minister of Interior, a post which he held until March 23, 1946. In 1947, he was named Speaker of Parliament. Since the establishment of the Hungarian Workers' Party in June 1948, he has been a member of the Central and Political Committees. In May 1950, he was named Minister of Crop Collections and, in 1951, became a member of the Party Secretariat. In November 1952, he was appointed Deputy Prime Minister. As a chief Communist theorist, Nagy has had a decisive influence in the Party and belongs to Rakosi's inner circle.

**Erno Gero**, born in 1898, planned to enter the medical profession but interrupted his studies in 1919 in order to join the Communist Proletariat Dictatorship. In 1920, after the fall of the Bela Kun regime, he continued his Communist work among youth. In 1921, he fled to Czechoslovakia in order to escape arrest and shortly thereafter went to Moscow, where he was employed by the Foreign Policy Section of the Comintern. He studied at the Communist Party Officers' Training School, and in 1930 was sent to France. In 1936, he was appointed advisor to Negrin, President of the Spanish Republic and, after the Civil War, returned to Moscow and worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Towards the end of World War II he worked for the MVD, controlling and supervising Hungarian Communist leaders, and in 1945 returned to Hungary as a colonel in the MVD. In 1945 he was appointed Minister of Commerce, and in June 1948 became a member of the Central and Political Committees of the Hungarian Workers' Party. In February 1949, he became Minister of Transportation, in December 1948, Minister of Finance, and in June 1949 Minister of State. In November 1952, he was made Deputy Prime Minister. He was also President of the National Economic Council. As such, Gero was absolute ruler of the Hungarian economy and initiated the Three Year and Five Year Plans.

**Andras Hegedus** was Minister of State Farms and Forests and a Politburo member under the Rakosi Government. In the Parliamentary elections last May, he was the first candidate for the Gyor-Sopron counties and, after the reshuffling of the Government on June 27, became a Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture.

**Istvan Hidas**, born in Budapest in 1918, is the son of a metallurgical worker. In the 1930's, he was active in the trade unions and, in 1939, joined the Social Democratic Party and became secretary of his local trade union. In



RAKOSI



GERO



KRISTOF



NAGY



HEGEDUS



HIDAS

1943 he joined the Communist Party, and in 1945 was appointed Party Secretary in Budafok. In 1946 he was transferred to Party Headquarters for cadre activities and became managing director of the Hungarian National Steel and Machine Factory. In 1947 he was elected a Parliament member, and between July 1950 and November 1952 was Party Secretary of Greater Budapest. In 1951 he became a member of the Orgburo and an alternate member of the Political Committee. In October 1952 he was a delegate to the 19th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party and, in November, was appointed Deputy Prime Minister.

**Istvan Kristof**, formerly a worker in the leather industry, is a Moscow-trained Communist. Until last spring he was General Secretary of the National Council of Trade Unions. At that time, the President of the National Council was ousted because of his "Socialist background," and Kristof was named President. In the May Parliamentary elections he headed the list of candidates for Nograd County and became a Politburo member after the June 27 reorganization of the Government.

**Rudolf Foeldvari**, formerly an iron worker, is a member of the young Communist generation. For the past year, he has been Secretary of the Budapest Party Committee.

He was given an important assignment this spring, when he was elected a member of the four-man delegation to Stalin's funeral. In the recent elections, he was fourth on the list from the Budapest District and, on June 27, was appointed a member of the new Politburo.

**Lajos Acs** was formerly a member of Rakosi's personal Secretariat and an alternate member of the Party's Central Committee. In the May Parliamentary elections he was second on the list of candidates from Somogy County, and in the Government reorganization became one of the three members of the Party Secretariat.

**Mihaly Zsofinyecz**, born in about 1905, he was a worker in the Hofherr and Schrantz Machine Works, and in 1930 joined the Social Democratic Party. Active in the labor movement, he was elected spokesman for the workers in his plant. Soon after World War II, he resigned from the Social Democratic Party and joined the Communist Party. He was elected President of the Factory Committee at Hofherr's and, after the factory was taken over by the Government, became its director. In 1949 he was appointed Minister of Heavy Industry and, later, Minister of Semi-Heavy Industry and Smelting. In the recent reorganization of the Government, he became Minister of the Machine Industry. He also retained his position in the Politburo.



Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia. All these measures taken by the new Government demonstrate its endeavor to improve the living standard—the primary aim of all countries building Socialism."

### Romanian Concessions

On July 5, the Romanian Communist regime announced new measures intended to improve the lot of the consumer. The official news agency declared that steps would be taken to ease the shortage of bread, flour, vegetables, fat and sugar which has been plaguing the population for the last six months. Grain will be released from state reserves, more bread and flour will be distributed, and sugar will be made available on the free market. It is clear that by raising the food rations, the Government intends to placate a discontented people.

Recent reports on the economic situation within the country testify to the severe scarcity of foodstuffs. It is said that the supply of meat and bread has grown alarmingly small and that butter has virtually disappeared from the market. Furthermore, cooking fat is also sold in very limited quantities and at excessively high prices—the average worker must spend two days' wages to procure one pound. Furthermore, the breakdown in the supply of vegetables to large cities has aggravated the situation, and the prices of principal foodstuffs have increased from two to four times on the free market since the currency reform one year ago. It is doubtful that the additional food supplies will be continued for any extended period of time. Whether the Government will make new concessions to the workers and align its future policy on a pattern similar to that announced by the Hungarian regime remains to be seen.

It is noteworthy, however, that the current theme of Communist propagandists in Romania, as elsewhere in the region, is the Party's primary concern for the people's well-being. On July 8, in an article on bureaucracy, *Scanteia* declared:

"The Romanian regime is constantly preoccupied with the need to raise the living standard of all working men. The force and invincibility of the Romanian State and Party are to be found in their close links with the people. . . . Experience shows that those Party organs and State and economic institutions, which pay attention to the requests and complaints coming from the masses, and which become acquainted with the thoughts of the workers, daily strengthen their links with the masses."

### Albanian Peasant Debts Cancelled

In Albania, also, new concessions were announced. A recent Government decree intended to "improve the living conditions of the patriotic working peasantry," wrote off all accumulated peasant debts from 1949 through 1952, with regard to wheat, barley, rye, oat, corn, bean, rice, pea, meat, wool and egg deliveries to the State. In a June 23 broadcast making this measure public, Radio Tirana declared that the Party is paying utmost attention to the development and progress of agriculture and is moving to-

wards "modernization and mechanization." The Communist commentator also asserted the Party is making great efforts to strengthen the alliance between the working class and the working peasantry:

"The June 22 decision of the Government is another factor which contributes to this. It is great news for the working peasants. It comes at a time when they are waging the important struggle of harvesting, threshing and collections. This decision will inspire the peasantry to fulfill the great struggle as best as possible."

### Berlin Riots

While the recent demonstrations in East Berlin and Czechoslovakia may have inspired a softer program in various parts of the area, commentaries on the East Berlin riots took the inevitable form of attacks against the West. Radio Warsaw, June 20, insisted that the riots were caused by "subversive, Fascist, warmongering organizations" in West Berlin that want to destroy plans for German unification. Harping on this thesis, the commentator interpreted the outcome of the riots as a "defeat of West Berlin Fascists by the Kremlin-led peace forces":

"Yet another provocation failed, petered out before exploding. Agents who wanted to start a riot in East Berlin are now blowing on burned fingers. Disappointed, they ask their sponsors: 'What will happen now?' For they were defeated—beyond any doubt. How did it all happen?

"A chance to unify Germany . . . appeared for the first time in years. [The East German Government] courageously evaluated certain false moves of its own . . . [changed its policy] . . . and proved that it valued above all the unification of Germany.

"Could this be accepted calmly by the gentlemen of 30 subversive organizations acting in West Berlin and paid by those for whom war is a long-dreamed-of business? The Berlin experts should not be paid for doing nothing. . . . In despair, they wrote in the German newspaper *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 14: 'Events are occurring with unbelievable speed. During the last few weeks, none of them had for us Germans more significance than the East German Government's resolutions. These resolutions are very dangerous.'

"Dangerous?

"Of course!

"They are dangerous . . . because they expose [Western] attempts to restore the Wehrmacht and Nazism. In order to prevent this . . . a large-scale provocation was arranged. Minister Kaiser and Adenauer have long been waiting for the great day, X, for the final test which would indicate the chances of a further fight. But it all failed. The criminals were caught by steel hands. They had to drop the loot from their bloody hands. The great day, X, the large-scale provocation failed. It was all for nothing. . . . The healthy forces of the German nation successfully resisted the provocations of American and Nazi agents."

Still trying to conceal the real meaning of the East Berlin riots, Radio Warsaw, June 30, claimed that they had particular significance for the Polish nation, which suffered



most severely under the Nazis: "These are the same criminals who once burned Polish villages. These are the same assassins who tortured Polish prisoners in Nazi concentration camps. Now they are instigating the murder of Socialist leaders of the Unity Party, because they desire friendship with the Polish nation. The Fascist provocation in Berlin shows all nations that the forces which brought about the division of Germany have not given up their plan of using West Germany as a springboard for a new war. . . . These events clearly prove that the alliance between the American and Bonn imperialists, concluded in order to initiate a new war adventure against the Soviet Union, directly menaces our country."

In like manner, Bulgarian Vice-Premier Anton Yugov stated: "The imperialist and Fascist provocation in Berlin disgusted all peace loving nations. . . . These provocations remind us that we must increase our vigilance and intensify our struggle against enemies and spies." And Radio Riga, June 26, commented: "The defeat of the foreign adventurers in Berlin again proves that the German people do not agree with the policy of the warmongers, but aim at peace, democracy, and the unity of their country."

However, worker and peasant rebellions reported throughout the Satellite area since the East Berlin riots are clear proof that the people were not deceived by this propaganda and that "Marxist explanations" are insufficient to allay their discontent.

## Beria

Satellite commentaries on Beria's purge parroted those of Moscow's *Pravda*. The Polish newspaper, *Zycie Warszawy* (Warsaw), July 12, declared: "We must be well aware of the fact that Beria's criminal machinations were directed at hindering peace. His criminal and diversionist activity did not reflect any internal [conflict], but was connected with a dangerous anti-peace plot, which included the Berlin and Syngman Rhee provocations."

*Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), July 11, declared:

"In the last 50 years, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has had a fine record of unshakable ideological strength and unity. . . . An instance of this is now provided by the unmasking of Beria, which is a powerful blow dealt at the reactionary forces of imperialism. Beria's elimination has taken place at a time when the moral and material strength of the Soviet Union and the peace camp is growing. At the same time, the crisis within the capitalist system is becoming deeper and the brazen policy of American imperialism is further accentuated. . . . Furtherance of Beria's criminal activities is part of the general intensification of the diversionary activities of the imperialist reactionary forces. . . . From this case we must draw . . . a political lesson. We should strengthen in our Party the Leninist principle of collective leadership in all positions of Party and public work. No official, no Party worker, irrespective of his position, must place himself over the Party and People's Government. . . ."

Comparing Beria to Bukharin, Kamenev and Tukha-

chevsky, Radio Warsaw, July 12, asserted that the Soviet Government is far more courageous than the governments of capitalist countries, because it exposes traitors regardless of the importance of their position. The commentator also claimed that it is "understandable that the Western press is offended by Beria's arrest, because Beria was their spy":

"It is understandable that when an imperialist agent and renegade is caught, an agent who became an instrument of imperialism, his colleagues and protectors start a big noise. This is required by the natural spirit of solidarity. But they also make a big noise because the blow aimed at them was exact and painful, because it caused a damage which cannot be easily repaired."

In an editorial on July 12, *Scanteia* (Bucharest), wrote:

"Beria aimed at grabbing power; he tried to put the Ministry of Internal Affairs above the Party and Government, to use the organs of the Ministry against the Party and its leadership and against the Soviet Government. Beria promoted the employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs on the basis of their devotion to himself. Under various fabricated pretexts, he impeded the settlement of extremely important agricultural problems and aimed at undermining collective farming and creating difficulties in food supplies. . . . At the same time, by various perfidious methods, Beria tried to weaken the friendship existing among the Soviet people . . . to sow discord among the people, and activate bourgeois nationalist elements within the USSR. . . . The facts show that Beria lost the face of a Communist, turning into a political bourgeois renegade, becoming, in point of fact, a mercenary of international imperialism."

## Slovak Party Congress

Postwar Congresses of the Slovak Communist Party seem predestined to be held in times of a Party or nation-wide crisis. Even at the first meeting of Slovak Communists after the liberation, in 1945, an ideological split between the so-called pure Marxist-Leninist faction of Viliam Siroky and the "bourgeois nationalist group" represented by Vlado Clementis, Gustav Husak and Laco Novomesky was evident. At that time Siroky was in an advantageous position. A relatively uneducated worker of humble origin and with no Western connections, he appeared to be more trustworthy than Clementis, an intelligent lawyer who in 1939 had expressed an independence of mind in condemning both the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact and the Soviet invasion of Finland. Furthermore, Clementis' associates, Husak and Novomesky, were tainted by their relationship with members of the totalitarian pro-Hitler regime of World War II, and also by their cooperation with the bourgeois wing of the anti-Nazi underground resistance. The 1945 Conference ended in a compromise in which Siroky came out on top and was elected Chairman.

The next Slovak Congress was slated for April 1950, but at that time the first big purge of the Party was in full swing and the Conference was postponed until May 24. Three months before, in February, Ladislav Kopriva had condemned, among other things, the existence of "bour-

geois nationalism" in Party ranks. On March 14, Clementis was forced to resign as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and on May 5, Husak and Novomesky were demoted from their posts on the Board of Commissioners. The Congress, which ended on May 27, confirmed the complete victory of the Cominform adherents led by Siroky.

Following these initial purges were the great purges of 1951 and 1952 which culminated in the Slansky trial. Among the eleven defendants sentenced to death, Clementis was the only Slovak, although Husak and Novomesky were mentioned as other "bourgeois nationalists," and it was expected that they would soon be brought to trial. So far, this has not occurred.

On March 28, 1952, the Central Committee of the Slovak Communist Party announced that the Tenth Congress would convene on May 30. However, Czechoslovakia's economic plight was critical, and the regime proclaimed a currency reform and reorganized the supply system on that date. Since the entire political and economic equilibrium of the country was upset by these measures, the Congress was postponed until June 13. The secrecy which surrounded the reform made it impossible to announce this delay beforehand, and it was only on June 12 that Radio Prague informed the public that the Conference would take place on the following day.

Minister of Forests and the Timber Industry, Julius Duris, opened the Bratislava session. The Czechoslovak Communist Party's Central Committee was represented by Deputy Prime Minister Antonin Novotny and ideologist Bruno Koehler. On June 15, the last day of the Congress, President Zapotocky put in a personal appearance, making his first visit to Slovakia as Head of State.

### Siroky Speaks

The June 14 issue of *Pravda* (Bratislava) published Prime Minister Viliam Siroky's report on the Slovak Party's activities since 1950. Chairman Siroky praised the Soviet peace policy with its "Stalinist thesis of 'the peaceful co-existence of the Socialist and capitalist economic systems'" and declared that "in defiance of US militarist groups, there is a growing desire among capitalist nations for a peaceful solution of international problems." Siroky then enlarged upon Slovak "economic successes" under Communism, and claimed that heavy industrial production was seven times higher than that of prewar years. In the cultural field, he said, the number of Slovak university students had increased fourfold since prewar days and the recent founding of the Slovak Academy of Sciences had been a great event in Slovak history. These statements were followed by the usual eulogies of the USSR and expressions of gratitude for Soviet economic aid.

Dealing with the recent reform, Siroky warned the Congress against the folly of believing that the new currency and the abolition of rationing automatically guarantee success: "We must fight for maximum economy and productivity in everything and all the time. . . . Now that the currency reform has been achieved, every Party branch, every

Communist, every adherent of Socialism faces the task of defending the new Czechoslovak *koruna*."

There was also a strong note of criticism in Siroky's address:

"Our successes could, however, have been more striking still, had we carried out the tasks of the Gottwald Five Year Plan more efficiently and at a more even rate, and had the Slovak organization of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia proved, as a whole, more effective in fighting against production shortcomings and for the application of new production methods. . . . The worst damage [caused by the Slansky gang] was in the field of investment. [This produced] a serious lack of balance in our national economy."


Siroky's harshest criticism was reserved for the backwardness in basic industries, such as coal and iron. He also complained that the building and transport industry had not fulfilled the plan in many sectors and that Party officials were guilty of irresponsibility, irresolution and lack of State discipline. Siroky admitted that all these shortcomings had led to the currency reform and that, now, a fundamental change must take place in all factories.

Touching upon ideological matters, Siroky examined how the entire Party had stood the "very serious test . . . of the currency reform and the abolition of rationing." After paying tribute to the "overwhelming majority which had successfully fought for the implementation and application of the needed measures," he stressed that others had badly failed the Party and Government: "There are even organizations and members, particularly in the Zilina and Kosice regions, who have not only failed to understand the policies and decisions of the Central Committee, but who have even fallen under the influence of reactionary, hostile propaganda. . . . According to our statute, there is no room for people like that in our Party."

Fifty delegates took part in the so-called discussion following Siroky's speech. Numerous references were made to "enemies at home and abroad," and to the "barking of Voice of America, BBC, Radio Free Europe and the Titoites." Zapotocky was then received with ceremony and, in his address, expatiated on the "great victories of the Korean and Chinese peoples, the Government crisis in France," and the results of the Italian elections. Zapotocky also admitted that the reform had revealed the weaknesses in Party mass political work, particularly the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement and the Youth Movement.

The concluding speech was made by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Security, Karol Bacilek, who warned the Congress of the dangers surrounding the nation:

"The reactionaries, who are losing ground because of our successes, are rallying even closer round the enemy . . . around the international reaction. They are trying to find a way out by linking up with hostile forces beyond the frontiers of our State. Inside the country, acting in accordance with directions of the US espionage service, they apply methods of espionage and sabotage, and organize terrorist gangs and individual acts of terrorism."



Стојници трудејќи се од Столицата и страната се покланат пред споменикот на Георги Димитров

Слика М. Николов

"Hundreds of workers from the capital and the provinces pay tribute to Georgi Dimitrov's memory."

*Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), July 1, 1953.

The Congress adopted Siroky's report as a binding directive for Party work. It also elected a new 61 member Central Committee in which 26 members of the preceding committee have been eliminated. Most of them have been purged, but a few have been promoted to higher posts. Eighteen alternate members of the Central Committee were also elected. After the close of the session, the new Central Committee elected a 13-member Presidium and five Central Committee secretaries. There are five new members of the Presidium (four old members were purged or promoted, and the case of the fifth, Minister of Justice Stefan Rais, is not clear. He has not been given a higher Party function, although he is still a Cabinet member). The Central Committee also elected an 11-member Control Commission. It is clear that the Congress could find no panacea for the many diseases infecting not only Communist-dominated Czechoslovakia, but the entire area behind the Iron Curtain.

### Response to the Reform

The failure of many Czechoslovak Communists to cooperate with the Government during the period immediately following the monetary reform clearly reflected the extent of antagonism to the regime. Recent editorials in the Czechoslovak Communist press indicate that a new purge

of the Party may be in the offing, although in view of the recent concessions to the people in Hungary, Romania and East Germany, these denunciations may possibly be intended as mere threats. Two typical rebukes appeared in the June 5 and June 19 issues of *Rude Pravo*. In the earlier commentary on the monetary reform, the newspaper wrote:

"Some Communists have failed their test. They have proved that they are not Communists, but proprietors, who think only of their own interests instead of the interests of the workers and the State. Some of them . . . have forgotten their primary task—the maintenance of State discipline, so frequently stressed by Comrade Gottwald. Such Communists . . . are in the same ranks as the remnants of the bourgeoisie."

Similarly, the second editorial declared that the true worth of a Communist is proved in times of crisis. Using the currency reform as an example, the newspaper wrote:

"In some places, there were Communists who were against the reform and who went over to the anti-State position of the reaction. While many non-partisans immediately understood that they, too, had to make certain sacrifices . . . these so-called Communists revealed themselves as egotistic profiteers, as hidden enemies of the Party who only tried to disguise themselves by getting Party cards. However, after the great test, it is necessary



to clear away refuse. We must disclose and eliminate from our ranks, all profiteers and enemies who have now shown their true faces, for only this will strengthen and fortify the Party."

### Baptist Trial

Between June 26-27, four leading functionaries of the Czechoslovak Baptist Church were tried in the Pardubice Regional Court on charges of espionage and high treason. The defendants were Jindrich Prochazka, former director of the Baptist College in Prague, Jan Ricar, Chairman of the Brotherly Union of Baptists in Czechoslovakia, Cyril Burget, Secretary of the Baptist Church, and Michal Kejsar, Chairman of the Brotherly Union of Baptists in Slovakia. According to the indictment, the accused had carried out subversive activities since 1945 under the direction of the World Baptist Union and the US. *Rude Pravo* (Prague), June 30 declared that all the defendants had admitted their guilt when "confronted with the overwhelming documentary evidence against them." One of the admissions was that the Czechoslovak Church had received \$40,000 since 1945 from the American Baptist Organization. Prochazka was sentenced to 12 years, Ricar to 18 years, Burget to 7 years and Kejsar to 5 years "deprivation of liberty." In its commentary on the trial, *Rude Pravo* wrote:

"Prochazka spent the war years in the US, where he was in constant touch with leading functionaries of the World Baptist Union. . . . Toward the end of the war, he was promised extensive material support and received instructions for his activities in Czechoslovakia: to create a spy network which would provide the American center with information on political, economic and military matters. His task was made even clearer when Dr. Bell, President of the Union, visited Prague in 1946 and explained that all information was to be passed on to the US Government for use in its policy of pressure and discrimination. Prochazka's best collaborator was Jan Ricar, who concentrated on gathering information on the new Ostrava. He was in close contact with Marie Selodjov, a white Russian agent who, under the guise of leading a Baptist orphanage in Bernolakov, Slovakia, conducted espionage."

### Lodz Conference

At the Eighth Plenum of the Polish Communist Party on March 28, Prime Minister Bierut cited numerous cases of lack of vigilance and berated the Party's tolerance of anti-Communist elements. (See May, 1953 issue, p. 11). At the subsequent regional Party Conferences, attended by prominent members of the Politburo, emphasis was placed on the need to reactivate the Party and to eliminate weaknesses, particularly with respect to agriculture and industry. Although the Conferences did not deal openly with signs of passive resistance, many of the reports stressed the importance of eliminating hostile forces which had penetrated all sectors of national life. The Conference in Lodz, the largest industrial center in Poland, paid particular attention to the prevailing indifference to the "class struggle."

In a report on the meeting, *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), June 9, complained that many weaknesses were due to "the narrow approach to present-day phenomena, and, in particular, to problems of the class struggle." Central Committee member, Roman Zambrowski, pointed out that failure to fight hostile classes will result in their growth. According to Zambrowski, these classes are to be found among all strata of the population:

"There is a large class of hostile kulaks. The class of urban bourgeoisie has been defeated but there are still many remnants of this class. In the countryside, the smallholder class is still dominant, with its 'property' psychology and morality. . . . There is a considerably large group of new, inexperienced workers who left their villages only recently and who are burdened with the old psychology. Remnants of the old psychology are strong and tend to multiply if not opposed."

The Conference also revealed that the former Socialist Party and National Democratic Party, which were the two most popular parties in Lodz before the war, still retain their influence:

"We must constantly bear in mind not only our own revolutionary traditions, but also the [traditions] of the WRN [Socialist Party] and the clerical reactionaries. Lodz is the city in which for many years [Socialists] Kwapiński, Szczerkowski, Chodyński and Wachowicz were politically active, trying to demoralize the working class . . . where Endecja [National Democratic Party] Chadeja [Christian Democratic Party], NPR [National Workers Party] carried on their reactionary work. . . . We must remember this, and constantly [struggle] . . . against the penetration of hostile ideology into the working masses and even into certain weaker Party organizations. . . ."

Other attacks were launched against the influence of Catholicism on women and against hostile elements among youth. The Conference said that neglect of the living conditions of young workers housed in special homes had permitted the enemy to build its nests among industrial youth. In general, the Lodz Conference gave abundant evidence of passive resistance to the regime, and the negative attitude towards Communist ideology.

### Polish National Councils

Polish provincial national councils held meetings in the latter part of May and the beginning of June for the purpose of discussing local budgets, fulfillment of economic plans and forthcoming elections. The sessions, attended by members of the State Council, the Government, Parliament deputies and a number of Party activists, dealt mainly with the problem of mobilizing the masses for carrying out State policy. The same theme was highlighted in a June 9 editorial in *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), which said that the forthcoming elections to the Councils will "contribute to the unity of our nation . . . in its struggle for peace and the Six Year Plan. It will permit the inclusion of new, broad masses of working people into the system of State administration, bind the national councils more closely to the working people, and raise their prestige among the masses."



That the prestige of the councils is not all that it should be was revealed by the Presidium Chairman of the Lodz Municipal National Council who said that the electoral campaign must be used for an intensified fight against bureaucracy and inactivity. "It is necessary for every national council member, and, in particular, every Party member, to improve his style of work."

Shortcomings in the councils' work have been the target of numerous criticisms in the regime press. On June 10, *Trybuna Ludu* denounced the complacency and idleness typical of many councils:

"An especially clear example of this is the recent case of Zyrardow [District]. . . . In the Municipal Committee . . . and later, in the National Council, an atmosphere alien to the spirit of our Party developed: an atmosphere of idleness, complacency, conceit and suppression of criticism. . . . The provincial executive committee was [informed of the matter] and when it looked into the situation carefully, it had to rid the Council and the Committee of demoralized persons."

On June 23, *Trybuna Ludu* rebuked national councils for failing to make preparations for the harvest, ignoring the condition of machinery and failing to check up on work plans. The rivalry between national councils and Party organs is another source of complaints. On June 14, *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), claimed that Party organizations often simply take over the functions of the councils instead of giving them political direction:

"For instance . . . the Pultusk Municipal Party Committee simply acted for Council presidium in the matter of housing economy, adopting decisions contrary to those of the council. . . . Frequently, Party organizations tolerate council chairmen who support kulaks, who are demoralized, and who ruin the regime's prestige. . . ."

The constantly increasing number of complaints about the Councils gives some indication of their failings. The Warsaw bi-weekly, *Rada Narodowa*, June 1, said that the number of complaints in 1952 increased twofold in comparison with the number in 1951. "In some districts, this increase is even greater. . . . In Warsaw District, 1,444 complaints were submitted in 1951; in 1952, the number increased to 5,185. In Olsztyn District, 1,802 complaints were submitted in 1951; in 1952, there were 4,809 complaints." The same newspaper complained that national council members show no interest in their organization's activities:

"The January 30, 1953 session of the Stalingrad [Katowice] District National Committee was the best illustration of this. During the second half of the session, not even one Presidium member was present, and in the end, the number of those present was below 50 percent."

The newspaper stated that one of the main reasons for this lack of interest was the overloading of the agenda and the poor selection of problems to be debated. "In a one-day session on April 27, three main items were put on the agenda: commerce, small industry and work plans. . . . The result of this was that the members present did [not

have time] to discuss the last two problems. [An attempt to debate] the second problem revealed that the councillors had no interest in the matter."

The newspaper cited another case in which the National Council of Poznan had held a meeting dealing with a report on fulfillment of a certain decree. The report was 53 typewritten pages, and the reading lasted almost eight hours. "The report was overburdened with details, so that the principal problems were lost sight of."

Furthermore, *Rada Narodowa* claims, the composition of the Councils is unsatisfactory, with a preponderance of white collar workers instead of factory workers and peasants:

"For instance, there were 86 white collar workers and only 29 workers on the Lodz Municipal National Council [total membership 119]. In January of this year, one half of the members on the Warsaw Municipal National Council were white collar workers, while in Lodz, peasants were represented by 18 percent, workers by 16 percent, and white collar workers by 57 percent of the membership."

In the forthcoming elections to the Councils it is possible that efforts will be made to alter the unsatisfactory composition of these bodies. Also, attempts will undoubtedly be made to improve the "caliber" of members. From the article in *Rada Narodowa*, it appears that in the Province of Rzeszow, 3 Presidium members of the District National Councils, 400 Presidium Chairmen, 23 Vice-Chairmen, 23 secretaries, and 36 members of the Presidium of Rural District National Councils, and 118 Commune heads, had to be recalled.

The above quotations reveal that the national councils have been unable to cope with their tasks, and that their administration is bogged down by inefficiency.

## Polish Sea Day

On June 28, the Polish Government celebrated Sea Day, as well as Navy Day and Dockyards Workers' Day. The main speakers of the occasion were Prime Minister Bierut, Minister of the Machine Industry Julian Tokarski, and General Jozef Turski, Chairman of the Central Committee of the League of Soldiers' Friends. In his address on the eve of Sea Day, Turski said that the age-old maritime ambitions of the Polish nation had now been realized under the Communist regime and that for the first time in her history Poland was building her own deep-sea vessels. According to Turski, yearly production amounts to about several dozen sea-going vessels and fishing boats, and the Merchant Marine is three times larger than it was before the war. In lauding these accomplishments, Turski paid tribute to Soviet aid, particularly in reconstruction and in the principles of maritime economy.

Bierut and Tokarski also stressed Polish accomplishments in ship building. Speaking at a Dockyards Workers' celebration, Tokarski said that the capital invested in the shipbuilding industry during the past eight years amounted to 630 million zlotys (\$157,000,000). According to *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), June 27, Tokarski also said that the num-

ber of people employed in the industry had increased rapidly and now totalled several tens of thousands, with a large percentage of engineers and technicians: "Over 300,000 square meters have so far either been reconstructed or built for production purposes. . . . As a result of our great efforts, we now have several dockyards which produce new ships. We have dockyards for repairs and plants which produce steering machines, lifts, ovens, electrical equipment, etc., indispensable for shipbuilding. The number of newly built ships increases yearly. . . ."

Tokarski admitted, however, there were certain shortcomings. The 1952 State plans were not fulfilled, and this year, although fulfillment has been better, certain dockyards, such as that in Szczecin, failed to fulfill the half-year plan. Tokarski also revealed that a new tramp steamer with a tonnage of 5,000 was being built: "Its construction is new and differs from the old type [4,800 tons] because it is welded. Plans and production schedules have been prepared for tramp steamers weighing 10,000 tons."

At the end of his speech, Tokarski emphasized the importance of the ship building industry for the nation, and the advantages it brings to the people employed in it. From his statement it appears that employees are lured with promises of privileges and better living conditions:

"The Party and the Government are greatly concerned with the well-being of the industry and the people—dockyard workers—employed in it. This concern was expressed in the Dockyard Workers' card . . . [which] gives ship industry employees several privileges: the right to State awards and a special premium for good work. It also regulates the system of training new cadres and guarantees employees the best living conditions. As an expression of the special appreciation. . . . [we have] for workers, engineers and technicians in the industry, the Dockworkers' Card has established the last Sunday of June as Dockyard Workers' Day."

Prime Minister Bierut and Marshal Rokossowski attended the Sea Day celebrations in Gdynia. *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), June 29, recorded Bierut's speech, as follows:

"The eight years that have passed since the liberation of the Polish coastline by the heroic Soviet Army have seemed short, but they are very significant. The Polish Merchant Marine has trebled its tonnage since the pre-war period. Thanks to our Soviet friends, we have learned to build various types of ships: our harbors employ nearly 26,000 workers, many of whom have acquired high professional qualifications. Some 15,000 more are employed in navigation and fishing."

Bierut devoted a major part of his speech to the international situation. Lauding the "Soviet peace offensive," he declared that the Polish nation recognizes the possibility of peaceful coexistence and cooperation among nations with different social systems. He pointed out, however, that bearing these principles in mind, every hostile act, every "attempt to transgress existing international agreements, and every warmongering act which would lead to increased international tension," must be sharply condemned. Bierut claimed that events in Korea and Berlin were a warning to

the working masses of the world to increase their vigilance against the "plots of provocateurs and diversionists, against the criminal activities of Adenauer's Fascist cliques, now trying to oppose the peace policy of European nations. . . . In reply to recent events, we will strengthen the ranks of the National Front, repel all enemy attempts with greater force, and increase our efforts for peace and the development of our motherland."

It should be added that special celebrations were held in all dockyards, harbors, and fishing villages. The best workers were awarded State decorations, and in Gdansk and Gdynia, there were exhibitions illustrating the achievements in Polish harbor economy. On the entrance gate of the Gdansk Dockyard, the following inscription appeared: "To Be A Dockyard Worker Means to Fight for Peace and the Development of the Motherland." The celebrations ended with a parade of the Navy, the Merchant Marine and ship industry employees as well as a review of the fleet.

### Dimitrov's Anniversary

On July 2, the Bulgarian regime celebrated the fourth anniversary of the death of Georgi Dimitrov, first Communist Prime Minister and founder of the so-called Bulgarian People's Republic. Memorial meetings were held in various parts of the country to commemorate the life and work of this late "Socialist fighter." At a special ceremony in Sofia, Vice-Premier Anton Yugov spoke on Dimitrov's "great accomplishments" and on the current international situation. The following excerpt from his speech, broadcast over Radio Sofia, July 2, is typical of the undiluted praise accorded dead Communist heroes:

"He was the ardent inspirer and standard-bearer of brotherly friendship between our people and the Soviet people. He taught us that we must love the country of Lenin and Stalin. From the time the Soviet State was established, he struggled continuously for the mobilization of the working class to defend the first Socialist country against imperialist attempts to crush it. . . . Georgi Dimitrov bequeathed us the principles of staying firmly in the camp of peace, democracy and Socialism headed by the Soviet Union, and of fighting the imperialist instigators for a new war."

Yugov used this opportunity to laud the "Soviet peace policy," and to denounce the West for its alleged rejection of peace. According to Yugov, the Americans want to turn West Germany, France, Italy, Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia into war bases for attacks against the Soviet Union and the "People's Democracies":

"Georgi Dimitrov asked us to protect our freedom and independence . . . and to strengthen our democratic state, to be active fighters for the fulfillment of economic plans and to intensify the economic and defense power of the country. . . . Georgi Dimitrov taught us to be vigilant. We must not forget the imperialist remnants in our country, which the imperialists would like to use against our government and the interests of our workers. We must not forget the imperialist hatred for democratic Bulgaria. . . ."

### Hungarian Workers' Party Anniversary

On June 14, the Hungarian Workers' Party celebrated its fifth anniversary. The occasion was used to launch bitter attacks against the Social Democrats who have been a constant target of regime abuse in the past year. A *Szabad Nep* editorial on June 14, denounced the "traitorous Social Democrats for attempting to destroy worker unity and the development of Communism on orders from the imperialists." The newspaper also referred to the continual purges of Social Democrats which began even prior to their merger with the Communists in June 1948. The major purge took place in February 1948, when Communists who had infiltrated the organization eliminated all members opposed to a merger. According to *Szabad Nep*, the Party continued its struggle against "these opportunists" after the merger and succeeded in consolidating and preserving the vanguard character of the Party. The newspaper warned, however, that the Party has not yet completely crushed "shady rightist Social Democrats":

"Whenever we must fight against backwardness in certain sectors of the working class, and whenever we wage a struggle for labor and wage discipline, whenever labor competition becomes a mere formality or we meet with demagogy or hostile and harmful activities in our plants, we are confronted not only with bourgeois vestiges in general but with a definite Social Democratic ideology."

### Student "Aid"

According to a May 21 resolution of the Hungarian Council of Ministers, trade school students will now be given free maintenance, and the level of education for both teachers and pupils will be raised. This measure is an obvious attempt to gain greater control over urban youth for the purpose of thoroughly indoctrinating them in Communist principles. In June, 1952, the regime admitted that young men over 20 had shown great reluctance to join the Communist Youth Organization. Apparently all subsequent efforts to win over Hungarian youth have been unsuccessful, and the Government has decided to concentrate on industrial youth and assume a more direct role in their lives.

In an editorial on this measure, *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), June 12, stressed that this maintenance is not a simple scholarship: it means that the state is taking over parents' responsibility for providing trade school students with clothes, uniforms, transportation expenses and "cultural needs." "Those who live in [student] homes get free food and board, and those who live with their parents get free lunches. Every student will be given books and other necessary school equipment. Those who show merit will enjoy free vacations." In addition, the students will receive pocket money, depending on their status and the quality of their work. The new system will first be applied to students in the first grade of vocational schools and will later be extended to cover all trade school students. According to *Szabad Nep* there are 24,000 industrial trainees now living in student homes, which means an increase of 4,400 over last year. All of these trainees are allegedly delighted that the Government has become their parents: "Workers hearts beat faster when they watch the neatly disciplined rows of the uniformed trade school students marching at meetings and demonstrations. By now, films have been made of their lives, and songs and poems sing their praise."

In elaborating on the resolution, *Szabad Nep* stated that teachers in industrial schools had shown insufficient improvement in their political, technical and pedagogical knowledge, and that very few of them have college educations. Also, the training of shop supervisors, teachers, tutors, managers and staff members is insufficient. Because of these shortcomings, all principals, assistant principals and teachers in vocational schools must get a college degree by the end of 1957. Shop supervisors in charge of the technical training of students must complete by 1959, a four-year course for masterworkmen arranged by the Manpower Reserve Bureau. Furthermore, 90 percent of trainees in the iron industry must receive training in trade schools:

"Our state makes serious sacrifices for the benefit of industrial trainees. . . . In return for this, our Party and Government only expect trade school students to study industriously and prepare themselves by intense discipline for the huge tasks of the future."



# West Wind Over Prague

"Czechs and Slovaks: Hear the message which comes to you today from the Free World:

*The Soviet Union is growing weaker — the people of the captive countries are growing stronger. . . ."*

On the night of July 13, and for four days following, thousands of balloons bearing printed messages of hope to the Czechoslovak people were launched on the German-Czechoslovak border in a project sponsored by the Crusade for Freedom. Borne by strong winds blowing from the west, the balloons reached as far as Central Slovakia, with Ostrava, Prague, Pilsen and Most as primary targets. Two types of balloons were used: a rubber sphere which bursts at high altitude, scattering its cargo over a wide area, and a plastic balloon which descends on the target. They carried twelve million messages—one for every person in the country—consisting of an illustrated leaflet describing

the recent demonstration in East Germany and the fall of former Soviet Police Chief Lavrenti Beria; a likeness of the one-crown [koruna] note issued during the recent currency reform, with an inscription; and an aluminum coin stamped with the Freedom Bell (see cuts and texts on facing page.) On the final night of operations, 80 plastic balloons with candle lanterns attached were launched in procession. Since the night was exceptionally clear, the "torchlight parade" could easily be observed from a great distance.

As soon as the first balloons had landed, Radio Free Europe was on the air explaining to the Czechoslovak

*(Continued on page 24)*



"All Czechs and Slovaks for freedom—



all the free world for the Czechs and Slovaks."

#### Text of message on side of crown shown

Men call this the hunger crown—gift of the Soviet Union. It is the symbol of regime desperation, of Five-Year failure; it is a challenge to fight, to meet weakness with strength, to resist as you know best.

The other captive peoples are uniting and will join you in your struggle.


The free world is with you. All power to the people.

#### VZPOURA VE VÝCHODNÍM NĚMECKU

Odt 16. srpna, kdy východoněmečtí dělníci povstali proti německé koutkové vládě, celá Sovětská úspornost Německo se octlo ve varu. Společně s červenými koutkami v Československu bylo spouštěno povstání vůči této, užasně slabé komunistické režimě a vše lidu v roztomilý odpor proti tyrani.



Vlevo: Berlínská demonstrace štábu svobodné války — celá ke svobodě. — Vpravo: Sovětská vlajka, strážná a Bratřinská vlajka, sloužila v plamenech.



Vlevo: Znamení povstání — komunistické plakáty — byly strženy a stínky a komunistickým úředníkům upřeny. Vpravo: Křivost, kde stávala dálná demonstrace 16. srpna ráno začala, se stala revolucí bojovním na něm padla bajka o lidovosti komunistických režimů.

#### HLADOVÁ KORUNA — DAR SOVĚTSKÉHO SVAZU

Je to důkaz vládní bezradnosti a bankrotu pětiletky, památka na to, oč Vás vláda okradla.

Je to výzva k boji, povel, abyste proti slabosti režimu postavili sílu lidu a kladli odpor jak nejlépe můžete. Lid ostatních zemí, zotročených Sovětským svazem, se sjednocuje a připojí se k Vám ve Vašem zápase. Svobodný svět je s Vámi. Věčná moc náleží lidu!

#### Text of message reverse side of crown

Czechoslovaks, know this:

Power lies with the people and the people stand opposed.

With unity and courage, organize your strength:

Down with the collective! Insist on workers' rights!

Today demand concessions; tomorrow—freedom!

#### Text on reverse side of leaflet:

Czechs and Slovaks: Hear the message which comes to you today from the Free World: The Soviet Union is growing weaker. The peoples of the captive countries are growing stronger.

The Soviet Union is growing weaker. The struggle for Stalin's heritage shakes the entire Soviet empire, and fear has crept into the Kremlin. Who will fall with Beria and who will fall after Beria? How many millions will fall victims to the new purge which is now to begin—the biggest purge which the Soviet Union has ever known?

How many victims will fall in the Soviet Union and how many in the occupied countries? Who will fall with Beria in Prague and who will be dragged down by his fall in Bratislava? Who will be the new Slansky and who the new Clementis? And when the purge spreads and broadens, down from the Politbureau to the lands and districts, to the offices and the factories—how many functionaries will safely survive?

Only those will survive who will detach themselves from the sinking Communist boat in time. Only those who join the people and help in the struggle against the oppressors.

At any rate the Soviets are in a blind alley. If the Moscow boot is to weigh even heavier on the necks of the oppressed people and if Moscow's demands upon the frightened puppet governments of the captive countries become more pressing, the resistance of the people will only grow—for the people will not return to submission. If the Communist regimes, in order to appease the wrath of the people, try to bribe their subjects by promising concessions as we have seen in Hungary and in East Germany, they will get nowhere: for the people will not be deceived any longer by token concessions.

The people are growing stronger. The first flames of revolt

flared up in Czechoslovakia and in East Germany. From Pilsen, from Moravská Ostrava, from Oslavany, from Berlin, Dresden and Magdeburg the echo of this revolt roared throughout the world and deeply shook the entire Soviet realm: the people showed their strength.

The Communist regimes recognized the danger and became afraid. They started apologizing, they started self-criticizing, they started giving promises. In Germany the anti-labor decrees had to be revoked. In Czechoslovakia the frightened government was forced to desist from applying the penal laws concerning absenteeism. In Moscow, under the influence of the news of the people's revolt in Czechoslovakia and Germany, the internal struggle became sharper. Beria and his all-powerful police fell as victims. Your revolt helped to alter the course of history: new forces made their appearance on the battlefield, the people won its first major victory in its fight against the regime.

The more your oppressors are shaken by uncertainty, the greater is the certainty of your victory. The regime is afraid of you, it knows that the power is fundamentally on your side. This is the time when people's unity, a common agreement and a united purpose can win concessions. Your battlefield is in the factories and in the field. On this battlefield of labor you have the advantage of numbers. On this battlefield you cannot be vanquished. You will not be content with bribes, you will ask more and more from the exploiters. We do not presume to give you orders or to give you advice. You and your new leaders who are being born in the struggle know best how and where to strike. But we want you to know that you are not alone; among the masses of people behind the Iron Curtain the flame of revolt is smouldering and its sparks are flying from country to country. Everywhere in the Free World your friends are with you. Their help will grow as your determination grows.

people the purpose of the campaign and the ways in which they could assist it. The operation was explained politically as an overt appreciation by the West of the Czechoslovak people's will for freedom as expressed in their recent demonstrations against the Communist regime. The balloons were intended to prove the ineffectuality of the Iron Curtain, to show that the West could and would always find means by which to communicate with the enslaved peoples. Radio broadcasting is one well-established means; leaflets, showing photographs of events suppressed or distorted by the Communist press, provide a further means of contact which can parallel and supplement the efforts of radio. "The Iron Curtain Does Not Reach to the Sky," a song composed especially for the occasion, was broadcast over RFE to dramatize the combined attack of radio and the printed word against the barrier set up by the Communists to isolate the people from the free world.

The technical progress of the balloon barrage was reported in regular bulletins over RFE. Figures were given on the number of leaflets, "crowns" and coins being sent and the estimated time and location of their landing. RFE gave advice to the people on how to open the plastic balloons, and how to circulate the contents. They were advised to protect themselves by turning over a certain number of leaflets at the demand of the Communist police, but to keep enough for themselves and their immediate family and friends; in this way, maximum distribution could be assured.

Ultimately, said Radio Free Europe, the balloon campaign means that the West will not recognize as final any Communist appeasement measures which stop short of restoration of liberty to the oppressed peoples of Central and Eastern Europe.

Communist counter-measures were swift and direct. On July 15, Russian-built MiG-15 jet fighters attacked the balloons and are known to have hit two. Ground fire later downed three more.

The Czechoslovak one-party press responded with clamorous indignation. On July 18, *Rude Pravo*, official organ of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, published a lengthy article characterizing the operation as an audacious act "surpassing even Hitler's hate campaign against Czechoslovakia":

"Due to the systematic peace policy of the Soviet Union and the other countries of the peace camp, the conviction of people all over the world that war can and will be prevented has been growing. This development, however, has caused considerable consternation to those for whom war is a source of immense profit and a luxurious, easy life. Therefore the warmongers try by various means to put obstacles on the road to international appeasement. . . . In Germany, gangsters recruited from the ranks of Nazi war criminals, SS men and others have been employed to organize terror acts in the Berlin democratic sector and in various other cities of the German Democratic Republic. The failure of the much-heralded 'X Day' is being followed by a hypocritical, demagogic offer of 'assistance' to the citizens of the German Democratic Republic for obvious propa-

ganda purposes, as is, by the way, admitted by the Western bourgeois press itself.

"Fitting into the chain of these provocations aimed at disturbing the efforts for strengthening peace is the American provocation started recently in Western Germany against the Czechoslovak Republic. Similar to the action of two years ago by the ill-famed 'Crusaders for Freedom,' now, too, balloons distributing slander leaflets have been launched from Bavarian territory across our borders. The Munich 'Free Europe' radio, financed by Ford and other exploiters, speaks bombastically of the 'propaganda balloon action'—allegedly the 'greatest action of its kind ever carried out in the world'—for which allegedly 'special' experts were sent from America.

"In fact we must admit that the 'balloon experts' have not been sparing any balloons. In the course of a mere two days, tens and hundreds of thousands of these balloons have been handed over—to the organs of our State Security and the National Committees, by the citizens who found them. Farmer Hajek in Doubravice, District Cesky Brod, handed over a whole package of leaflets which landed together; Josef Korinek in Zatec delivered a whole balloon; leaflets are being brought in by workers of the V. I. Lenin Works and other enterprises, by railway men, school children, etc.

"However, even if the 'balloon action' were not four times—as announced by 'Free Europe'—but a hundred times the size of the 'Crusade' action in 1951, its instigators will achieve the exact opposite of the expected and intended result. Our citizens arrive with expressions of justified disgust at the leaflets, and they find offense in one leaflet which is some kind of copy of the new Czechoslovak *koruna*, covered on both sides by a slanderous text. Our people respect the new *koruna*, its firm purchasing [bread-buying] power which enabled us to discard the ration system, and therefore they deplored, in harsh and not too selective language, that the effigy of the *koruna* has been misused for printing on it stupid lies and slander against the government of our Republic and against the Soviet Union.

"The second leaflet is propaganda for 'X Day'—the Fascist provocations in the German Democratic Republic on June 17. Since these provocations ended in failure, the organizers now attempt to exploit them by printing pictures on both sides, showing the gangsters in Berlin performing arson, the provocations at the Brandenberger Tor, and such. These pictures 'honorably' join the ranks of those pictures by which the Nazi cutthroats preserved the memories of their murders and arson in occupied countries—in the Ukraine, in Oradour, in Lidice. Naturally this can cause only disgust toward the initiators of the whole criminal action. Apart from that, pictures showing the Fascist provocations in Berlin are no sensational novelty, as is apparently assumed by the chieftains of this balloon action. Similar pictures have recently been published here in *Svet v Obrazech*.

"It proves the absolute political shortsightedness (people, when speaking of it, say 'stupidity') of the organizers of the 'balloon action,' if they assumed that they could really influence our people with leaflets which show, on one side, a eulogy of arson and an attack on peace—which June 17 in Berlin was intended to be. In vain they act—and will act in the future—as 'protectors



of the interests of the Czechoslovak working people.' This provocation proves clearly what reactionary USA circles mean by easing international tension. It is a crude disturbance of peace just at a time when people all over the world watch hopefully for the chances of a truce in Korea, when they trust the Soviet policy, aimed at a peaceful solution of international matters.

"Therefore the 'balloon action' has been categorically rejected by our people. It would certainly be no pleasure for the 'balloon experts' to hear the people who deliver the leaflets to the police stations and the National Committees. It is amazing to hear even those who, up to now, have not had an active relationship to Socialist building—they are surprised 'by the means chosen by those in the West.' All our people are deeply offended by the harsh attack on the sovereignty of our state territory, by the stupidity of those who expect to achieve something with their balloons.

"Of course, the 'Crusaders for Freedom' in the West are constantly losing ground and the chance to develop 'friendly' activities on the territory of our Republic. Our borders are carefully guarded to prevent any action of their agents, and therefore they must content themselves with the 'balloon action' which is ridiculed by our people who reject it, who declare the action to be a gangster affair which even Hitler did not use at the time of the worst slander campaign against Czechoslovakia. When handing over the leaflets at the State Security and National Committee offices they demand that the whole action be publicly condemned.


"This spontaneous resistance to the balloon provocation proves that the mercenaries of 'Free Europe' who sponsor this action are in absolute isolation, uninformed, and completely divorced from the real views of our workers. 'Free Europe' even sent in the balloons some poor verses claiming that 'always all good has come from above' and that our people know it.

"Our people, however, have a better memory. They remember all the 'good' that came from 'above' from the West: the bombs which on the eve of the end of the war killed women and children in their homes in Prague and Pilsen, which destroyed the Pilsen Skoda Works and the Prague Kolben Works, to hamper our path to reconstruction. Later we had from 'above'—from Western Germany—the American beetle which was meant to bring us hunger and misery. And they are well aware of what American fliers have brought to Korean women and children.

"There is another coincidence. One of the boxes found near Drevec, in the Pilsen region, bore the mark 'Munich.' The name Munich itself brings back for all Czechoslovak citizens recollections of the worst days of our nation, recollections of the actual aspect of the 'affection' of our Western 'friends.'

"In vain have the organizers of the ridiculous and silly 'balloon action' spent their dollars on balloons, paper and tinfoil with the mark 'Free Europe.' They can hardly expect to be rewarded by their employers when the result has been the opposite of what they intended.

"Of course, some businessmen made a good profit. Apart from that, this action was doomed to failure right from the start. Blown up by 'Free Europe' it quickly burst, just like the balloons."



### Reverberations

Echoes reverberated throughout the entire Satellite area, and from the Soviet Union itself where, on July 20, *Pravda* (Moscow) published excerpts from the *Rude Pravo* editorial, with this preface: "Having failed in their Berlin provocations, the West European agents of the US imperialists are endeavoring to carry out still another provocation aimed at hampering peaceful construction in the countries of People's Democracy. This new sortie by the enemies of the Czechoslovak people is exposed by *Rude Pravo* in its article entitled 'A Campaign Doomed to Failure.'"

On the same day, Radio Warsaw broadcast portions of the article, and the Romanian radio denounced Radio Free Europe and quoted *Rude Pravo*. Radio Budapest, July 21, described the balloon barrage as "directed against the peaceful co-existence of the peoples" and an interference into the "domestic affairs" of Czechoslovakia. Radio Sofia, July 23, repeated the theme.

*Rude Pravo's* article was reprinted in most Czechoslovak newspapers.

An official protest by the Czechoslovak government followed. On July 20 the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry dispatched this note to the U.S. Embassy in Prague:

"Small balloons, containing leaflets of an inflammatory character, have recently been sent over Czechoslovak

territory. These leaflets are aimed at creating unrest among the population of the Czechoslovak Republic and at inciting it to activities against the state.

"This new attempt to influence the Czechoslovak working people by such primitive propaganda methods was naturally met by them with feelings of contempt and revulsion and, in itself, would scarcely merit serious mention.

"The crux of the matter, however, is that the whole action was prepared and carried out by U.S. citizens especially sent to Germany for this purpose and, what is more, to that part of Germany which is controlled by the U.S. Occupation Administration.

"We are thus faced with yet another case of gross abuse by the U.S. Government of its position as an occupying power, incompatible with the four power agreements on Germany. Under these agreements, the United States assumed the obligation to carry out the occupation in accordance with the principle that Germany must never again become a threat to world peace and to its neighbors.

"A further important consideration, which makes this latest infringement of the fundamental principles of international law particularly reprehensible, is that it is taking place at a time when the nations of the world are intensifying their efforts to strengthen peace and secure international cooperation.

"The objective of this provocation, organized under the aegis of the U.S. occupation authorities, is to step up the so-called 'cold war' policy and to hamper the relaxation of international tension.

"For these reasons the government of the Czechoslovak Republic energetically protests against these acts and requests that it be informed by the U.S. Government of the steps taken to prevent the recurrence of similar provocations aimed against peaceful relations among the nations and constituting gross interference in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia."

The U. S. Department of State, through Ambassador Wadsworth in Prague, presented the following reply to the Czechoslovak government:

"The American Embassy presents its compliments to the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and with reference to the Ministry's note of July 20, 1953, concerning the release of balloons from the U.S. Zone of Germany, has the honor, upon instructions of the U.S. Government, to make the following reply:

"The balloons apparently in question were released by the Crusade for Freedom, an organization established by private American citizens. The U.S. Government has ascertained that the balloons were released for the purpose of communicating with the people of Czechoslovakia.

"It is a fundamental conviction of the American Government and people that free communication between people constitutes a principle upon which the very life of the international community should be founded. If any Government attempts to erect a wall sealing off its people from contact with the outside world, it is inevitable that ways will be found both by the people inside that country and by the people of other countries outside to penetrate that artificial barrier and maintain some line of contact with one another. The use by those

outside of such media as balloons, confirm that the Czechoslovak Government has created a barrier interfering with free communications. The U.S. believes that the best assurance that this means of communication will not be used is to obviate the need for it by permitting what is natural and necessary in the modern world; namely, free contact between nations and the free exchange of information and ideas.

"As for the content of the messages carried to Czechoslovakia by this medium, it is understood that they contained information on current developments in Central and Eastern Europe and, in addition, various statements focusing on the idea of 'freedom'. There would be no reason for a Government to be disturbed by the principle of freedom in a message to its people, if conditions of freedom actually existed in that country. One cannot readily believe that the Czechoslovak Government would even raise this issue with the U.S. Government if the fundamental freedoms were observed in Czechoslovakia, and if the Czechoslovak Government were not now especially concerned about the attitude of the people toward the absence of those freedoms.

"The U.S. Government cannot agree that the transmission of these messages to the people of Czechoslovakia from the territory of the U.S. Zone of Germany by the Crusade for Freedom Committee involved any misuse of the position of the U.S. as an occupying power. Such communication is clearly not contrary to any quadripartite agreement affecting Germany, nor does such communication violate any other international agreement to which the U.S. Government is a signatory.

"With reference to efforts to strengthen world peace, the U.S., as is generally known, has endeavored in every practical way to work step by step, in accordance with the deep interest of the American people in permanent peace, and in cooperation with other countries, toward building an enduring structure of international peace and stability. The U.S. seeks to help bring about a relaxation of international tension whenever there are genuine possibilities of doing so. It is recognized, at the same time, that true international tranquillity presupposes conditions which assure human rights and fundamental freedoms for the people concerned."

Information on the reaction of the Czechoslovak people, to whom the balloon messages were addressed, began to come in slowly but steadily. Seven escapees from Pardubice in Czechoslovakia, interviewed in Vienna, reported: "All during the week people rushed to catch the leaflets as they drifted down. Many wore the coins around their necks. The Army posts sent out soldiers to collect the leaflets, and even the postmen had orders from the militia to ask everybody along their postal routes if they had found any leaflets." A man in Bratislava related over the Czechoslovak radio his own experience after he had picked up some of the replicas of the crown notes. "The next day," he said, "I went to a tobacconist's, pulled two crowns from my pocket, and asked for some tobacco. The girl laughed and said, 'Why, they're the American ones!' And then I realized that I had put them in my pocket. Just now I remember a sentence I read on them: 'Insist on the rights of labor,' it said. Thanks for the advice. We'll take it."

## Vacation With Big Brother

WHEN the Communists satellized Eastern Europe, they promised a proletarian paradise resplendent with worker benefits. One of these was the annual paid vacation, now propagandized throughout the area as an outstanding achievement of Communism. "The Czechoslovak system of recreation," intoned the *Czechoslovak Economic Bulletin* (Prague), on September 15, 1951, "has been recognized by officials of the World Federation of Trade Unions [composed of Soviet bloc countries] as the best in the world after that of the Soviet Union." "In Hungary," blared Radio Kossuth last May 9, "we have created conditions for the working people of which the people of Rome, Paris, London, and even across the ocean, do not even dare to dream. For the first time Hungarian workers are free from exploitation, and a happy, carefree vacation has been assured them." "One of the greatest achievements of Polish working people," boasted *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw) on February 4, 1952, "are workers' vacations. . . . Nowhere in the world is the right to rest and leisure shared by such broad masses of the working people as in the People's Democracies."

The right to "rest and leisure" has indeed been lavishly bestowed upon the captive populations: guaranteed, glowingly, in all their constitutions.\* But Communists never indulge in give-away programs, of any kind: what they grant in principle they withhold in practice, then dispense in minute proportions, as a carefully calculated form of State coercion.

\* Subsequent laws modified this "right" with respect to agricultural workers on State farms (which comprise no more than 15 percent of total arable land in any Satellite). These workers may take vacations only if they make collective agreements with employers to this effect. On collective and private farms, vacations cannot be so regulated.

Vacation legislation was already in force in all Central European countries before the Communists took over. At first, the post-war coalition governments incorporated this in their own laws and in some cases genuinely improved the pre-war situation by lengthening vacation time or extending its application to additional occupation groups. But after the Communist *coup d'etats* and subsequent establishment of "People's Democracies," Party leaders began to shape vacation policy into a political and economic weapon. By new provisions concerning job changing, absenteeism and length of employment, they modified the right to vacation and partially negated benefits which the laws purported to grant. In 1947 the employment period requisite to vacation eligibility was increased from 5½ or 6 months to 9 and, in some countries, to 12 months of continuous employment with the same enterprise. Absenteeism became a punishable offense in 1949, frequently by deduction from allotted vacation time.

The severity of the penalty varied with each country. A March 24, 1949 Czechoslovak law stipulated that one day of unexcused absence meant the loss of one vacation day; absent hours were cumulative and applied in the same manner. In 1950, according to Czechoslovak Law No. 32, passed February 22, two days of vacation were to be deducted for one day of unexcused absence. If a worker used his vacation time for one calendar year and subsequently accumulated unexcused absences in the same year, these would be deductible from the following year's vacation. Since 1951, Hungarian law has provided that "those who, of their own volition or without the permission of the manager, leave their employment in a State concern are entitled, for a period of two years at their new place of employment, to only six days' leave with pay. . . ." (*Magyar Kozlony* [Budapest], January 13, 1951).



## I. DISCRIMINATION DEVICES

Communist rationale for depriving "non-productive" workers of all or part of their annual vacation time can be summed up in the Satellite phrase: "Those who contribute the most deserve the greatest reward." The captive workingman's chances of getting his "guaranteed" two-week leave, and particularly the extent to which he may be eligible for State vacation allowance and the much propagandized State recreation facilities, are determined solely by his "contribution" to the "building of socialism." In other words, upon his production output. Far from being granted outright to all workers, Communist vacation policy is used by the Party as an incentive, a punishment, and a reward: an incentive by which workers are spurred to greater productivity; a punishment by which the majority of workers are denied either the right to vacation at all or the privilege of using State facilities; a reward by which highly productive workers are assured annual leave and afforded State recreation benefits in precise proportion to their individual work-fulfillment records.

In practice, annual paid vacations go to trade union members who have fulfilled their norms and shown a record of no tardiness and no absenteeism. The use of State resorts belongs to those who have overfulfilled their norms. Of this elite group, only outstanding "shockworkers" and "stakhanovites" get all bills paid by the State. Among the "deserving," there is a strict hierarchy of privilege. Outstanding members enjoy, among other things, the most financial assistance, the choice of resort spots, free transportation, and the right to be accompanied by their wives and children. For all less productive worker categories, space at a State resort for either employee or family (and all other privileges enjoyed by "production leaders") are virtually unattainable. This "priority principle," which excludes the vast majority from benefits the regime claims to be available for all, was clearly defined in a section of *Czechoslovakia's New Labor Policy* (Prague: Orbis, 1949):

"During the coming years, selection of workers [for resort vacations] will be determined chiefly by our concern with the fulfillment of tasks in developing the State. Priority will be given to workers who have won distinction in the latest round of the national competition, who are winners or organizers of competitions, who are model shock brigade workers, who have made successful improvements in production methods, or have set an example by their participation in voluntary brigades, who have distinguished themselves in trade union work, and who are fulfilling their obligations at work in an exemplary manner."

Prague's daily *Prace* wrote on April 17, 1952 that "recreation is designed for outstanding workers who have made the greatest contributions toward plan fulfillment. . . . Not everyone who wants a resort vacation can have it, because it is impossible to select workers irrespective of their work merit. It would certainly be unjust to send someone on vacation who reports late to work or who does not meet the norms, simply because he was interested in taking part

in a recreation trip. . . . Recommendations can be given only to those workers who are superior to the rest. . . ."

"We must be more careful," wrote the Budapest periodical *Társadalombiztosítás Munkasvedelem* (*Social Security and Workers' Protection*), November 1952, "in selecting the people who enjoy our vacation plan. Ultimately, these vacations must represent a reward for workers with the best production records." *Trybuna Ludu*, a Warsaw paper, summed up when it said (February 4, 1952), "in the Socialist system and in the People's Democracies, work and rest supplement each other reciprocally: one is conditional upon the other. . . ."

Statistics from official Communist sources\* give the clearest indication of how many workers "in the workers' state" are in fact deprived of State recreation benefits. In 1952, 500,000 of Poland's 4 million trade union members were sent to State vacation resorts; 176,000 of Hungary's 1,430,000; 300,000 of Czechoslovakia's 3 million; 300,000 of Romania's 2,500,000; 53,154\*\* of Bulgaria's 737,452.

The chart below, taken from the *Czechoslovak Economic Bulletin* (Prague), September 15, 1951, is similarly illustrative. Union membership figures, taken from official Czechoslovak government sources, have been added:

Past and Proposed Recreation Schemes Under ROH\*\*\*

Year	Total Number Vacationers	Trade Union Membership	Total Population
1947.....	81,685	2,500,000	12,000,000
1948.....	130,548	"	"
1949.....	205,592	2,858,278	12,500,000
1950.....	239,056	"	"
1951.....	310,000	"	"
1952.....	300,000	3,000,000	"
1953.....	320,000	"	"
1954.....	370,000	—	—
1955.....	400,000	—	—

### The "Wide Network"

Satellite regimes use three principle devices to implement their discriminatory vacation policy: deliberate limitation of the number of available vacation resorts; government ownership of these resorts; and strict State control of all agencies responsible for the allocation of resort space.

Of these three, planned scarcity of resort accommodations is perhaps the most cynical fraud perpetrated on the captive populations. Article 119 of the Soviet Constitution, which has been written into every Satellite constitution, ensures the right to rest and leisure "... by the provision of a wide network of . . . rest homes [i.e. resort housing] . . . for the working people. . . ." According to the Satellite

\* *Statistical Yearbook* (Warsaw), 1949; *Társadalombiztosítás és Munkasvedelem* (Budapest), November 1952; *Czechoslovakia's New Labor Policy* (Prague: Orbis, 1949); *Scanteia* (Bucharest), August 1, 1952; *Vecherni Novini* (Sofia), April 14, 1952.

\*\* 1951 figure.

\*\*\* Revolutionary Trade Unions.

press and refugee reports, however, Communist governments have done little toward providing this "network," except to nationalize practically all those resorts formerly used only by the "wealthy classes." Twenty percent of these have been turned over to the Ministry of Health for use as convalescent homes. Of the remaining 80 percent, many are reserved for the exclusive use of "favored" trade union groups: miners, steelworkers, railway workers, Party and trade union leaders, intellectuals, and workers of prize-winning factories. Most additional resorts are admittedly being built for the use of "our best workers." *Scanteia* (Bucharest) wrote on August 1, 1952: "The State takes special care of stakhanovites and other highly productive workers. Special rest homes for these people and their families have been built in the Prahova Valley, in the Olt Valley and at the seashore. . . ."

It is obvious, from comparative published statistics on the number of resorts and vacationers in Satellite Europe, that the Communist governments deliberately limit resort capacity in order to restrict such vacations to a favored few: both to increasing labor productivity and to save the State expense. When the very figures with which Communists boast of increasing vacation activity are compared with total employment, it becomes apparent that more than two-thirds of the workers are denied the use of State recreation facilities. The chart below (compiled from official Polish sources\*) indicates that: (1) the number of resorts grew very little after 1948, when nationalization was almost completed; (2) the increase in vacationers has not grown in proportion to increase in employment; and (3) even trade union members (allegedly entitled to more privileges than non-union workers) had no guarantee of a resort vacation.

Year	Employed in State Sector	Trade Union Membership	Number of vaca- tioners	Number of rest- houses
1945		1,492,000	12,666	54
1946	2,357,000	2,288,000	171,122	451
1947	3,194,400	2,936,000	236,397	639
1948	3,586,600	3,516,000	316,828	668
1949	4,238,100	4,072,000	452,000	1,028
1950	4,988,900	4,319,000	556,000	1,496
1951	5,264,800	4,500,000+	530,000	1,500
1952	5,608,000	—	500,000	1,500

### Resort Space, Ltd.

The process by which a chosen few are selected for resort vacations begins at a high governmental level: in Czechoslovakia and Romania, with the Commission for National Insurance; in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania, with the Central Trade Union Council. This agency has at its disposal a limited number of holiday certificates, each representing one place at a State resort. Prior to the vacation period, these certificates are allocated to the agency's district offices, where they are distributed to the agency's

\* *Nowe Drogi* (Warsaw), June 1952; *Statistical News* (Warsaw), 1952; *Statistical Yearbook* (Warsaw), 1949; *Glos Pracy* (Warsaw), various issues, 1953.

representatives at the factory or office level, and subsequently to workers.

Because there are not enough certificates to accommodate all workers in all industries, strict selection is imposed at all three stages of distribution. At the first stage, a district having highly productive or important industries is likely to receive more certificates than another less "qualified." At the second, an enterprise having a higher production record than another employing the same number of workers will probably receive the larger share of the district office's quota.

At the third, or factory level, the same principle applies but varies in each country. The Party-dominated shop committee, workers' council, local trade union branch or national insurance commission representing a given enterprise may prepare a list of workers "deserving" accommodation at State resorts, and jointly decide with the district office how many certificates its enterprise will receive and which workers may use them. Or, the district office may allocate (at its own discretion) its quota of certificates to all enterprises under its jurisdiction, leaving worker selection to its representatives at the enterprise level.

Whatever method is used, certificate quotas for industrial enterprises are ridiculously small. A Romanian who escaped in 1951 said that only 100 out of the 1200 employees at the Olga Bancic Factory where he worked were sent to resorts. A Latvian recently reported that large factories (employing about 300 workers) receive seven or eight holiday tickets yearly, and that the small enterprises are never allocated any. An English-language propaganda pamphlet entitled *In An Hungarian Plant* (Budapest, December 1951) reported that 927 Ganz Factory employees enjoyed Hungary's "generous vacation facilities in 1951," but did not admit that the Ganz Factory employed 12,000 that year.

The Czechoslovak paper, *Prace*, on January 12 published a typical letter-to-the-editor complaining of unfair distribution practices:

"Our factory received only about half as many places for winter recreation as a factory of the same size which is engaged in the same type of production as we are. Could you explain this discrepancy?"

In his reply *Prace's* editor explained the principle governing the selection system:

"You evidently overlooked the fact that the factory you mentioned, which received a larger allocation of places, fulfilled the plan, whereas your factory is sadly lagging behind. The same principle which applies to individuals also applies collectively. Whoever contributes the most to national income receives the most."

A *Lidova Demokracie* (Prague) reader wrote this letter-to-the-editor, which appeared in the May 27th issue: "I am a 36-year-old father of three children and employed as permanent laborer at the local distillery. Although I have worked there for six years, I never have had a holiday. The manager has his yearly holiday. Please let me know what holidays I am entitled to."



„Vypadáte nějak buržoasně – z výchovných důvodů nikam nepojedete!“

“You look somehow bourgeois: for educational reasons you won't go anywhere!”

Dikobraz (Prague), February 15, 1953

The newspaper replied, “Your basic holiday is two weeks plus two days for each year over five years' employment at the same enterprise. . . . We assume you have claimed your holidays regularly each year and that they were denied to you for some inexplicable reason. . . .”

In a characteristic orgy of self-criticism, Radio Warsaw (June 8) admitted that:

“The widespread propaganda among the working masses is still far from satisfactory. The Vacation Fund is unable to effect the proper distribution of allocations. Those mainly responsible are trade unions dealing with the allocations. Our plant councils, clubs, wallnewspapers, radio stations, doctors, and social commissions are not doing enough to popularize vacations. Often the workers learn so late about the time of their vacation that their departure and preparations are either utterly impossible or surrounded by the utmost difficulties. Some workers are told about the dates of their vacation only a few days in advance. . . .”

## II. VACATION TYPES AND THEIR COST

In the final choice of workers by branch trade union or insurance commission agents, the “output” factor governs to an even greater extent, with quantity and quality of vacation privileges varying according to the degree of productivity. Of 50 certificates, for instance, about 40 will probably be available to selected outstanding workers at reduced rates and with a moderate number of privileges as to time, place and type of vacation. Another 5 certificates may be given free (along with more and better privileges) to the best stakhanovites and shockworkers. The remaining five will go on sale for sale at the full rate, with virtually no extra benefits of reduced transportation cost, choice of resort or permission to take wife and children along.

Of the three certificate categories (free, reduced, and full rates), only the first and second offer the worker any choice

as to how his holiday will be spent. For stakhanovites and shockworkers qualifying under either category, there are four possible types of holiday: “cruising,” “family,” “mother and child” and “foreign” (to the USSR and other Satellites). Although there are variations in both cost and choice in each Satellite country, the “foreign” and “family” types are generally reserved for particularly outstanding workers and are either completely free or available at very low cost; the cruising and mother-and-child types are at somewhat reduced rates, for slightly less productive workers than the first group.

The holiday abroad, which has important propaganda value for the Communist regimes, is granted only to the most outstanding and trusted workers, carefully chosen by a top review board in the trade union council or national insurance commission. These holidays are part of a larger exchange scheme in which each Satellite is host to trade union workers from other Satellites and from a few non-Soviet countries. Through this scheme, the Communists hope to build “solidarity” among all captive peoples, and to impress Western workers with a carefully-staged vacation in the “Socialist” working paradise. Although the USSR has been host to the largest number of foreign delegations, most Satellites have received a few British, French and West German workers; thirteen Italian trade unionists vacationed in Prague in September of last year, and Bulgaria was host to West German workers in August. Soviet delegations are said to have visited Britain and Switzerland; Satellite workers are rarely sent anywhere “abroad” but to the Soviet Union. In 1951, Czechoslovakia sent 4,669 of her three million trade union members on holidays to Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania.

### Life Without Father

“Family” holidays are almost as scarce in captive Europe as the “vacation abroad.” Attempting to discourage “bourgeois” family living, the Communists deliberately make it difficult for wives and children to accompany their husbands: by up-rating fees for “family vacations”; by providing separate holidays for “mother and child”; and by sending children away to isolated summer camps. In Poland, family holidays are available only to “shockworkers, innovators, time-saving improvement masters. . . . Members of these workers' families (wife, husband, mother, father, children over seven years) who are totally dependent upon the workers' earnings, may join these workers on their holidays (except during summer months), providing they remit full payment and if space is available. Workers' families do not have the right to free transportation” (Warsaw: *Labor Legislation*, 1952).

Women shockworkers “burdened with large families” are the only candidates for “mother and child” vacations in Poland, where the mother pays the full rate but is given free transportation. Children (under seven years) are charged nothing. According to Poland's *Labor Legislation*, there are only three resorts available for such holidays, and children at these are to be “under the care of a special matron throughout the entire day from breakfast to supper,



except for a two-hour break during lunch time. The mother must prepare her children for breakfast (wash and clothe them) and must care for them during lunch period. After supper, the mother must prepare the child for bed and care for it during the night."

In Czechoslovakia, the fee for a mother and child holiday is 360 *koruny*: about half the normal "reduced rate". Both participants pay half their train fare, but no resort fee is charged for the child.

Other reduced-rate vacations include the normal 14-day resort or "cruising holiday," and are generally available to those workers just below shockworkers on the "productivity" scale. The fee in these cases amounts to about one-third of the actual cost. In Poland, reduced-rate holiday certificates are issued only upon presentation of a receipt showing that the worker's designated share has been paid, at which time the factory council and the state make up the balance of the cost, or two-thirds. In 1949 in Czechoslovakia, when the total cost of a vacation was 1,600 *koruny*, reduced rate vacations cost the "deserving" worker 500 *koruny*, "outstanding" workers nothing. The full rate was 1,000 *koruny*. In 1950, the reduced rate scale was revised and ranged from 400 to 800 *koruny*. A uniform fee of 700 *koruny* was established in 1953, for all vacationers. The fee for a wife permitted as a family dependent to accompany her husband, has increased from 1,200 *koruny* in 1949 to 1,400 *koruny*. All participants must now pay half their round-trip railroad fare (*Prace*, February 27). For a journey of 200 kilometers; the cost is about half the average monthly wage of an industrial worker.

Romania's reduced rate amounts to 200 *lei*, which corresponds almost exactly to the average monthly salary. A little over twice this amount, 500 *lei*, is the highest salary on the scale.

When a selected worker does not wish to use his certificate, unchosen workers have the opportunity—not of being given his free or reduced rate certificate, but of taking his place at the resort by paying the full rate. This is graded in Poland according to his earnings: 84 *zloty* for monthly wages of 450 *zloty*; 105 *zloty* for wages between 450 and 750; 150 *zloty* for 750 or more.

### The State's Share

In addition to fees paid by participants in resort holidays, contributions toward the total cost come from various other sources. In Poland, enterprise management adds one-third of the cost to the third contributed (through salary deduction) by the vacationer himself and both amounts are forwarded to the Workers' Vacation Fund administered under the Central Trade Union Council. The remaining third is then donated from the State treasury. The worker's share is not refunded if he is unable to go on vacation.

In Czechoslovakia, other financial sources in addition to the vacationer's fee are contributions from the National Insurance Commission, occasionally from large national enterprises, from the government through the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, from a United Worker's Fund

financed by obligatory contributions by employers (amounting to 10 percent of net planned profit), and from union dues. The latter (1 percent of basic wages) are arbitrarily deducted from all workers' salaries. The Prague newspaper *Prace* wrote on April 17, 1952:

"One of our readers has asked this question: 'Why should it be only the best workers [who enjoy resort vacations]? We all pay our contribution to the union.' It is because the best workers contribute the most to the expansion of our national income. Union contributions would not be sufficient to finance vacations; the greatest part is derived from our national income, and whoever contributes the most to that has the right to receive the most. . . ."

As demonstrated by the chart below (published in *Czechoslovakia's New Labor Policy*), the "greatest share" is not derived from national income at all. In 1950 the workers themselves, whether chosen for resort vacations or not, paid almost half the costs of recreation. The dues of non-participants are not refunded to them, nor do they benefit from the United Workers' Fund, which the government puts to good investment advantage.\* In 1949, capital investments amounted to 180 million *koruny*; in 1950, to 131.5 *koruny*. Moreover, the large government contributions shown for 1946 and 1948 went principally toward children's recreation: 75 million *koruny* in 1946, 109 million in 1948.

### Financial Contributions Toward Union Recreation Schemes

(in millions of *koruny*)

	1945	1946	1948	1949	1950
United Workers' Fund	—	—	—	100	100
National Insurance . . .	—	—	—	—	20
Government . . . . .	24.8	139	139	—	50
Trade Union Dues . . .	—	—	—	—	30
Participants' Fees . . .	—	—	—	—	129

### Red Tape

With the exception of juvenile workers' vacations, which may be taken at any time of the year, all resort holidays must be spent during specific periods scheduled by the Central Trade Union Council (or National Insurance Commission). In most Satellite countries there are two such periods. The summer cycle (generally for those entitled to two weeks' leave) runs from May or June through October or November. One-week leaves are ordinarily scheduled for the fall cycle, which begins around November and ends near the close of the year. There are a number of formalities involved in leave-taking. On March 14 Radio Sofia reported that workers would not be admitted to resorts unless they presented personal identity cards and

\* At the time of Czechoslovakia's currency reform, *Lidova Demokracie* (Prague) announced in its June 21 issue that monetary reimbursement for unused vacations would be made at a ratio of 50 to 1. Under this system, if a worker was due 2000 old *koruny* in compensation for entitled leave which he does not wish to utilize, he now actually receives only 40 new *koruny*.

certified trade union membership cards. In Poland, according to *Labor Legislation* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Prawnicze, 1952), the worker's holiday certificate must contain place and date of vacation, seal of the worker's union organization and signature of a representative of this organization. Notice to the effect that vacation is being taken is entered on the worker's personal identity card.

### The "Classless" Society

While a resort vacation for a member of the working class is a special privilege earned through high production records, the same vacation appears to be commonplace for the Party "elite," for whom vacations are only a part of their generally high standard of living. This master-group is not obliged to "compete" for space at a resort, can easily afford its cost, and enjoys better facilities and comparatively greater freedom of movement than workers do.

The composition of this group, and its vacation privileges, vary with each Satellite. As a rule, it includes trade union leaders and officials, enterprise managers, Party functionaries, members of the army and police, and intellectuals. All these categories enjoy prolonged leave. The Bulgarian Labor Code gives "scientific workers" annual leaves ranging from 26 to 36 days; artistic personnel from 30 to 42 days; rectors, deans, school inspectors and teachers, 48 days; editors and journalists, 30 days (*Trud*, July 12, 1952). Hungary's 1952 labor code gives those in "responsible leading positions" 6 to 24 days of leave.

Most members of Satellite "high society" have resorts reserved for their exclusive use, either for weekends or extended holidays. A Romanian refugee reported the existence of a recreation center at Mangalia for Party functionaries and their wives which "maintains the luxury of the past, but not its gaiety." There is another center at Timisul de Sus for writers, actors, theatre directors, composers, professors "in the field of arts" and directors of the Ministry of Fine Arts. One of Hungary's castles, Csonka, is a favorite weekend recreation spot for top Party officials, who (according to an escapee report) "bring along their guests from the Soviet colony in Budapest." The castle has recently been renovated and luxuriously furnished: "12 fireplaces were installed, suites have been separated hotel-style, and 11 marble bathrooms have been built." The castle is guarded around the clock by police.

### Workers' Pennies

In December of last year, during a peace loan campaign, the Hungarian government sponsored a documentary film entitled "How the Workers' Pennies Are Used." Along with shots of workers' homes, childrens' centers and new factory buildings, an aerial view of a new recreation center located at Balatonoeszod was shown, allegedly under construction for the "benefit of workers." The caption read: "This is how our People's Democracy provides our workers with a suitable vacation." An engineer who worked on the construction recently reported that this resort, which

cost Hungarian workers millions of *forints*, was for the exclusive use of top Party officials. Construction was begun, the source said, in the spring of 1951 "under strict security regulations," supervised by Council of Ministers Secretary Kovacs. The source went on to describe Balatonoeszod in unusual detail:

"A special road connects the resort with the main Budapest-Balaton highway. There is a nice promenade along Lake Balaton; inside, several tennis courts, bowling alley, ballrooms and card rooms have been built. The lawn is beautifully kept. There are separate buildings for garages and servants' quarters. A magnificent view of the lake is seen from the dining room, which has glass walls. Each apartment has an ante-chamber, bathroom, telephone, radio, and is luxuriously furnished with Persian rugs, expensive furniture and paintings."

### III. DISCIPLINED LEISURE

The kind of resort allocated for "worker" use, on the other hand, is considerably less attractive, despite regime claims to the contrary. Here is a typically poetic description from the April 17 Budapest daily *Szabad Nép* of one of "our workers' resorts":

"Encircled by the majestic pine trees, high above the city, stands the spacious building of Mecsek Resort. The light reflected by the huge windows and glass walls dazzles the eye; the terrace is bathed in sunshine. The large parlor with its four glass walls is most impressive; sunshine may freely penetrate every corner, covering the small brown tables and other objects with a golden gleam. During the early afternoon, the vacationers rest in their rooms or sit in the comfortable armchairs in front of the large glass walls. One of them is Jozsef Kiricses, a stakanovite locksmith of Veszprem; the other is Ilona Bano, an ace welder of Budapest. Their gaze sweeps over the lonely valley with its breathtaking beauty. After a long silence, Ilona remarks: 'How beautiful our country is and how fortunate we are.'"

The majority of newspaper articles, however, are of a different tone. They stress the need for "greater cultural-educational activity in resorts," and paint a more realistic picture of "vacationing": workers regimented and disciplined by specially-trained instructors and political activists, who organize endless discussion groups, lectures, rallies, and other varieties of Party exhibitionism. "More attention must be given to political work among the vacationers," the Czech Home Service radio station warned last June 23; "an occasional concert or recital is no substitute for systematic political training."

"There are still cases where plant councils failed to pay proper attention to the selection of candidates for the tourist recreation," *Lidova Demokracie* (Prague) wrote the next day: "Although on the back of their tickets participants are told that they will have to make daily hikes of 15 to 20 miles, in mountainous terrain, vacationers still arrive at the starting points with heavy suitcases, unsuitable shoes and street clothes. Of thirty-nine people who arrived

at the starting point in the Krkonose mountains, only four had been correctly informed. Eight of the participants were physically unfit to make such long hikes and the rest had to borrow suitable clothing. . . ."

*Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest, March 18) reported a meeting of vacationers where "Sandor Gyulai, stakhanovite of the United Incandescent Lamp Factory stood up and declared: 'In honor of the Liberation Week, I pledge to reorganize the faulty planning section of my department. . . .' He was followed by Marton Guboczki of Diosgyor Iron Works, and many others who made similar promises. . . ." The "occurrences of the afternoon," *Magyar Nemzet's* reporter made a point of emphasizing, "were purely spontaneous."


Political lectures and discussions are usually scheduled only two or three times weekly, but at some resorts workers must attend daily political courses. An escaped Hungarian said that at the resort where he stayed, vacationers who had not graduated from the basic party course attended lectures from 2 to 7 p.m. daily. The course ended with a written exam.

Refugees who themselves have vacationed in captive Europe report that guests are marched in formation to and from meals, "singing all the way," and that even movie-going, dances and excursions are "organized" for group participation. Activists attempt to discourage private recreational enjoyment by demanding a "legitimate reason" from workers who wish to be excused from planned activity.

### "Increased Strength for Work"

There must never be a moment's let-up, never an hour's real vacation from Communist propaganda. As the Bucharest magazine *Contemporanul* wrote on September 2, 1952:

"It is a duty of honor for the cultural activist from these [resort] establishments to do his best to make use of all the possibilities for organizing a rich, multilateral cultural life which will enable those who have come for a rest to enrich their knowledge, to increase their strength, to be ready to return to the field of production with renewed vigor and increased strength for work. . . . Workers must always be stimulated to read more and more books. . . . What is essential in their work is its political content. . . . The workers who are resting in these establishments must always have the possibility of close contact with the problems of internal and international politics. . . . Visual agitation must be well organized through pictures and slogans and by radios and megaphones. . . . In some establishments where radios are not used, one can see a lack of attention to the political guidance of those who have come for a rest. . . . In Vatra Dornei, the three radios have been broken for several months; nobody tried to repair them and the workers who were at that time in the establishment couldn't listen to the news. The draft of the new Constitution of the Romanian People's Republic [published July 18, 1952] has not been given enough attention by the cultural activists. In Slanicul Moldovei, the draft has been popularized by the radio station and by posters, but no copy of the constitution could be found in the library of the resort before August 20."



### Nyári vendéglő

Minden pincér: Nem jöhetek, kérem. Ez az asztal nem hozzám tartozik.

"I cannot come. This table doesn't belong to me."

Ludas Matyi (Budapest), July, 1950

*Scanteia* (Bucharest) wrote on June 9, 1952: "Party, State and trade union organizations are duty-bound to combat resolutely all manifestations of slackness or bureaucracy which could cause inconvenience to workers on their holidays. The authorities in charge of some resorts . . . underestimate cultural work, so that cultural facilities do not meet the requirements of the guests, whose demands have increased considerably lately. Lectures and shows must have a high standard of ideas and must treat subjects which are of interest to working men. . . ."

A typical resort day in the Bulgarian Zdravets Home was reported by a Bulgarian who escaped in 1952:

- 8:30—breakfast
- 9 to 11—group meetings at which political topics are discussed
- 12 to 1—lunch (soup, meat, dessert)
- 1 to 4—rest
- 4 to 4:30—snack (bread and marmalade)
- 4:30 to 6—free leisure time
- 6—meeting at which vacationers listen to speeches over loudspeakers
- 7:30 to 8:30—dinner (meat and fruit)
- 8:30 to 10:30—choir singing, folk dances and fireside talks
- 10:30—lights out

### Let Them Eat Propaganda

In their unrelenting efforts to provide workers with Communist "culture and education," report management frequently overlooks the more basic requirements of vaca-



# I Activize . . .

*A resort "Social Director" is harshly criticized in this June 26th article from the Warsaw magazine, Szpilki. He is speaking before a mythical conference of district social directors, boasting of the methods he uses in "activizing" unwilling participants.*



## Dear Colleagues and Lady-Colleagues:

I have just heard some rather pessimistic statements from which it appears that the work in the cultural and educational sectors of our community is not gratifying, not easy and—in short—is rather grim.

My dear colleagues! Having worked for several years in vacation homes and sanatoria, I emphatically maintain that this very work has always given me a tremendous amount of satisfaction,

enabling me, so to speak, to fully expand my wings.

During my long years of rather (forgive me!) successful activities I have managed to work out my own precise methods, the benefits of which I am only too glad to share with you now.

To begin with, then, always keep this in mind! The first practical step which every one of you might, and should, take is to look through the lists and records of vacationers to whom you are about to pay a personal visit. I myself

tioners. According to most refugees, food and sleeping quarters are generally inadequate. Even the regime admits of this. The Polish Workers' Vacation Fund chairman, Boleslaw Kania, speaking over Warsaw radio on June 8, promised to remedy the poor food supply noticeable in resorts:

"Very frequently in the same locality one home provides splendid food, cleanly and neatly served, while another nearby is notorious for tasteless, monotonous, or even scanty fare. We now have, in all centers, our own vegetable gardens and pig fattening stations. Highly skilled chefs are training cooks and kitchen hands. We fight for a large variety of tasty and nutritious foods which will at the same time be hygienically and esthetically served. Vacationers are receiving about 4,000 calories a day. In clubrooms there are buffets serving coffee and cold beverages."

## Same Sameness

Communist "recreation" is designed to drench vacationers with the same lectures, debates, discussions, and propa-

have achieved some wonderful results by doing just that. Those bright and happy moments when we discover that among our future guests is the name of some famous singer or actress (properly handled, mind you, such a talent can be made to serve throughout the season) cannot be compared with any other moment of happiness!


How well I remember last year! When I suddenly spotted the name of a well-known journalist on my list of prospective guests, I felt as light and happy as a bird. I knew immediately—no more trouble with our local wallnewspaper. There were, of course (there always are), certain difficulties. The journalist tried to convince me that he had made this trip to the countryside for the specific purpose of resting and getting away from work. I soon persuaded him, however, that there is a great difference between *professional* and *social* work. A few hours of discussion and elaboration on the subject led to one happy event: submission on his part. The wallnewspaper was indeed a masterpiece. I still treasure it as such.

And what will you say to this, dear colleagues? It had (the work, I mean) such a wonderful effect on the journalist that, having prepared three wallnewspapers, he left suddenly (he must have gained strength quite rapidly) ten whole days before time!

However, we cannot always hope for such ideal coincidences—just as the budget cannot be based on money which has been found. What we require in our methods is quick perception; an ability to associate even the smallest, seemingly most trivial details; the perseverance to be systematic; and a psychological approach.

ganda films they are subjected to at home. There is so little chance to escape from the disciplined day-to-day life that many workers refuse their hard-earned holiday certificates. Many do not even apply for them. The degree of worker dissatisfaction with resort fare is indicated by a June 10, 1952 article in the Sofia paper *Trud*, which reported numerous cases of rejected holiday certificates:

"In spite of the wonderful conditions for relaxation and recuperation in these resorts, . . . the Central Committee of Professional Unions cannot fulfill its yearly plan. During the winter many resorts were almost empty. At the resort in the village of Vurshetz, which can accommodate 200 persons, only 5 to 10 workers registered. The May 3 to May 16 shift was not filled in any of the resorts. In Hisaria, only 193 beds out of a total 440 were occupied; in Bankia, 180 out of 300; in Peshtera, 50 out of 150; in Pchelin, 20 out of 160. . . . The construction workers' trade union received 170 certificates for the shift beginning in May, but only 19 workers registered at the resort. The remaining 151 certificates were returned unused to the management. Out of 272 issued certificates





One of our guests had been refusing for a long time to participate in our evening artistic events. She argued that she felt tired, that solitude is the best cure for poor health, the only way to rest, and so on and so forth. I must state here, my dear colleagues, that this line is adopted by the majority of our guests. One should not, however, become discouraged. Our vacationists are usually made up of tired and nervous people. Very few of them—I can assure you all of this—can withstand the pressure of long hours of persuasion. Sooner or later they all give in. The lady guest I was speaking of refused six times. After my seventh attempt—she sang. Unfortunately, she couldn't finish her song—failing to reach the most interesting part of the song, she suffered a nervous shock. But this example clearly proves that one shouldn't give up in despair, even in almost hopeless cases.

As you may very well know, the most difficult task is finding candidates for choreography. Adults show an almost childish stubbornness where solo dancing is concerned. Why they can dance in an overcrowded dance hall and can't dance on a large, comfortable stage, beats me. A certain citizen Z. tried to convince me that he suffered from some heart disease or other. Vacationists like him must be made to understand that the quicker the folk dance, the healthier it is for their hearts. He then told me that he couldn't dance at all. Don't worry, I said to him,



not everybody is a ballet star. He was so stubborn that one night before the opening of our little show he came to my room and, kneeling down, begged me to release him from his dancing part. I managed to convince him that his attitude was anti-social. He got up. He danced next day. He danced as long as he could. Unfortunately, they had to carry him off the stage—straight to bed.

During my long years of work I have managed to create a whole corps of—you'll excuse the expression—"eager beavers." One should not, of course, speak lightly of specialization. It requires a great deal of painstaking trouble and sacrifice, but the results are terrific. A certain pleasant gentleman whom I taught the art of reciting became so enthusiastic about the beauty of poetry that he replied to all doctors' questions with the following fragment of a poem no doubt well known to you:



"Their beards are long, their mustaches curled,  
Their eyes are wild, etc. . . ."

I came across him recently in a sanitorium.

It sometimes happens that certain persons try to sneak out for a walk or to rest for a moment in the shade of a tree—unproductively. Making use of my methods, I immediately *activize* them.

These brief examples of my technique and experiences will, let us hope, encourage you, my dear colleagues, in moments of despair. It is even possible that a few of you may perhaps be inspired to better my own personal record: forty-six artistic performances during a single season lasting (as you know) less than seven weeks.

for the second half of May, 197 have been returned. Many of the certificates for employees of the post office, Ministry of Public Health, Ministry of Education and the press, as well as miners, textile workers and administrative workers are being sent back to the Central Committee of Professional Unions."

In typical Communist-criticism fashion, the government blames this unpopularity of resort vacations not upon the system, but upon the trade union, or the insurance commission which has "insufficient concern" for the welfare of workers. The Warsaw paper *Glos Pracy* wrote on August 20, 1952: "... The fact that out of a total 111 certificates only 36 were used by the District Council of Trade Unions in Konskie proves that the council does not concern itself with providing proper rest for the working people. It has to be admitted that the blame for this state of affairs in many districts may be put on district councils. . . . Many enterprises, too, used only 20 percent of their annual allocations. . . . Workshop committees and social welfare sections should pay more attention to this important problem."

The Romanian daily *Scanteia* wrote on June 9 that "... trade union and state organs must see that the staff at resorts takes good care of workers who come on their holidays. All criticism must be attended to and the necessary remedies applied. Working men on holidays must be able to see the paternal care of the people's State. . . ."

An article in *Otechestven Front* (Sofia), April 15, 1952 criticized trade union scheduling of vacations.

"... Errors in the organization of summer vacations which were allowed during past years should be carefully studied and eliminated this year. Vacancies at resorts last year are attributable to the refusal of trade unions to take advantage of resorts at their disposal or to use them for other purposes. Trade union organizations did not correctly understand that vacations should be properly scheduled throughout the whole year, and because of this there was an overloading of the summer shifts and considerable vacancies during the spring. Some of the trade unions . . . did not return undistributed certificates in sufficient time, and in this way deprived others of these places. . . . Many trade unions distribute certi-

ificates to workers at the last moment. . . . Local trade union councils do not sufficiently care for the improvement of resort conditions."

### The Gate-Crashers

Because of unpopularity of resort vacations among "selected" workers, it often happens that "undeserving" workers buy the rejected holiday certificates. The regime considers this deplorable. *Prace* (Prague) wrote on March 28:

"To prevent unjust selections and abuses of the benefits of recreation by the undeserving who do not belong in these plans, and to stamp out remnants of favoritism, the widest democratic control must be introduced. Plant councils are directed to post on bulletin boards the names of selected participants. To each name, detailed merits of the participants must be added. . . ."

Less than one month later, *Prace* wrote again:

"'Why don't you go to a resort?' Members of the plant union council confronted everyone they met with this question. 'Go,' they said, 'it would be a pity to let the certificates expire.' Thus it happened that a care-nothing worker of ill fame enjoyed recreation benefits for three consecutive years, just because the plant council wanted to get rid of certificates at the last moment before they expired. . . . The Revolutionary Trade Union Movement subsidizes the cost of the 14-day stay of each participant, and to foot the bill for care-nothings means robbing the collective. All members of plant union councils must surely be aware of this, for they are responsible for selection of participants. . . . It is necessary that plant and shop councils publicly announce on bulletin boards why this or that worker was chosen for recreation. Such control will be a guarantee of correct selection in the future."

### Private "Vacationing"

This summer, according to *Prace* (May 12), Czechoslovak trade unions will exceed all previous records and send 320,000 of the country's 3 million union members to State resorts. This excludes roughly nine out of every ten workers.

The State provides no resorts for these non-certificate workers (who nonetheless have the legal right to two weeks' annual leave), but has permitted a very few private establishments to remain open for public use, and sometimes makes a portion of rooms in State resorts available to "outsiders." It is likely, however, that the high cost of either kind of lodging is prohibitive to the ordinary worker. Moreover, workers who can actually afford private vacationing are considered suspect.

In Poland, the daily private rate is from 23 to 26 *zlotys*, or about 350 *zlotys* for two weeks. When travel, food and miscellaneous expenses are added, the total cost of such a vacation probably exceeds the average worker's monthly wage of 500 *zlotys* (\$125.00). A letter to the editor in the Warsaw paper *Zycie Warszawy*, January 22, 1952, complained: "The price for a night's lodging, as approved by the National Municipal Council, is simply absurd: one bed, often in a room with several others, costs 23 *zlotys* plus 3 *zlotys*

for heating and 6 *zlotys* for the so-called climatic tax."

On May first, a luxury hotel was opened to the Hungarian public in Balatonfoldvar, at a cost of 22-28 *forints* daily for a double room. Exile economists estimate three meals a day at 35-50 *forints*, bringing room and board alone to about 1000 *forints* for a two-week stay. This luxury is well beyond the reach of most workers' paychecks, which average 700 *forints* (\$59.00) monthly for an industrial worker.

A former electrician who escaped from Czechoslovakia in 1952 reported that in one of Czechoslovakia's major resort areas, the Krknose Mountains, only 10 percent of all hotels and other lodging are available for private use, at 200-260\* *koruny* daily. Application for space must go through the Travel Information Service (CIS), which has offices in all large cities. The agency requires the following information of prospective travelers: name, address, place and date of birth, profession, place of work, number of identity card, whether or not a vacation has already been granted during the year (by the trade union or privately), and the place and approximate time vacation will be taken. Applications are forwarded to the main CIS office in Prague, which makes the final decision as to place and date for the two-week holiday. It may be as much as two months beyond the date of application.

### The Booby Prize

If a Czechoslovak worker can't afford an extended private vacation, he has the opportunity of taking a one-day or week-end trip, also through CIS. Buses leave daily for tours through historic Prague, at a cost of 60 *koruny* for adults, 40 *koruny* for children under 10 years. A minimum of 25 persons must book for a second type of tour, through modern Prague; the price is 70 *koruny* for adults, 50 *koruny* for children. A boat trip on the Vltava River, combining a visit to the zoo, costs 30 to 40 *koruny*, depending upon the number of participants.\* Tours through Prague's environs, either by train or bus, and week-end or one-week skiing trips to the mountains, are arranged upon special request by interested travelers. Lodging for the night is at the same high rate as for extended private vacations, and difficult to obtain unless reserved in advance. *Rude Pravo*, July 17, 1952, said that during the first half of 1951 approximately 300,000 persons used CIS services for organized trips. The number increased to 1,260,000 for the first six months of 1952. The newspaper added: ". . . Although in general CIS fulfills its important tasks, there are still some shortcomings, . . . derived primarily . . . from insufficient cooperation between administration offices and hotels and transportation enterprises. [Unfortunately], CIS owns no special means for transportation, accommodation or restaurants. . . ."

In Romania and Bulgaria, trade unions arrange one-day or week-end trips to the capital's environs. The Sofia paper *Trud*, in an editorial dated July 4, 1952, wrote:

"Last year, the district council of trade unions in Sofia

\* Pre-currency reform prices.



successfully used one-day excursions . . . for broad cultural-educational work. Special trains were assigned for tours to Svoge and Kurilo villages, near Sofia. On the occasion of the 70th anniversary of Georgi Dimitrov's birth, mass excursions to Vitosha Mountain and Makotzevo village were organized, and short reports on the life and deeds of Dimitrov were given for the workers. These excursions could also successfully be used for the exchange of experiences between stakhanovites from different enterprises."

### **Never "Wish You Were Here"**

As with life and liberty, what few "pursuits of happiness" the Communist leaders grant their captive populations have tight political and economic strings attached.

While two weeks' annual leave is "guaranteed" in all Satellite constitutions, this right is considerably watered down by laws on job changing and absenteeism, by restrictive "vacation cycles," and by provisions against carrying over unused vacation time from one year to the next.

While Central European regimes have committed themselves to providing a "wide network" of resort homes, and boast the best recreation system in the world, they deliberately limit vacation housing and closely control their handful of resort certificates to increase individual worker output.

Although the regimes claim they foot so much of the bill

that now even the humblest citizen can go on State vacation, only one out of ten workers ever manages to get away: the nine who stay home contribute substantially, through automatic salary deductions, to privileges enjoyed by their stakhanovite brethren.

The "toiling masses" are asked to believe that they are the beneficiaries of "classless" democracy, but the Communist Party elite is hypocritically showered with preferential vacation treatment.

Even for those chosen few among the masses who do get free or reduced-rate resort certificates, this production reward is not the prize package Communist regimes would have the West believe. Comrade Vacationer can almost never leave his country. He has no final say as to where he will go. He can seldom take his wife along, and almost never take the whole family. When he arrives at his assigned "resort," he's likely to find inadequate housing and poor food. Recreation activists, taking over the job of Party agitators and Plant activists who have been at his heels the rest of the year, will schedule his time and regiment his activities. Communist "leisure" becomes a political farce; Communist "relaxation" an economic travesty. Resort certificates go begging, for the simple, human reason that workers prefer to spend their vacations at home or with relatives, away from the jaundiced eye and strenuous lungs of the Communist State.

# Satellite Drugs

## I. SHORTAGES AND SUBSTITUTES

The entire East European wing of the Soviet empire is today suffering from drug shortages. Before World War II the smaller or less industrialized states (Albania, the Baltics, Bulgaria, Romania) produced few drugs on their own, relying heavily on foreign imports to satisfy their limited needs. With Soviet absorption, and Moscow's blockade of Western trade after the summer of 1948, this important source was inadequately replaced by Russian imports, pathetically supplemented by the confiscation of such drugs as happened to turn up in "gift packages" from the free world.

In the more industrialized nations (especially Czechoslovakia), where there had been considerable pre-war domestic production as well as thriving trade with the West, Communist nationalization of the drugs industry seriously affected output. Notwithstanding vigorous regime efforts to bring production back to pre-war par, the loss of Western raw materials combined with technical difficulties has blocked real advance.

Throughout the area, and despite rigidly State-controlled distribution of medicaments, shortages in supply have nourished a flourishing black market dealing particularly in drugs smuggled or gift-mailed from the West.

### Poland

Up to the beginning of the Second World War, the Polish pharmaceutical market was supplied by home industries and the unrestricted flow of foreign products. The Klawe and Motor industries, with head offices in Warsaw, were the most important companies producing medical supplies. Foreign firms such as Bayer (German), Roche and Sandoz (Swiss) were well represented, as were various French manufacturers. Medicines were distributed and

prepared in privately-owned pharmacies.

After the war the entire pharmaceutical industry was nationalized, including foreign companies\*, under the name of the "Polish Pharmaceutical Industry" and each plant was assigned a serial number. Management was placed in the hands of the so-called "Centrofarm," previously known as "Centrosan."

Newly instituted economy measures limited experimental research; costly methods of production and scientific contracts with foreign countries were stopped; and currency restrictions prevented the replenishment of worn out installations and the importation of necessary raw materials.\*\* A physician who escaped to the West near the end of 1951 described the effect of these measures:

"The government requires the strict application of all money-saving methods without consideration of human health or life. Part of this economy is based upon the false evaluation of medicaments purchased by the patient. Doctors soon began to realize that medicines of Polish make, prescribed in similar doses, are less effective than those manufactured abroad.

"Some medicines are imported from the Soviet Union, but they have proved to be not only ineffective but so impure that their effect is rather toxic and often very dangerous. The importation of caffeine was discontinued because it often produces symptoms of poisoning, grave diseases, and leaves a white, insoluble residue in sealed ampoules and syringes.

"In spite of all the rules governing asepsis, Polish-made specifics often produce suppuration with compli-

\* The nationalization program was carried out in so questionable a manner that such firms as Roche filed suit against the Polish government in the International Court of Justice.

\*\* A small amount of import is still carried on with the West, principally France.

cations of the *ersipelas* type. Similar effects result from the use of Polish-made camphor. In the case of narcotics, Polish physicians are afraid to inject morphine manufactured in the USSR because it often brings about symptoms of depressive respiration. When using penicillin, doctors are advised by authorities to give dosages which are only 80 percent as strong as those manufactured abroad (Danish, Belgian, American or English). In reality, their strength is even lower."

## Production

Data concerning the production of medical supplies is very fragmentary. However, during the later part of 1952, *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), December 9 boasted:

"Production has increased manifoldly due to the rapid development of pharmaceutical establishments. We now produce about 700 pharmaceutical preparations. Several new specifics have been fabricated such as penicillin, ACTH [adreno-cortico-tropic hormones], chloromycetin, anti-tubercular remedies such as pas, hydrazid, etc., as well as synthetic hormones, sulphamids, aminoacids and so on.

"During recent years, the country's raw material base has been considerably developed and the substitution of materials of foreign origin by those produced in Poland has been carried out. At present, about 70 percent of total pharmaceutical output consists of basic materials and products needed in the preparation of medicines. These achievements enable us to decrease the import of pharmaceutical products. Planned import . . . for 1953 represents only a fifth of that for 1951."

The most important manufacturing plants are located as follows:

1—*Trachomin*, near Warsaw. According to *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), March 9, 1952, penicillin is the main product manufactured. Some barbiturates such as veronal, dial, evipan, luminal, ACTH etc. are also produced.

2—*Starogard*, Province of Gdansk. Here sulphazol (an antibiotic used against infection) is produced. Bromural (a sleeping drug used to combat neurasthenia) has lately been added. Other drugs manufactured are: luminal, used against insomnia and epilepsy; evipan, used in surgical narcosis; polopirin rubrosil and sulphamid, used in treating diseases of the respiratory tissues.

3—*Jeienia Gora*, Province of Wroclaw. Histidin (used in treating stomach and intestinal ulcers), luminal, crystalline penicillin, and a form of penicillin called "procain" are the main products. Production of liver extract was begun in 1951. The extract is prepared for use in injections used to cure anemia.

4—*Zgierz*, near Lodz. This establishment produces great quantities of the anti-tuberculosis specific, pas.

5—*Poznan*. Center of Vitamin A, B, and C production.

6—*Krakow*. *Kurier Codzienny* (Warsaw), July 17, 1952, stated that chloromycetin (used in treating typhoid fever), and specifics used to cure diseases of the digestive track, are produced in large quantities.

7—*Wroclaw*. Here great quantities of Vitamin B<sub>12</sub>, used to combat anemia, are manufactured.

Other large pharmaceutical plants are located in Warsaw, Walbrzych (Province of Wroclaw), Wroclaw, Gliwice (near Katowice), and Sopoty (near Gdansk), where cod-liver oil is produced.

## Distribution

The official pharmaceutical directory for 1953 contains 1,397 entries—"at the disposition of physicians for prescriptions destined for insured patients"—according to *Express Wieczorny* (Warsaw), January 7. However, far fewer than that number are available. Drugs such as chloromycetin are not available in drug stores and lately it has been impossible to buy them on the black market. Aureomycin is also scarce. Only in exceptional cases is it possible to get hold of and then at a cost of 1,200 *zlotys* for 250 grams (about 33 dollars an ounce). Streptomycin and pas are also very difficult to come by. Until the middle of 1952 they could be bought on the black market, but are no longer available even from that source.


Penicillin was available in sufficient quantity until 1947. Supplies at that time consisted chiefly of UNRRA shipments. After 1947 foreign-made penicillin appeared periodically, but after 1949 it disappeared completely from the market. Then Soviet-made penicillin of poor quality began to appear in drug stores and hospitals. Domestic production was started in 1951 and small quantities, although only 30 percent as strong, were available in drug stores. Then the drug again disappeared and is now rare. State distributors have informed medical personnel that the drug should be prescribed only in exceptional cases and in small amounts, and recommend the use of substitutes such as sulphametazin and other sulphamids.

The use of penicillin is further controlled by a regulation introduced in 1951 which requires the physician prescribing the drug to submit his diagnosis and address, along with the address of his patient, to a special commission. As a result doctors hesitate to prescribe scarce drugs, and persons desparately in need of such drugs are often forced to go to considerable lengths to obtain them.

Prior to 1950, hormone preparations were not generally produced. Those manufactured were of inferior quality and doctors avoided using them. Necessary extracts were bought on the black market. The same situation prevails today. For the time being, liver extracts produced in such places as Jelenia Gora are not equal to those made abroad, which are no longer obtainable on the black market.

Heparyn and dicumerol, used to treat thrombosis, could never be bought in drug stores. Until 1950, they could be purchased on the black market at a cost between 40 to 60 dollars for an amount needed to effect a cure. Now they are difficult to get even there. If someone receives a gift of these two drugs from abroad, he must report it immediately to the proper authorities and sell the drugs to the State pharmacies. Similar regulations apply to streptomycin, chloromycetin, the sulphas, etc., even though these first two are produced domestically.





The picture shows the research laboratory in the Pharmaceutical Plant in Cracow which produces chloromycetin.

*Wirtschaftsdienst* (published monthly by the Polish Information Bureau, Berlin), August, 1952.

Distribution of medicines to State pharmacies and hospitals is controlled by the State Pharmaceutical Central, which is a division of the Ministry of Health.

It is reported that high State functionaries, Party dignitaries and their families receive medical care in special clinics operated by the Ministry of Health or in well equipped ambulatories, while the bulk of the population is serviced in public hospitals which are inadequately equipped and insufficiently supplied with medicines.

#### Import

Before nationalization, pharmacies sold medicines smuggled into the country from Germany as well as those acquired through the receipt of gift packages from the West. This peculiar form of import played an important role in supplying the country with needed medicaments. It even enriched pharmacists through subsequent price rises. Penicillin, streptomycin, Vitamins B<sub>6</sub> and B<sub>12</sub>, etc. were all available at "quoted" market prices. Now, in spite of published lists of products and directives governing their distribution and use, shortages are reported from every part of the country. And Poland's new partners in trade are in no position to satisfy her present need.

Advertisements regularly appear in the papers proclaiming: "Wanted, Streptomycin", "Wanted, Antystin", "Vitaman B<sub>12</sub> Wanted", etc. Foreign-made drugs shipped to Poland from the West, as gifts, fetch as much as 1,600 *zlotys* (40 dollars) for one million units of penicillin.

The Department of Supplies of the Ministry of Health has no influence in planning the import or domestic production of drugs. Finding itself in an awkward position, the department decided to tap gift parcels from abroad. On March 22, 1952, a disposition of the Ministry of Health

appeared "concerning the acquisition of some pharmaceutical items from gift parcels." The purpose of this disposition was to legalize the sale of drugs received from the West and to encourage their continued reception. The list attached to this disposition names 201 items. Shortages are underlined by the fact that no minimum has been set on the amount of medicines and drugs which can be sold to State pharmacies. The regulation merely stipulates that the wrapping should be original and intact.

In spite of all these difficulties, *Trybuna Ludu* wrote on January 10 that pharmaceutical supplies produced in Poland are now being exported abroad, which probably means China and North Korea.

#### Romania

In 1938, the import of medical supplies and drugs into Romania amounted to 620,186,000 *lei* or 3.3 percent of the total import for that year. Supplies came chiefly from Germany, France and the United States. At the same time, supplies and drugs of almost equal monetary value (counting cosmetics) were domestically produced.

Prior to 1944, the most important pharmaceutical industries were affiliated with such international organizations as Bayer, Dr. Wander, Standard, I. G. Farben, etc. But the independent Beyersdorf, Chlorodont, Hygea, G. Richter, Odol-Pharma, Vorel and Gea-Krayer factories produced most of the drugs needed.

After September 1944, the Russians seized approximately 80 percent of available stocks held by both civilians and the military, with a value (according to provisional reports received by the Romanian Foreign Office in 1946) of almost two billion (1944) *lei*.

The Russians also took over all chemical and pharmaceutical enterprises in which German nationals held stock. These factories were the largest and best equipped in the country. They have been run ever since as extra-territorial Soviet enterprises, and are exempt from taxes and fees as well as from Romanian laws. Their products are either exported to the USSR or sold on the Romanian market as Soviet goods.

#### Present Needs

In spite of a decrease in population (brought about by territorial changes) from 20 to 16 million, the volume of medicines and drugs needed is greater than the amount necessary before the last war. As the result of malnutrition, overwork and nervous strain, the proportion of people suffering from TB, stomach ulcers, nervous diseases, etc. has risen considerably. During 1951, in a single region containing 250,000 inhabitants (Mures), no less than 36,000 persons became infected with TB and were placed under cure, while an additional 40,000 were vaccinated against the Kolch bacillus. The largest proportion of victims were children.

The number of people suffering from anemia is alarmingly high, and physical resistance generally low. But synthetic vitamins necessary to replace those normally obtained from food are not available. Such important drugs

as penicillin and neosalvarsan are not being manufactured, and the supply from West Germany was cut off in 1945.

## Production

Except for sporadic imports of small quantities of medicine from Switzerland, imports from the West have completely ceased due to the lack of foreign currency. The little import remaining comes from East Germany and the USSR. Consequently, home industries must increase and diversify their production.

Last January the newspapers announced that the production of medicines and drugs during 1953 will reach the level originally planned for 1955. It is also claimed that factories are manufacturing 350 items never produced before, such as aspirin, glucose, calcium glucoside, sulphanamides, salicylic acid, pak, phenacetin, vitamins and various antibiotics.

Among production facilities still in Romanian hands are the Cantacuzino Institute in Bucharest, which chiefly prepares sera and vaccines; Medicine Factory No. 2, which produces liver extract among other things (processing is very difficult however, as the plant lacks adequate installations); Medicine Factory No. 7, which manufactures Vitamin C, adrenaline, novocaine and a stabilizing solution which adequately replaces the matron bisulphite formerly imported from the West; and Medicine Factory No. 3, at Cluj, which puts out standard medicines.

Research for the Romanian-owned pharmaceutical industry is done by the Chemical-Pharmaceutical Institute of Bucharest, under the supervision of the Romanian Academy of Sciences. In the spring of 1952 it was claimed that this Institute had succeeded in "synthetizing" a drug called "Rimifon," which is supposedly superior to streptomycin. It was also claimed at that time that Romanian factories had produced "an appreciable number of difficult syntheses" such as chloramine, sulphanilamide, Vitamin K, histidine, dihydrotyrosine and paramino-salicylic acid. Substitutes for Digitaline K and for medicines used in the treatment of angina pectoris, arteriosclerosis, etc. were also mentioned in the press.

The Soviet-owned factories are known to produce a greater variety of medicines and drugs, as their facilities are better. Many Western patents are developed in their laboratories and later claimed as Soviet discoveries. For instance, the TB antibiotic "Nydrazid", which was developed by the United States, is being made in such Soviet-owned Romanian laboratories as "Tebecalm."

## Quality

Drugs are manufactured and marketed according to formulae supplied by the Ministry of Health. Standard drugs are prescribed for whole groups of related diseases, and only one is available where many were thought necessary in the past. The formulae do not differ from those formerly used, but their quality is reported to be very poor due to incompetent druggists and substitute ingredients.

To combat the scarcity of raw materials, the cultivation of medicinal plants has been greatly expanded. It is officially claimed that Romania will soon become second only to Russia as the greatest producer of medical herbs in Europe. Activities are under the control of the government which acts through its agency, Plafar, an organization which supervises the cultivation, processing and distribution—including exports—of medical herbs.

## Distribution

All pharmacies, distribution centers and chemical enterprises were nationalized by law in June 1948 and the distribution of medical supplies placed under State control. Distribution is carried out via the organization O.F.I.F., which operates chiefly in urban and industrial centers.\*

The quantity of medicines and drugs available to the people at present is no more than one-third the prewar supply. Only 60 standard drugs are sold in State pharmacies, compared to 5,200 varieties offered before the last war.

The distribution of penicillin has been under the direct control of the Health Department of the local Soviet since January 1951. It can be found in only 12 pharmacies in Bucharest and can be bought only when the doctor's prescription has been approved by the local Soviet.

In 1951, the government built an experimental plant near Sinaia for penicillin produced according to Soviet methods. Apparently, it was a failure, as it has been completely dismantled and a new factory is reported under construction somewhere in Moldavia (probably at Iasi), for which the Soviet Union will supply the major installations. Production is planned to cover all domestic requirements.

Streptomycin is so scarce that physicians may prescribe it only for children, and then only in desperate cases.

It is reported that Western medicines are not available in hospitals accessible to the average working man and his family, although they can be obtained in a number of special hospitals reserved for card-carrying Party members. Prior to the ban on imports from the West, these hospitals were supplied by the confiscation of 20 to 25 percent of incoming medicines as "payment in kind" on customs duties, and from the obligatory sale to the State (at "official" prices) of a fixed quota of these same medicines. Lately, many of these hospitals are being supplied with items smuggled onto Romanian ships stopping in Western ports.

## Imports

Some medical products of good quality have been imported from East Germany. But such imports have recently diminished, leaving the USSR as the chief foreign source of medicines and drugs. However, even Soviet products have become scarce. As a matter of fact, Soviet production was never designed to exceed domestic requirements and the Satellite countries have been constantly en-

\* Rural distribution is supervised by the People's Councils, i.e. the local Soviets.

couraged to produce their own medicines and drugs.

Of those Russian-manufactured drugs available in Romania, tuberculin and novocain are reported to be particularly poor in quality. Soviet penicillin is scarce, yellow in color and reportedly poisonous. The latter charge does not appear to be true, but the drug has proved ineffective. The Soviet substitute for neosalvarsan, called "arsphenamine", is even more to be avoided as its use has resulted in a high proportion of deaths. Such deaths may be due to imprecise directions for administering the drug as well as to its variable arsenic content.

### Czechoslovakia

Drug production in pre-war Czechoslovakia was excellent, with a number of enterprises putting out drugs of superior quality. Many large foreign companies maintained representatives in the country, and some owned plants which produced their brands. All drugs were available. Those not in stock were imported from abroad. American and English insulins were on the market immediately after they were produced in those countries. Domestic production took care of the demand for most drugs and was equal to world standards. Under the German occupation, high quality German and Swiss drugs were available wherever domestic manufacture was insufficient.

Almost all biological drugs (serums and vaccines) were made by the State Health Institute in Prague. Others were imported from Germany and Austria. Some hormones were also manufactured. There was large-scale export of pharmaceutical products. The State Institute had a large department producing drugs for the treatment of allergies, and every kind of autovaccine was prepared there.

After 1945, many American drugs such as penicillin, the sulphas, dioumarol and blood plasma were imported by UNRRA. A short time afterward dioumarol was put on the market under the name "Pellentan-Rapid." Up until the Communist coup all foreign drugs were available, although prices were high.

Like all other Czechoslovak industries, the pharmaceutical industry was nationalized and a drop in production followed. The 1951-52 plan omitted Vitamin B tablets and injections and none have been available since the beginning of 1952. Sulphonamides, penicillin and streptomycin have also disappeared from the market, the latter two being available only in hospitals.

By a decree issued by the Ministry of Health in accordance with the Ministry of Finance on March 27, 1952, three national enterprises for the production of drugs were set up as of March 31 of that year: Penicillin National Enterprise\*, located in Roztoky near Prague; Biogena (antibiotics), in Prague; and Lecive Roztliny (medicinal plants), at Zbraslav on the Vltava. The preparation and distribution of drugs, sanitary materials, etc., is entrusted

\* This plant, which was supplied with modern equipment by UNRRA in 1946, is the only plant producing penicillin in Czechoslovakia. Efforts to extract penicillin in a purified form have so far been fruitless; the product is not soluble in oily liquids, and must be kept on ice. Of the one billion units produced, nine-tenths are exported to the USSR, the rest going to the population of Czechoslovakia (which actually requires three billion units).

to 19 enterprises in various parts of the country, all of which carry the name Medika, with the additional designation of their geographical location.

There are two other national enterprises called Sanitas, located in Prague and Bratislava, which pack and distribute imported and other special drugs, sanitary materials and optical goods.

A Special State Institute for the control of drugs was established in Prague, with a branch in Bratislava, in April 1952. Its chief job is to control and examine the quality of drugs, to carry on research in the field of drug control, and to train health workers in drug control.

### Production

On April 2, 1952, *Rude Pravo* (Prague) claimed:

"Workers at the Spofa Works in Olomouc have succeeded in producing three important drugs which formerly had to be imported for hard currency. One of the drugs is used in treating gastric ailments, the second is a sedative and the third is Vitamin C. All are being made from domestic raw materials or materials imported from the USSR. . . . The new drugs are equal to foreign ones and are even superior. . . ."

Another report, published by *Rude Pravo* on January 10 of this year, stated that an anti-tuberculosis drug called pas "is now being made in Czechoslovakia in tablets, and dry injections and manufacture as an ointment are being considered." The paper also claimed that there is sufficient production of insuline, chloromycetin, pelentan (used to combat coagulation of the blood in cases of thrombosis, inflammation of the veins, etc.).

On June 22, the same newspaper reported the discovery of a new antibiotic:

"Dr. Otakar Smahel and Milos Herold recently announced success in creating a new antibiotic: perocilin.

"Perocilin has proved to be more effective than penicillin in the treatment of certain diseases and has the added advantage that it can be given in tablet form rather than by injection . . . making the patient less dependent on medical personnel. It can therefore be used more extensively. . . ."

Further information regarding this new drug was released by the *Prague News Letter* (in English) on July 4.

"[Perocilin] can also be used with penicillin. For example, in cases where penicillin has been prescribed, perocilin tablets may be given to offset the danger that arises when large numbers of microbes . . . adapt themselves to the penicillin and do not perish. When perocilin tablets are used in conjunction with penicillin, development of microbe resistance is prevented. Perocilin is also of value in preventing the development of such diseases as rheumatic heart. . . ."

"The tablets are manufactured by the Roztok Penicillin plant which is also responsible, in co-operation with the Charles University medical school in Prague, for the perfecting of Czechoslovak penicillin."



*Svobodne Slovo* (Prague), July 8 announced that:

"The operation of the first Czechoslovak factory for the production of streptomycin has just been started. The product has been subjected to the most rigorous analytical tests which have shown that it is satisfactory from both the chemical and pharmacological point of view. Its effect has been successfully tested in our clinics. Manufacture will be increased so that we should be self-sufficient in the near future and entirely independent of imports."

Penicillin itself is no longer imported, and the penicillin factory at Roztoky has recently been enlarged. The manufacture of penicillin in tablet form is in preparation. Preparations in crystalline and ointment form are being made "in sufficient quantity to allow for export." Quality is claimed to be high and raw materials are of domestic origin. The plan for 1952 was fulfilled in November of that year and this year the plan exceeds that for 1952 by "170 percent."

The treatment of syphilis by penicillin is forbidden, because such large quantities of the drug are required to effect a cure. Between four to six hundred thousand units are allotted for cases of pneumonia, which requires 1,200,000 units for proper treatment. Parcels from abroad containing penicillin or streptomycin are seized, and most of their contents confiscated.

#### Distribution

Drugs are provided free of charge to members of the national insurance system (*Rude Pravo*, December 15, 1951). But the same newspaper suggested later in the month that this practice might have to be revised:

"The question of charging for drugs has been the object of careful consideration. In the Soviet Union, insurance bearers have to contribute a certain amount toward the cost of drugs prescribed for them. Therefore, it can be assumed that this method will be introduced here too. Especially as the cost of drugs is increasing. . . ."

Antonin Zapotocky expressed annoyance over drug waste, in a speech printed in *Rude Pravo*, May 16, 1952:

"The situation . . . is most unhealthy. Because they are supplied free of charge, there is real gambling and wasting of drugs. At the present time, we are spending five billion *koruny* a year . . . and rank first in drug consumption. . . . Consumption increased 150 percent over 1946 in 1949, and 200 percent in 1951. . . . One is amazed to see how many things are being prescribed by the doctors, and how many drugs the patient is able to stuff himself with. Loads of drugs, pills, drops, etc., go unused, [spoil] and are being thrown away. . . . We neglect the collection of herbs which can be grown here. Last year, we planted ergot which has never been harvested. Camomillae had to be ploughed under . . . although dry camomillae was unavailable throughout the country."

In January of this year, *Nova Praha* reported the continued fight against waste.

"Employees of the Regional National Health Insti-

tute in Prague have understood fully the appeal to fight against the wasting of drugs. . . . This fight has resulted in savings of one billion *koruny* during 1952. . . . At the National Health Institute, drugs are prescribed only after medical examination and never upon the claim of the patient. As a result, expenses for drugs in Prague have been considerably reduced. . . ."

Two weeks later the same paper complained of continued waste in spite of the efforts of the National Institute.

"The drug shortage in Prague is constantly increasing. We desire to provide everyone with good treatment without charge, but the unexplained increase in drug consumption proves that there must be waste. District offices . . . in Prague consumed 277 million *koruny* worth of drugs from January to October 1952 and hospitals consumed drugs valued at 64 million *koruny* during the same period. . . . In order to prevent waste, the National Health Institute checks expenses for drugs in hospitals and health institutes every month, and advises pharmacies to inform doctors in their district as to their supply."

#### Imports

Imports have been cut down to a minimum (in January, *Rude Pravo* stated that they constitute only five percent of total imports), and the soliciting of gifts from the West is discouraged. Drugs are still imported from East Germany, Denmark and Switzerland, and up to 1952 trade agreements with the USSR mentioned reciprocal deliveries. No official mention has been made of the use of Soviet drugs, but private reports state that they are being used and that their quality is poor, especially in drugs used to fight tuberculosis.

As in the other Satellite countries, drugs received from abroad are held by the customs until the recipient presents a doctor's certificate countersigned by the local National Committee stating that the drugs are necessary. Any amount in excess of the recipient's requirements must be turned over to the State.

#### Bulgaria

Before the Second World War, the chief manufacturer of drugs in Bulgaria was the Galenus Pharmaceutical Company, which in most cases prepared tablets from materials imported from abroad. There were also a few small enterprises which prepared drugs from imported raw materials. Now, all production is nationalized and operates under the direction of the Ministry of Public Health.

The main sources of imported medicaments before the war were Switzerland and Germany. After the war, antibiotics were imported mainly from Western Europe and the United States. There is no local production of penicillin, streptomycin, etc. and at present they are bought from the other Satellites and the USSR. The quality of these drugs is not as good as those manufactured in the West.

## Production

A series of articles appearing in the press boast of achievements realized since the nationalization plan went into effect.

*Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), September 1, 1950:

"The workers of the Galenus Factory in Sofia are already producing a great number of the basic materials used in manufacturing different drugs. . . . Valuable drugs such as codeine, morphine, santonin, ergotamin, alkaloids from bella-donna, calcium phosphate, etc., are obtained from our herbs. . . . As of July 31, the plan for 1950 is fulfilled 65.88 percent. Workers engaged in the preparation of tablets are in the lead. They have fulfilled the plan 72.72 percent."

*Vecherni Novini* (Sofia), February 1, 1952:

"Studies so far prove that our herbs contain the drug santonin . . . which has been obtained in pure form, is now produced in quantities which not only satisfy our needs but allow for export. . . . The valuable anti-worm drug, henopodium, until recently imported, has also been discovered. . . ."

"The pharmaceutical department of the Vulko Chervenkov Medical School has discovered a new drug called antiparkin which combats sleeping sickness. . . ."

*Otechestven Front* (Sofia), October 24, 1952:

"The vaccine BCJ—the most effective drug against tuberculosis—is already being made in our country. . . . The dry form has great advantages over the liquid form. Dry vaccine remains good for a year, while liquid vaccine is only good for fifteen days after it is produced."

*Vecherni Novini*, December 22, 1952:

"The chemists Hariton Ivanov and Boris Yordanov of the Ministry of Public Health, along with Stefan Stevchev of the Galenus Factory, have worked out a method for obtaining ergotamin—pure alkaloid—from the indigo plant using local raw materials. From ergotamin, bellergeramin is produced which is identical to imported bellergeral."

"Engineer Bojan Patev and chemist Milko Nikolov have worked out a method of producing tubigal, identical in chemical compound and curative effect to the Soviet drug 'tubin.'"

"Ivan Isaev, an assistant in pharmaceutical technology . . . has produced the drug zitizin by using local materials. By producing this drug in ampuls, imported lobelin has been replaced."

"The chemists Georgi Tzenov, Virgilii Kamidulski and Boris Yordanov have created atropin sulphuric from local materials, thereby satisfying the need . . . for atropin."

*Vecherni Novini*, January 19, 1953:

"Until recently, antivariolous [smallpox] vaccine was obtained only as liquid. . . . Following the instructions of the Soviet doctor A. Ignatova, we have now obtained dry antivariolous vaccine using the method of Prof. Belaev from the Virus Institute at the Lenin Academy of Sciences."

"During December 1952, in the laboratories of the Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology, a new antibiotic called eritrin was obtained. [It] is a dark brown, amorphous powder which is derived from red blood corpuscles. It is used against purulent wounds, burns, etc. [Its] effect is being tested in the Institute of Pediatrics, after which it will be mass-produced."

Radio Sofia claimed in a broadcast on February 14:

"The Bulgarian Chemical and Pharmaceutical Plant has mastered the production of hydrochloric morphine, which is used to treat pain and coughs. This plant also produces bionine ethyl morphine, papagenin, tempanin and other drugs. . . ."

A new penicillin plant is under construction in Razgrad. Work began in December 1952 (*Trud*, Sofia, December 10, 1952), but due to the lack of building materials little progress has been made (*Trud*, May 7, 1953).

Other sources report that Bulgaria is manufacturing piperazin, which is used to treat kidney disorders, gout and rheumatism. A bottle of this medicine costs eight *leva* (6.8 *leva* equal one dollar) and is a little smaller than those available in Italian pharmacies. Another medicine, called bellergeramin, is used as a substitute for the famous Sandoz "Bellergeral" in heart disease cases. This medicine is made by the Galenus plant. Each bottle contains 30 pills and costs 14.25 *leva*.

Other achievements were claimed for the Chervenkov Medical School by Professor Petur Popchristov, in his report broadcast over Radio Sofia on March 8, 1952:

"Our specialists on tuberculosis have found methods to detect earlier, treat better, and lower the death rate of tubercular pneumonia. They have demonstrated the excellent new drug, tubisal, which can be used in cases of pulmonary tuberculosis."

"A number of well-known but hitherto imported drugs for the treatment of common skin diseases have been synthesized, and a number of new drugs have been invented. Important work has been done on cardiac drugs, as well as on the production of vitamin concentrates from domestic raw materials."

"Our stomatologic faculty has studied problems connected with the production of medicaments for dental diseases and prophylaxis, as well as dental prosthetic materials. . . ."

"One of the most important achievements of medical science during 1951 is the isolation of specific microbes found in the human mouth which, after being treated, have a curative effect similar to that of penicillin and the sulphur drugs on suppurative skin injuries, obstinate wounds and diphtherial infection. In the last two cases, the drug has proven to be more effective than penicillin and a number of other modern drugs. . . ."

## Distribution

Refugee reports reveal a lack of medicines and drugs similar to that existing in the other Satellite countries. The same black market operations also exist. Medicaments are to be had only on the prescription of officially recognized

doctors and are difficult to obtain. Streptomycin, the drug most in demand, is available only on the black market. The official price is about 5,000 *leva* per ten grams. Rimifon is also very much in demand for TB treatment. Requests for pas—another drug used in treating TB—are constantly being sent to Italy.

*Vecherni Novini* wrote on February 22 that "the Ministry of Health has ordered the customs not to deliver packages containing pas—the new drug against tuberculosis—except on receipt of a permit issued by the health department to the sick person or his relatives."

### Hungary

Before 1945, Hungary had a flourishing pharmaceutical industry: big drug factories such as Chinoin and Richter exported a considerable volume of drugs, especially to the Balkan countries, Latin America and the Far East.

These factories are still operating at full capacity, but no data are available on the amount, cost and distribution of the medicines and drugs they manufacture.

Pharmaceutical products were imported from Germany and Switzerland until the outbreak of the last war. At the present time some of these products are smuggled into the country, but the shortage of medicines is grave. In 1947 Hungary imported 853,000 *forints*\* worth of sodium bicarbonate from Austria (1.72 percent of total imports), 3,188,000 *forints* worth of medicines (1.19 percent of total imports) and 4,515,000 *forints* worth of sterilized cotton bandages (1.68 percent of total imports).

At present, drugs are exported chiefly to the Soviet Union, China and North Korea, as well as to countries belonging to the non-Communist East (such as India). No further details are known.

One important pharmaceutical plant has been built under the Five Year Plan: the Hajdusagi Gyogyszergyár plant, in the vicinity of Debrecen, which began operations in June, 1952. It is modern but small, and primarily produces penicillin. The Budapest daily *Nepszava*, May 31, 1953, carried a report on the factory which revealed that a few grams of penicillin were first manufactured by the Chinoin factory in 1949. The article went on to say that the new factory is "a comparatively small one" and that its first-year plan was fulfilled 94.6 percent.

*Magyar-Szovjet Kozgazdasagi Szemle* (Hungarian-Soviet Economic Review) mentioned the same factory in its January-February 1952 number.

"Our drug output will be increased 55.4 percent and the production of . . . ingredients 30 percent compared to 1951. . . . A large sum will be appropriated for finishing the construction of the Hajdusag Drug Factory, which will become an important producer of antibiotics, second only to the one in the Soviet Union. . . . By [the end of] 1952 it will manufacture enough penicillin to meet not only domestic demands, but to allow for export."

\* 11.78 *forints* equal one dollar.

An escapee who fled the country last year describes some of the conditions in the plant, and the difficulty in obtaining drugs.

"The Debrecen [Hajdusag] Factory began making penicillin regularly in September [1952]. The plant was equipped with machines imported from East Germany. The drug is packed for export to the USSR and is tagged with labels written in Russian. The output of sulfonamid is also shipped to the Soviet Union.

"Severe measures were recently introduced in the plant to prevent theft. All employees are now searched before leaving the factory. One woman was caught trying to smuggle medicine out of the plant. She explained that the doctor had prescribed the medicine for her child and that she had tried to get it at drug stores, but that it was not to be found anywhere. She tried to buy some from the factory, but her request was refused with the explanation that the medicine was not sold within the country. Since she could find no other way of procuring the medicine, she decided to steal some. Her case was reported to the police and she was sentenced to six months in prison by the Debrecen District Court."

The quality of domestically manufactured medicines and drugs is reportedly very poor and the people express complete confidence only in those products manufactured abroad.

A lengthy article appeared recently in the magazine *Magyar Technika*, No. 2, claiming new achievements in drug manufacturing. These claims appear somewhat excessive, particularly in the light of continual private requests in letters to the West for medicines and drugs.

The article read, in part:

"The Pharmaceutical Research Institute and the Central Biochemical Industry Research Laboratory have initiated the manufacture of many new medicines. . . . The Chinoin Factory's new product, 'ultraseptil,' should prove very important as an export. The growing domestic demand and a rapidly increasing export require that experiments be made to find a cheaper way of manufacturing this drug. . . . As the result of successful experiments, certain raw materials which have formerly had to be bought on the Western market are no longer necessary.

"We have also succeeded in producing large quantities of chloramphenicol, the new antibiotic discovered in recent years. . . .

"Our successful anti-tuberculosis drive has been supported by the production of many very important drugs [tebaminal and thiomycin]. Soon we will be able to manufacture these drugs for export. . . .

"The Chinoin Factory has been producing Vitamin B<sub>1</sub> since 1938, but at a price far higher than on the world market. On the basis of the Soviet chemist Chelencev's theory, we have recently succeeded in manufacturing it to sell at a reasonable price. . . .

"The fact that most raw materials must be imported has hampered the progress of [the] pharmaceutical industry. Therefore the production of drugs from domestic raw materials of plant and animal origin is of great significance. The production of antibiotics, especially . . .



can be further developed. Our greatest achievement is the manufacture, from domestic materials, of enough penicillin to cover both foreign and domestic demands.

"The making of Vitamin C is also based on the use of materials derived from agriculture. . . . A new production method based on Soviet data has made it possible for us to establish our first Vitamin C plant.

"Drugs derived from animal matter, which we have worked out a method of producing, include thrombin, which effects the clotting of blood and which we produce in sufficient quantity for export; and fibrin [in the form of] powder, foam and sheets. . . .

"The Szeged Microbiological Institute has succeeded in working out a method of producing a liver extract containing B<sub>12</sub>. Now we have an effective . . . product at our disposal for treating persons suffering from anemia. . . .

"This year, we will begin making the important drug ACTH, which has proved effective in the treatment of rheumatic fever and other illnesses. . . ."

The newspaper *Magyar Nemzet* carried an article about the new liver extract in its May 7 issue, asserting that:

"Kossuth Prize-winning academician Gyorgy Ivanovics, and the associates of the Pharmaceutical Research Institute, have been conducting experiments since 1949. They have now succeeded in simplifying the production of a liver extract containing Vitamin B<sub>12</sub> and in producing it in a form easy to apply. The new extract has proved very effective in hospital experiments, and is as good as similar drugs produced abroad. . . . The new drug will be called 'Neoperhepar.' We are already receiving substantial orders from abroad."

Last November, *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest), reported that a new drug called "Isonidic" is also being manufactured. It is supposed to reduce the temperature of persons suffering from TB.

### Latvia

During Latvia's independence, the Ministry of Public Welfare supervised the execution of health measures in compliance with comprehensive public health laws. An extensive network of medical institutions covered the country. Three-fifths of the population were insured against sickness through membership in the health insurance system. The latter provided free medical treatment and drugs. These drugs were both manufactured locally and imported from Germany, Switzerland, England and other countries. Extensive research was carried out in the State Pharmacy and its enterprises. A number of private research laboratories also produced high quality drugs. Latvia was among the leading insulin-producing nations. During the last war, this drug was entirely confiscated by Germany.

Under Soviet occupation in 1940-41, the system of manufacturing drugs was altered. All private laboratories were nationalized and a joint pool of laboratories and pharmacies was established. Pharmacies were ordered to produce only a few specific medicines not being made in the USSR.

Such products as vitamins, now imported from the Soviet Union, proved to be of inferior quality. Escaped pharmacists report that Vitamin C proved to be nothing more than pulverized fern needles. Packaging was very inferior and contents varied from 0.5 grams to 2.5 grams when listed as 1 gram. The production of most patent-drugs was stopped and such medicine as eledron, eubasine, cybasol, etc., were imported from the USSR.

Just before World War II the Latvian government had made large purchases of vital medicaments from abroad and all pharmacies had large reserves in stock. The Russians shipped all stocks stored in warehouses to the USSR, but left the reserves located in pharmacies. These latter were sold, free, to both Latvians and the Russian occupation forces.

Since then, insurance funds have been dissolved and new, increased payments set up. Prescriptions must be paid for individually by the recipient. Prices remain about the same, but as they have been adjusted to the *ruble*, pharmacies have suffered a considerable loss. Prescriptions are handled by so-called "polyclinics" (Soviet medical centers). Doctors are not permitted to visit patients in their homes except on orders from the "polyclinic."

No information has appeared in the Soviet Latvian press or on the radio regarding drug production, although it is known that such production is still carried on.

### Lithuania

A plant for the production of drugs was established in Kaunas after the First World War. This plant is now nationalized and operated by the Ministry of Public Health. Production is limited and most drugs are imported from East Germany and the USSR. Prices are high. A great number of medicines and drugs are unavailable.

The scarcity of drugs is evident from the many letters sent to the West asking for streptomycin and other antibiotics. As there has been no information concerning the fate of these drug shipments, many westerners have refrained from answering further requests.

The Ministry of Public Health has published a pamphlet on the use of a new medicine called testosteronepropionat which is described as an "anti-diphtheria serum" and recommended for "toxic and hypertonic dysentery".

A young doctor complains in the newspaper *Tiesa* that there is no such disease as "hypertonic" dysentery, that the term is "hypertoxic" and that the serum is not an anti-diphtheria, but an anti-dysentery one. He also pointed out that the pamphlet recommends administering the serum by "intravenous" injection, which would be extremely harmful as the serum is made with fat. He states that it should be injected into a muscle, not a vein.

The reason given for this confusion was that the instructions, written in Russian, were carelessly translated and that the translator didn't bother to differentiate between muscles and veins, tonics and toxics, or dysentery and diphtheria.

## Albania

Before the last war Albania imported drugs chiefly from Germany, Italy and France. Since Communist seizure of the country one "pharmaceutical laboratory" has reportedly been established in Tirana, but no further information has appeared. The principle source of drugs at the present time are gift packages received from the United States, Italy and Australia, a considerable number of which have entered the country. Most of the contents of these packages are confiscated by the government, which buys them at very low prices or in exchange for Soviet-made drugs.

## II. ECONOMIC BRIEFS

## New Economic Policy

Imre Nagy's July 4 speech to the Hungarian Parliament contained an unprecedented admission of Five Year Plan failure and outlined a new economic policy taking some of the heat off heavy industrialization, encouraging farmers (in or out of kolkhozes) to produce, and promising to place more emphasis on consumer goods production. Portions of the speech dealing with Hungary's "NEP for 1953" follow (for more on this and subsequent Hungarian speeches, see page 9).

"In dealing with problems in our economic policy, I wish to emphasize that the government will conduct this policy in accordance with the directives, realistic program and proposals of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Worker's Party. This means that in developing our people's economy, the government will always take into consideration the country's economic resources and will not set itself tasks for which the economic preconditions indispensable to their realization are lacking—for example, if necessary raw materials are lacking; or, in the case of investment projects, if they are beyond the country's strength and capacity; or, in the case of certain other new economic tasks, if they can be introduced only at the expense of the living standard of the working people.

"In its economic policy, the government will observe the proverb: 'Cut your coat according to your cloth.' We have to note, and we have to state frankly before the whole country, that the objectives of the augmented Five Year Plan are beyond our strength. Its implementation is greatly overtaxing our resources. It is hampering the growth of the material foundations of the country's welfare, and has recently resulted in a deteriorating standard of living.\*

"It is evident that we must introduce important modifications in this respect. The development of a Socialist heavy industry cannot be an end in itself.

\* In keeping with the backtracking which has been taking place in Hungary since Nagy's first speech on the "NEP," *Szabad Nep* editorialized on July 22: "The figures of the [quarterly] report [of the central office of statistics] are a telling denial of certain opinions which are still being expressed about the unrealistic character of our plan. The Central Committee of the Party has come to the conclusion, after a profound examination of the situation, that we have committed errors in our entire economic policy. . . . This does not mean, however, that the mistakes are very significant. . . ."

"This brings into sharp focus one of the main tasks facing the government in carrying out its economic policy: an overall and significant reduction in the speed of development of the people's economy and of the investment program, in conformity with the capacity of the country. In this respect the government will re-examine . . . plans . . . and will make proposals for the adoption of [corrective measures].

"The general direction of [economic] development must also be modified. There is no justifiable reason for an exaggerated industrialization and a striving after self-sufficiency—all the more so since Hungary does not possess the necessary raw materials. Self-sufficiency means economic isolation, overtaxing the country's productive capacity, and forces the country to give up advantages which can be derived from an increasing participation in the international exchange of goods, from trade with the capitalist countries, and above all from our mutual economic cooperation and trade with the USSR, the People's Democracies and China. The government will [take these factors into consideration] to an ever increasing extent and in so doing, lighten the burden. . . . We shall introduce a significant change . . . also by substantially slowing down the rate of development of those branches of heavy industry which are manufacturing means of production, and by laying a much greater emphasis on light industry producing consumer goods and on the food industry, which will enable us to satisfy the growing needs of the population. . . .

## Agricultural Aid

"The government regards it as one of its foremost duties to substantially increase agricultural investments, while cutting those in industry, in order to insure a speedy and large-scale increase in agricultural output. [Nevertheless], the fulfillment of industrial production plans is . . . one of the indispensable conditions for the success of measures designed to raise the standard of living.

"The development of agriculture . . . is not possible without the complete fulfillment of the industrial production plan. Therefore, it is our industrial working class which holds the key to the success of the government's objectives.

"Agricultural production has been stagnating and during the past few years its pace has been determined by meager investments, the lack of support offered individual farmers, the far too rapid development of the producers' cooperatives, which is neither economically or politically justifiable, and has made the peasantry's work insecure.

"During the land collectivization program, too much bullying was practiced. This not only offended the peasant's sense of justice, but also caused serious harm to our economy and played an important part in bringing about the present state of affairs.

"Our agricultural production depends to a certain extent upon the individual farm. . . . The government therefore regards it as its primary duty to assist . . . individual farms and to provide them with the means of production—fertilizer, improved seeds, etc. The government wishes to reinforce the security of the peas-

ant's holdings and their production by every available means. To protect the peasant's holdings, the government will prohibit, as of this year, the emassing of land which usually takes place in the autumn—a procedure which diminishes the peasant's desire to produce more. . . .

"The exaggerated speed of the producers' cooperative movement . . . has undoubtedly contributed to [present difficulties]. . . . The violation of the principle of voluntary cooperative membership has particularly created unrest. . . . On the other hand, excessive measures against the kulaks have resulted in . . . difficulties for the State in utilizing the so-called 'land reserves'. . . . In fact, these remained uncultivated. . . .

"In order to insure complete respect for the principle of voluntary membership, the government has decided, in future, to allow cooperative members who so desire to carry on farming individually (because they have found it to be a better proposition), to leave the producers' cooperatives after the end of the present agricultural campaign and, even further, to authorize the dissolution of producer's cooperatives in which the majority of members express such a desire. For the rest, the government will continue to grant considerable aid to the producers' cooperatives in the way of loans and investments, and will contribute to the development of their animal husbandry and to the welfare of their members. . . . The government has also decided to permit complete freedom in the renting and leasing of land. Those who desire to rent reserve land from the State may now do so for a period of five years instead of one, as is the rule at present.

"During the past few years the State has also extended its economic activities to those spheres in which private initiative still plays an important part. . . . One of these spheres is retail trade, and the activities of independent craftsmen. Notwithstanding the considerable development of the craftsmen's cooperatives, they were unable to make up for the shortage in this field of production. This has lead the government to grant concessions to craftsmen. . . . At the same time, it will provide them with the necessary conditions as regards their supply of goods. . . .

"The government is determined to fight the high prices. A larger and more significant reduction in prices will take place following the fall harvest."

### Agricultural Concessions

The Hungarian Communist government has come forward with concessions designed to check the number of independent farmers leaving their land due to crop failures and excessive taxation and delivery quotas (for news of other concessions in Romania and Albania see page 14). These concessions come at a time when the mechanization program has failed to keep pace with collectivization and the possibility of a manpower shortage has become acute. They do not basically alter the government's drive against farmers branded as "kulaks."

On April 10, the Council of Ministers issued a resolution regarding the cancellation of penalties which provided that "individual farmers and cooperatives delivering the prescribed amount of milk, eggs, poultry, wine, potatoes,

pigs, cattle, corn and sun flower seeds by the deadline set—June 1, August 20 and November 7—will be exempted from paying penalties for former arrears.\* . . . To win exemption, it is enough to meet one of the [above] deadlines."

The machinery of propaganda continued to emphasize the importance of this decision. On April 11, a supplementary decree stated that: "Those who paid their fines and met their delivery quotas prior to January 1, 1953, may deduct the amount from their taxes." This was followed on April 27 by a statement over Radio Kossuth: Our government has arranged the collection of crop deliveries so that peasants working independently should find it just as rewarding to produce more as do members of the agricultural cooperatives. . . ."

Further concessions were announced by the Hungarian Home Service on July 7:

"Many peasants have asked that grain delivery quotas and land tax be lowered, in cases where damage has been caused by acts of God. Our government has complied with this request and [such] losses are now taken into consideration in cases involving both individual peasants and producers cooperatives. . . .

"The instructions provide that, if the loss of produce caused by acts of God amounts to between 25 to 50 percent, land tax and grain delivery obligations are to be reduced 25 percent and . . . [if] between 50 to 75 percent [damage, reduced by] 50 percent. Should the damage exceed 75 percent, both delivery obligations and land tax are to be reduced 75 percent. In those regions where the entire crop has been destroyed, all obligations and tax are cancelled."


A July 11 decree outlined certain conditions which must be met if penalties and arrears are to be avoided.

"All penalties imposed as of today are to be abolished immediately, together with all previous conditions. This refers to all penalties imposed, because of non-fulfillment or delayed fulfillment of delivery quotas, upon kolkhozes, cooperatives, their members or individual farmers. . . . Delivery arrears for the economic year 1952-53 will be abolished immediately if [the above groups] completely fulfill . . . their delivery quotas for grain, wheat, barley, rye and oats as prescribed by law [in] 1952 for the economic year 1953-54. . . . However, arrears in milk poultry and egg deliveries only up to December 31, 1952 will be voided. . . . Delivery quotas for kolkhozes, including types 1, 2 and 3, must be reduced ten percent for all agricultural products. This privilege does not extend, however, to those kolkhoz members who wish to farm individually next year. These must pay back the ten percent reduction later.

"The ten percent reduction in bread grain deliveries must be recorded in the kolkhoz' delivery book immediately, by the local council. . . . These concessions make it possible for every single producer to fulfill, completely and without difficulty, existing delivery quotas. Therefore [those] remaining . . . must be fulfilled as prescribed by Law 26. All other decrees and orders . . . are null and void."

\*On June 4 it was revealed that originally the first deadline, which was evidently not met, was May 1.





# Radio Free Europe

Tonight, in the countries behind the Iron Curtain, men, women and children will gather around radios tuned to the voices of their countrymen in the West, bringing them the news of the free world, the knowledge that they are not forgotten, and the hope of their future liberation. Radio Free Europe, operating as a home service from abroad, broadcasts over a network of 21 transmitters to Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania and Romania, competing directly with all Satellite Communist stations. The scripts below are excerpts from programs prepared by freedom-loving exiles from Central and East Europe, and beamed by RFE to its target countries.

RFE to Czechoslovakia . . .

## The Struggle for Power

Recently we have spoken to you with new confidence. We told you about the changed situation, about the confusion of the Communist governments; we have stressed the fact that things are starting to move behind the Iron Curtain, and that the time has come when the dictatorial governments can be forced to make concessions, that it is worthwhile to work with this aim, and that it is necessary that the people be aware of their power. Today we ask you: have we been right?


Let us review the events of the past [month]. All of them are moving in one direction.

The most important has been the retreat of the Hungarian government. It was announced that the Hungarian farmer will be freed from compulsory collectivization, that the persecution of prosperous peasants will be stopped, that concentration camps will be abolished, and that the rate of industrialization will be modified. Simultaneously the Hungarian Communist government has changed the display in the show window: Mr. Rakosi, responsible for the old policy, has been ousted from his top-ranking position and shifted somewhere backstage.

The opposition of the workers in Berlin is still going on; despite the Soviet tanks in the streets, passive resistance is in full swing. Just now the workers are demanding the release of political prisoners from prison. The regime has not released anyone yet, but the language of the regime has become rather mild.

The governments of the Ukraine, of Hungary, East Germany and Albania have confessed their errors and promised remedies. Four Russian officials in Latvia have been recalled and replaced by Latvians. The Ukrainian govern-

ment promised bigger food supplies and increased production of consumer goods. The Romanian government also promised improvement of the food supply and ordered food stockpiles to be released to the starving population instead of being hoarded for an unnatural and mysterious purpose. The regimes on all Communist-occupied territory claim that from now on, first place will be given to the production of goods for the daily needs of the people.



Let us ask once again: have we been right all along? Of course we were—the heart of stone could not be moved without a push from the people. It has been stated candidly, perhaps too candidly, by the new Hungarian Prime Minister: “The Berlin riots have been a warning to us”; the specter of freedom is haunting the Communist world.

We have also told you of the struggle within the Soviet Union, of the struggle which started before Stalin's death and which is a wild, primitive, unrestrained personal struggle for power. Now you have read that the ground opened under Beria's feet and that he is on the way to perdition. Again we ask: were we right, or was *Rude Pravo* right when it declared conditions in Russia to be one monolithic rock of granite? Again, the rock shattered, the Soviet people have been ordered to rip out a few pages of the Soviet encyclopedia, to forget what, up to yesterday, was told about Beria, and to memorize what is being told about him today. With its usual smug insolence, disdainful of human memory, Moscow has overnight branded the saint a villain.

This could serve as a theme for a comedy—if there were time left for that. We are concerned at the moment with other matters. We simply state: either it is true or it is not true that the second ranking man in power in Russia is a spy and an agent of foreign powers. If it is true, how

corrupt Communist society must be, how immoral in character its highest representatives! If it is not true, if all the accusations are lies, then again we say—how corrupt Communist society must be when its highest representatives lie in such a manner. Everyone knows all this, and it is somewhat boring. We would like to know to what extent Beria's defeat and Malenkov's victory will influence Russian policy. Will the Russians, as a consequence, abandon their conciliatory policy which had barely been started, or will they continue this line? We would appear more wise than we are if we dared to predict. It is, perhaps, of minor importance to know who is the victor in Russia. Twenty-five years ago Stalin defeated Trotsky, only to acquire, in the course of time, Trotsky's policy. Perhaps between Beria and Malenkov there has merely been a struggle for power, and not for political policy.

Czechoslovak Communist leaders must, however, have felt relieved at this event. Now they could open the water-gates of their humble and subservient eloquence; now, finally, they again know to whom to direct their adulation. As long as the struggle between Beria and Malenkov was unresolved, there was confusion in Prague, even in the highest quarters. Many were ready to break away—unfortunately they were at a loss to decide from whom—and many were ready to join—unfortunately they were at a loss to know with whom. They chose the middle way: in public they followed a certain policy, but privately they told whoever would listen of their conviction that this policy was an error. In the midst of all the uproar in the captive countries, the Czechoslovak government attempted to remain rigid, motionless. The Czechoslovak government tried to delay the reforms which were taking place all around—the Czechoslovak government was the one to remain the most anti-popular of all the "People's" governments.

The new Hungarian Prime Minister admitted having learned a lesson from the Berlin riots. Mr. Zapotocky and Mr. Siroky, however, pretended that the Plzen and Ostrava riots had been no lesson to them. Whenever the government took a step, it scared itself with its own courage. The cruel provision on penalties for absenteeism was issued—perhaps this had been considered a Malenkov trend. However, as soon as this provision was issued it was immediately recalled, perhaps in order to follow the Beria line. Never before has this government proved so clearly that it has no policy of its own, that it is dominated entirely by orders from Moscow. There can be no one so optimistic as to expect this government to act on its own. Motionless, and breathlessly, it waited to see who would be the winner in Moscow. Now, without stirring and without thinking, the government will wait for the results of the Malenkov victory. It is—and that we have known for a long time—a cowardly government.

However, whatever this government may be, whatever may be the significance of the Malenkov victory, since early June there have been other actors on the stage behind the Iron Curtain. At the beginning of that month, first in Czechoslovakia, and later in East Germany, the people and their will began again to take part in history. Things

have changed and are no longer what they used to be before the people's uprisings. The Soviet government as well as the Satellite governments had to take into account the fact that there are not only Ministers, but people as well, living behind the Iron Curtain.

There are three things which these people who have begun to participate again in history must be aware of.

In the first place, the people must know that they can rely only upon themselves and their anonymous leaders, and that they have no real friends among those who are Cabinet or Parliament members, or who write in the press or who publish books, or who have been assigned by the government to be functionaries of Trade Unions. All of that is a bureaucracy without a mind. These are no revolutionaries, just men who have found jobs in the revolution. What can you expect of those who enjoy privileges, and have more than the normal supply of food—privileged, not normal wages—a privileged, not the general currency exchange rate? Regardless of this mercenary and satisfied class, the great struggle has begun behind the Iron Curtain. Communism has asked for authorization to provide an allegedly better life for the people. Several years have passed with all those "authorizations," but without any improvement in the material or moral conditions of the people. And this is the permanent, indestructible basis for opposition. The desire for a better life has an elementary, undefeatable force.

Secondly, the people's movement behind the Iron Curtain must recognize that the Communist governments will again attempt to deceive, that they will promise more than they intend to give. However, if the people's movement will continue to apply systematically the methods found and applied up to now, if the movement will conduct the struggle mainly at the places of work, it may be possible to transform the tactical concessions of the government into permanent concessions, and thus to gain an easier life—until the real liberation comes.

The third point is that Communist policy is, and always will be, muddled. Lines are set forth and abandoned, men are raised up and torn down, the people are flattered and fired on . . . whoever gives his soul to Communist policy is in the position of someone who has tied his property to the tail of a mad dog. In the midst of the chaos which will continue, but which will vary from one half year to another, the basic truth of "policy" will become evident. Policy does not mean the passive observance of the coming and going of events, of the rising and setting of celestial bodies. Policy means the exercise of an aim, a will, and healthy instincts. The people can enforce its will on events, if it is determined to exercise this will. But their policy should also be patience and perseverance. Never has anything been gained or lost in one stretch.

The Communist governments are estranged from the people to such an extent that the struggle will continue, regardless of who is directing Soviet policy. It is a disagreeable fact for dictators that every rule is dependent on the labor of the people. This is a basic power of which the people cannot be deprived. The Communist governments have tried all kinds of duress to deprive the people

of this power, but they have not succeeded. Even Malenkov will not be able to invent some new duress. This June will remain a memorable month for a long time: the people behind the Iron Curtain showed that they hold the power and mean to use it. *This* is the important change, no matter whether Malenkov has defeated Beria, or had Beria defeated Malenkov.

RFE to Poland . . .

### Letter to Poland

(At the beginning of the year Radio Free Europe, through announcements in the Polish emigre press, invited Polish exiles to participate in a literary competition, the winning essays to be broadcast by RFE to Communist Poland. The script reprinted here won first prize for themes with the subject title, "Letters to Poland.")

"Dear Slawek:

"I don't know whether you remember as well as I do our discussion last year at the ZMP [Polish Communist Youth Organization] instructors' course in Szczawnica, only a few weeks before my escape abroad.

"It took place one evening when Wojcik, together with a secretary of the Basic Party Organization, went into town, while our group, taking advantage of their absence, gathered in the community center for a bit of fun. One episode of the evening still remains in my memory—when Heniek went on the stage and began, as only he can do it, to mimic a Party lecture 'designed to convince even the simplest elements of the broad masses.' His eyes blank and staring, he began roaring, exactly like Wojcik, shouting gibberish and ending each sentence with the almost sacrosanct: 'And for all this we are grateful to the great Stalin and for the Soviet Union's help.'

"We almost died laughing.

"Who invented airplanes, insect powder, watches, typhus and submarines? The great leader of the world's nations, Stalin! Who supplies us with straw from the straw mattress of Mao Tse Tung so that we are not short of tea? Our brotherly friend and neighbor, the Soviet Union! Who taught our ignorant and backward nation how to read and write? Our great ally, the Soviet nation, which under the leadership of ingenious . . .

"Suddenly we froze. Wojcik had appeared in the doorway with his cross-eyed friend from the Basic Party organization. Heniek immediately grasped the situation. In the same tone of voice, but without the facial contortions, he finished the sentence as if nothing had happened:

" . . . which under the leadership of ingenious Stalin has already reached the stage of Socialism and prepares itself to enter the victorious stage of Communism. That is why I consider Comrade G——'s question of whether it is possible to enter the stage of Communism immediately, an ignorant question. No, Comrades. One cannot skip over the stages of historical development just as one pleases! That's all."

"We sighed with relief. I suspect that Wojcik knew that something was not quite in order. But the secretary, de-

lighted with our discussion, climbed on the stage and began to deliver his usual speech.

"This episode served as the basis for our next conversation, when I told you that if a situation like this is possible—if you, Franek and Wlodek, the only true Communists in our whole group, can take part in such a tragi-comic farce—if what is considered sacred in the presence of the Party functionary becomes a parody when he is away—then we are all insane or else we are just kidding each other like ordinary fools.

"I remember well your answer, which then shut my mouth; I can still repeat your very words: 'You are right in saying that it is sickening. But you must also realize that all this is merely on the surface; underneath flows the current of a new and better life. Consider for a moment what is happening in the West which you admire so much; consider the situation in the colonial countries, in India, where regularly every year two million people die of starvation. A class of exploiters rules in the West, wanting to keep power at any price. We have a rule of the proletariat, or the Party of the proletariat at any rate, and we at least have a chance of building a classless society. No, my friend—life is not better in the West.'

"I couldn't find the right answer then; it seems to me now, however, after a year in the free world, that I can answer you and some of your ZMP friends.

"I write the phrase: *free world*. The word *free* is my answer to you. I shall not try, though I very well could, to convince you that 'poverty' in the West is luxury compared to the life led by Poles in their homeland. It is true that the quantity of bread is perhaps not the most important factor in human happiness. Let us accept for the sake of discussion your view that the West is ruled by injustice, that poverty and ignorance are rampant. Even if the West were like that, there would still be one basic difference: here, in the West, I have a right to speak up and point to the causes of this poverty and injustice, I have a right to fight for the improvement of life, and everyone else has the same right. But just try, as a Communist, to criticize anything more basic than a petty fraud by a store salesman, or unevenly turned trouser cuffs made by the tailors' co-operative! Just try to prove that for these crooked trouser cuffs is responsible not a tailor, but his chief, and then a Minister, and after the Minister—the Party. And for the Party, the great leader, the ingenious . . . , etc.

"I know beforehand the arguments you will counter with. After all, we studied the principles of dialectical materialism together. You will say that the freedom I am speaking of is a fiction, because it is limited by economic exploitation. Perhaps it is, but even within those limitations it does exist; and that is why I see progress in the West, why I see people living better and better every day, every year. They learn by their own errors.

"In the Soviet Union, judging from the press and literature, there are no errors, there is nothing that can be improved, except, of course, the crooked trouser cuffs. There, after thirty-five years of Communist rule, everything is static, all development halted and the spirit petrified. You know from your own observation how much more ad-



vanced spiritually and intellectually is the most backward peasant from our Kozia Wolka compared to the average Soviet soldier or kolkhoz member. How can it be, you ask, that the system which advertises itself as 'revolutionary' actually hinders progress?

"Nevertheless, that is the case. I will go even farther: it had to be that way. This is proven by facts. This inevitable course of development, or rather of degeneration, had long been foreseen by Western sociology. A warning to this effect was given long ago by philosophical thinkers of Christian ethics, and, finally, it is the answer given by dialectics, which you hold in such high esteem.

"You do not believe me? Try to apply the dialectical method in appraising the events which have taken place in Russia.

"Only now, in exile, have I carefully read certain works of Lenin, the same ones which I had to study, lightly, at one time in the past. I was struck by one sentence, one thought begun and not finished, as though the author had suddenly taken fright at the conclusions awaiting him at the end.

"Lenin writes that the first revolutionary upheaval in Russia was a bourgeois, not a proletarian, revolution. The social class which started the revolution was fulfilling a historical necessity—the building in Russia of the capitalist industrial system. The bourgeois revolution, Lenin writes, had to be carried through to completion.

"After this seemingly logical introduction, Lenin interrupts his train of thought and slurs over the subject. It would further seem that in his opinion the proletariat, in the post-revolutionary period, would complete this historical task, instead of the bourgeoisie. But Lenin could not pursue such a contradictory line of reasoning: a 'proletariat' which undertook to construct a bourgeois-capitalist system would simply become a bourgeoisie. Or did Lenin perhaps imagine that this task *would* be fulfilled by the Russian bourgeois, and did he mean to provide them with the opportunity to do so by his introduction of the New Economic Policy (1921)? Again the answer is negative, for the October Revolution deprived the bourgeoisie of the political power necessary for the construction of their economic system.

"If on one hand the dialectical method proves that the stage of capitalist development is inevitable, and if, on the other hand, there is no social class capable of carrying out the task, then history must find a way around. *Capitalism which could not enter through the door stepped in through the window.*

"The group which held the power, in this case the Bolshevik group, became an instrument in the hands of history and was eventually transformed into the capitalist class. The task of industrializing Russia has been fulfilled by this new class, at the price of greater suffering and hardship than would have been necessary if the course of development had been normal.

"What happens to a ruling class or caste which has fulfilled its historical role? You well know what the dialectical methods of reasoning say on the subject. Such a class begins to hinder progress. That is exactly what happened

with the Communist bureaucracy in the Soviet Union; following the pattern of all outlived classes, it fights the march of progress, fearing loss of power.

"You certainly remember those few weeks which we spent in the Kampinowski Forest, after the [Warsaw] uprising. In a forest glade there was a ruined pillbox dating from before 1939. A young oak tree had begun to grow inside the pillbox; having no other way out, the tree began to escape outside through the shooting-hole. Unable to grow straight upward, the tree found another way to grow—just like capitalism in Russia. Even while we were still there, the oak tree began to break through the pillbox which was hindering its progress, so that a crack appeared in the cement wall of the pillbox. This is a picture which I have constantly before me when I think of the huge confining pillbox which is called the Soviet Union. The force of growing life will inevitably burst it open in time.

"If you follow my reasoning you must admit that the Communist Party is not the party of the proletariat but an isolated caste of oppressors and exploiters, exactly the same as that of old slave-owners, who similarly also fulfilled their historical role and were then dissolved despite their attempts to save their class. It is like this with the Communists. All their propaganda, their whole elaborate system of indoctrination, has only one purpose—to keep them in power.

"The part of mankind which marches forward is fighting to remove the obstacle which, having outlived itself and having been transformed into a reactionary group, is represented by the Stalinist bureaucrats. We, the Poles, recognize as our first goal the regaining of national independence, and this goal is in reality identical with the liquidation of Bolshevism, and thus also identical with the goals of all forward-moving humanity. That is why our victory is certain. . . .

Yours, Stach."



**Istvan Rab (left) and Nora Kovats (right), Hungarian ballet dancers, broadcast the story of their escape to West Berlin, over RFE and VOA in Munich.**

RFE to Hungary . . .

### Stop Wheat Deliveries Destined for USSR!

(In a series entitled "Farmer Balint Speaks", the nature of Communist exploitation of agriculture is exposed and the efforts of peasants to resist this exploitation are frequently discussed. In this particular program, an escaped Hungarian farmer tells Balint how farmers under Communist domination have stalled delivery of grain to the regime without risk to themselves.)

**Peasant:** If the Communists succeed in collecting the grain, they win, but if they don't, the peasant wins. Concessions promised by Nagy will do no good if we starve. Our fate for an entire year hinges on this. . . .

**Balint:** Yes, that is why the harvesting has gone so slowly. The farmers realize this, and very few have begun to harvest. Apart from Communist propaganda, the country does depend on you for bread. So the harvesting must be done. But on the other hand deliveries must be prevented, because if the Russians succeed in making the collection, the grain will be taken to Russia, and there will be nothing left for the Hungarian people. What can the Hungarian farmer do to prevent the collection of grain? And can he do it without risk? Now is the time to determine the right action. Tell me, how are deliveries carried out?

**Peasant:** Where the farmers work with a threshing machine or a common threshing floor, the grain is collected right on the stubble field. That's why threshing by individuals is forbidden.

**Balint:** So the problem is, how can the farmer succeed in threshing in his own yard without risk?

**Peasant:** When I was a prisoner of war in Russia, the peasants there had this same problem. They solved it by ruining the large threshing machines.

**Balint:** That sounds good. But how can it be done without risk?

**Peasant:** Very simply. They slipped an old rusty coulter\* into each sheaf. Of course it was picked up by the machine along with the sheaf, and the machinery of the thresher was ruined. There is no risk, for not even a detective could find out who slipped the coulters into the sheaves. Not one Russian was caught that I knew of.

**Balint:** Good idea. In these crucial times, the Hungarian peasant should learn from the privileged Russian. But are you sure there won't be any trouble?

**Peasant:** There'll be trouble all right. Within a few days, the large threshing machine will be wrecked. But does that matter when the country is in a life and death struggle? The ones who put the coulters in the Russian wheat were never found; the thresher could not betray their bosses. I am convinced that in every tractor station there will be one brave man who will know his duty. After all, the Hungarian farmers have as much sense as the Russian farmers. But do the Hungarian peasants have the right to use such harsh measures under present conditions?

**Balint:** The people in the village are waging a war of self-defense. An opportunity like this will not come again for another year, and who knows under what conditions? Both divine and worldly law agree that *the harvest belongs to those who work for it.*

RFE to Romania . . .

### The Forced Laugh

On April 8 of this year there was a discussion by Soviet writers in Moscow on the problems of satirical comedy. On April 17, *Contemporanul* [organ of the Romanian Communist Party] featured an editorial on the same subject. As you can see, whatever is shouted in Moscow must echo in Bucharest.

Moscow had felt the urge to lay down the "line" on laughter. After so many changes in her "line," in the course of which doctors were criminals one day and innocent victims the next, while victims became executioners and the executioners became the victims, Moscow must have felt in the mood for laughing. The go-ahead signal was given by Malenkov himself, who made the most famous admission in the history of self-criticism in modern Russia: "We would be mistaken to believe that our Soviet reality does not offer material for satire." Although Malenkov's remark sounds like an invitation to laughter, it clearly indicates that there is but one kind of laughter in a Communist regime. Man laughs—as it was so well put by the French writer, Andre Malraux—"with a knife between his teeth."

Throughout the empire petrified by constraint, oppression, fear and degradation, the right to laugh can be exercised only by officials, overseers, agitators and the deserving servants of all kinds—the *commissars*, as they are dubbed by another student of Communist psychology, Arthur Koestler. In accordance with this giant planification of laughter, only the commissars are entitled to laugh, and only in Moscow. In Bucharest, where panic, insecurity and fear are stalking even the commissars, laughter is scarce—it falters and becomes a mere grimace.

For such is the situation: Romania is the country where man cannot laugh any more. The people, those who are oppressed, those who are humiliated by persecution, cannot laugh any more. The minority—the leaders, the servants, the agents of the occupiers—can barely grin. Between the

\* A sharp blade attached to the beam of a plow.

terrible silence which hides the resentment within the soul of the population, and the yellow grin, the forbidding grin of those who rule, there is no middle ground. The abyss widens between those who rule and those who are ruled, a great gulf of terror across which there is no communication, no mutual language. How eloquent is this problem of laughter, the object of so much agitation on the part of those with the "knife between their teeth," who want so much that man should laugh in Romania!

This does not mean that our people, so sorely tried by fate, have forgotten how to laugh. Our people wait; for, as the wise proverb says, who laughs last laughs best. Meanwhile, laughter will continue to be a problem. Rather, laughter will continue to be a slogan; the writers of a "People's Democracy" no longer have problems, they have slogans. "Laugh," says this most recent one. Laugh all the time, laugh everywhere, laugh in the factories, the offices, the kolkhozes, the jails. First of all, laugh if you can, then, laugh in a certain way. Let us face the fact, this is a mobilization of laughter. The cheerful agitators want their slaves to laugh on command. Laughter, they claim, must in the end become "a weapon of our struggle."

The *Contemporanul* editorial which we referred to demonstrates this view clearly: "Laughter has always been a weapon," one can read there. What kind of weapon it is was more explicitly defined by another famous article published in *Scanteia* on March 21. There it was stated that laughter is the weapon of hate. Indeed, this editorial hints that whoever does not know how to laugh does not know how to hate. We can read in that article that "by laughing, workers and youth can learn how to hate murderously." In Romania, laughter is not only "mobilized," but is mobilized to serve murderous hate. For the same reasons have been mobilized the agronomy, the philology, the circus and the puppet shows.

It so happens that this weapon of forced laughter does not score good results in the Sovrom-literature. Not even the mercenaries of satiric laughter have been able to produce any worthwhile works of this kind. The balance sheet published by *Contemporanul* is very revealing. It lists the names of only two writers, and they are not very important ones: the satiric V. E. Galan and Lucia Demetrius. When not even Zaharia Stancu's non-committal face can laugh within Party limits, nor Eusebiu Camilar's eternally repentant face, we can assume that the situation must be bad in this sector of fighting, in which must be present all the merry-making long faces of RPR literature.

But if the Party cannot score in the present, it can do very well indeed in the past. Every time there is a crisis in any sector of creativity (in this case, the satiric sector) the Communists turn to our classics. The things one can do with the classics these days! When Eminescu has become "progressive" and Balcescu "Marxist-Leninist," we cannot be surprised that the regime now embraces Caragiale in its long arms and makes of him the prototype of the Party-line humorist. Caragiale has become "the founder of Romanian critical realism," the critic of the "bourgeois-land owner regime", the founder of dialectic laughter,

the father of the monetary reform and the adept of Malenkov's aesthetics. His name is profaned everywhere, in the newspapers or at the Academy. Because the regime is afraid of him, afraid that his irony will be invoked against them, they have hurriedly adopted him. There is a truly Caragiale-like situation in this process of his adoption by Sovrom-literature. Unfortunately, no agitator is felled by his own absurdities in the Romanian "People's Republic." But what counts is the truth of Caragiale. *Contemporanul* tells it itself to those who know how to read between the lines: "Our epoch has created a gallery of satirical types which is truly inexhaustible." And Caragiale, from beyond his grave and counterfeited glory, replies: "Are you telling me?"

*RFE to Hungary . . .*

### No Problems Are Yet Solved

The Government wants to satisfy the workers by apparent concessions. During this period only wholesale reforms can help.

Istvan Kristof stated at the last congress of the pseudo-Trade Unions: "there are no unsolved social questions." At the time we denied the allegation of Kristof, and we were supported by the flood of complaints which came to the "People's Democracy's" press and radio. It will soon prove that there is nothing except unsolved problems.

During this last week there has been more talk about workers' protection than ever before. This, however, does not mean that everything has changed at once. Everyone can see that the regime projects a flurry of emergency solutions; beyond this, everything is just as it was. There is still hardly a single plant where equipment and safety measures are adequate. The letters of complaint have scarcely achieved their aim; because those who, until now, thought that only their own plant was lacking in safety measures, now know that every factory from Hagyesshalom to Zahony is alike in this respect.

They cannot even be proud of their model works. In Budapest, in Ozd and in Pecs alike, all safety measure-investments had been cancelled. These deplorable conditions are too general to hold any one individual responsible.

It is easy enough to solve the mystery of responsibility. The works delegates know very well that, as early as 1951, the Government had considerably restricted the basic wage-economy. According to the words of Csutar Gyorgy, "The work norms form the basis of Socialist wages; at the same time they form an important basis of productivity and Socialist competition. They form the basis of work planning."

In these days, it is most important to quote this item.

It is important because, according to us, the basic mistake is in the wages. The Socialist wage-economy with the high basic norms is designed to raise individual production. It demands a raise in production without giving the worker a part of the production.



After the declaration made by Imre Nagy, the workers in factories thought that an end would be put to the unhappy conditions. They did not ask for the impossible. Machines everywhere make possible the reduction of work hours to at least 8 hours per day. All the more so because thirty years ago there was already a law in Hungary for an 8-hour work day.

Though Imre Nagy promises to bring back the 8-hour workday, and the cessation of overtime, this has not come to pass and the "hot pick" movement and the "on the spot shift" have remained. The maintenance of machinery after working hours is still unpaid.

This is not the only defect. If you look at the results of innovations, along with the thousands of senseless innovations you occasionally come across sensible reforms: reforms which mean the saving of many millions of *forints* for that branch of industry. It follows that the saving should increase the earnings of the worker. In reality, according to the proportional statistics issued by the government, the reduction in cost brought about a fall in wages too. Needless to say, it also affected the investments for safety measures.

During these days there is much talk of saving. We must face the problem. Every sensible saving can be useful if, as explained above, it does not adversely influence wage calculations. In production cost the percentage set aside for wages changes according to the proportion of other expenses. That wages are the only item which can be changed is a fatal mistake. I think the effect of this need not be explained in detail.

Most of the complaining letters mentioned above write about the lack of those extras contained in the collective contract. It is not a merit that these have been restored. The safety dress, the safety glove, and protective food, form just as much part of workers' wages as the *forints* which they earn. If a person has so far not fulfilled the collective contract, he will have to take the responsibility. In any case, it is no merit to give what is due.

But even if every complaint is satisfied, the normal state of affairs will not return. I must repeat that the elimination of those mistakes which are mentioned in the letters of complaint is an obvious duty. The time is over when such minor defects could be corrected. Wide-reaching reforms are now necessary.

It appears that the Government will stop at promises. The position will not change as long as they continue to cure the symptoms, and the germs which cause the disease continue to breed.

The basic mistake is to continue organizing work competitions. Until now I have not mentioned the "Friday

movement", for I consider it psycho-pathologic nonsense: an absurdity which is difficult to explain to a person with common sense. It would only have some meaning if the week finished on Friday and so Saturday and Sunday were free. I have found few who were capable of working at top speed for five days so as to overdo what he had done on the sixth day. If we want to make this plan sensible there is no need for a "Friday movement", nor for individual work-excess. Ever since the "norm shifts" were introduced, the demand for this "overfulfillment" has been more merciless than before.

It is not shameful to admit mistakes; much can be put right with slight adjustments. But of course the way to do this is not by publishing the model-promises in the "Hongosujag" for the sake of effect. New conditions must be laid down in the book of work regulations and the collective contracts alike. It is not enough to point out the mistakes of the past. To stop them, their causes must be stopped too.

I have already explained that the chief cause of accidents is work competition. The Government has the power to put a stop to these work competitions at once.

After justice has been brought back to the factories by electing new committees, the worker's delegates must control regulations. The power of the works delegates must be extended.

In the case of neglect of workers' safety, it is the right, even the duty, of the delegates to call a strike. In works and in mines, the system of piece-payment must cease at once, for this system gives unpermissible advantages to the favorites of the regime. The system of time wages must be introduced, by which every hour begun counts as a complete hour.

The worker must have the right to elect his leaders freely and to join free Trade Unions which look after his interests.

These are reforms which are needed at once. The time has arrived when the conditions which prevailed must come to an end. The workers have a right to expect the solution of their problems. I can hardly expect that the present leaders will recognize the importance of the moment and admit that this catastrophic policy must come to an end.

The desire for a change is alive in the heart of every worker. He himself will put leaders in the place of the present leaders.

The increasing resistance will put men at the top who are real leaders of the workers: men who will, at the first possible chance, rightly represent their interests.

In these historical times they must assume the responsibility.

# The Red Network

**L**IKE all other forms of mass communication, the radio in Satellite Europe functions primarily as a propaganda medium. Rejecting the Western concept of radio as entertainment, the Communist regimes have made it a channel of communication between the Party and the people and admittedly assigned it political-ideological tasks:

"... To speak about the magnificent achievements of Socialism, to mobilize millions of people all over the world in the struggle for peace; to educate the people in the spirit of Socialist ideas, in the spirit of love for the country and proletarian internationalism; to shape the political consciousness of the working masses; to propagate education, culture and science; to mobilize the masses for participation in the construction of Socialism; to denounce the propaganda of warmongers; to strengthen friendship with the USSR. . . ." (*Głos Pracy* [Warsaw], May 7, 1953).

In order to convert Satellite radio into an effective propaganda instrument, the Communists have had to alter the entire prewar radio apparatus: administration, physical structure, types of receiving sets—even audience listening habits. These alterations can be divided into four general stages: (1) seizure and State monopolization of existing broadcasting facilities and radio enterprises; (2) creation of Party-controlled administrative governmental agencies (known as Radio Committees, Boards, Councils or Administrations) with exclusive rights to the organization, planning, direction and operation of all broadcasting; (3) increased manufacture of radio sets in order to expose the entire population to "the Party's voice"; and (4) physical modifications in transmission and receiving equipment for the specific purpose of excluding western programs and limiting the radio audience to wave lengths broadcasting Party-approved material.

## I. THE STATE RADIO

As on most of the continent, broadcasting facilities in Central Europe have always been largely State-owned. State broadcasting corporations were responsible for programming and administration, and a Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications usually owned technical equipment and issued licenses to subscribers for the operation of individual receiving sets. Generally speaking, the Communist Party seized this dual apparatus (as well as other means of communication) even before it had gained full control of the government mechanism: either by placing Party members in strategic positions in the Ministry and the radio corporations, or by transferring corporate powers to a newly created Committee, Board, Council or Administration. The chronology of these two stages varied, but within a very short period both had been accomplished in every country of Central Europe. Polskie Radio, for example, was created as early as 1944 by the Communist-dominated Committee of National Liberation, and assumed authority over all broadcasting. Czechoslovak radio corporations were nationalized in 1948 along with other private enterprises, and a new State radio administrative body was created under the name of Czechoslovak Radio. Romania's Broadcasting Board, with exclusive radiotransmission rights, was not set up until 1949, in a decree published in *Buletinul Oficial*, No. 32, May 23. Article 32 of the decree stipulated that one to twelve years' imprisonment and a fine of from 10,000 to 200,000 lei would be imposed upon "any person who, not being legally authorized thereto, builds or installs any radio transmitter, or broadcasts speech, music, or televised pictures by means of electric waves, whether by wire or wireless. . . ."

The duties assigned Romania's Radio Board, typical for

all radio committees in the area, were enumerated in Article 4 of the decree:

(a) To assist in carrying out the policies of the Government by producing and broadcasting programs, in Romanian as well as in the languages of the national minorities of the country, of such a nature as to educate, organize and mobilize all the working people for the building of Socialism in the Romanian People's Republic.

(b) To foster and to spread cultural activities among the broad masses of the people.

(c) To make known beyond the borders the achievements of the Romanian People's Republic in its struggle for peace, democracy, and Socialism.

(d) To supervise all the programs produced by the programming staffs of individual stations in the Romanian People's Republic. . . .

(g) To coordinate the work of the Ministries and other agencies of the State, [and] of institutions, enterprises, organizations, and associations which build, install, sell, or use transmission sets or installations, or receivers of any sort, as well as their accessories.

### Organizational Shake-Ups

Since their inception in the pre- or early *coup* years, the State radio administrations have been subject to periodic administrative reorganizations, probably in an attempt to more closely approach that of the Soviet Radio Committee after which they are modeled. The Bulgarian Council of Ministers, for instance, created a Main Administration of Radio Information and Radiofication on August 19, 1950 following a visit of Soviet delegates and advisors to Sofia. In 1952, Bulgaria's radio administrative apparatus was changed and took on the official title of Radio Committee. The Czechoslovak Cabinet reorganized that country's State radio in June of last year and, according to press reports, partially redefined its tasks. Pointing out that Czechoslovak broadcasting was not measuring up to the "magnificent example" shown by that in the USSR, where "radio is an instrument for political mass education [and] . . . an important propagator of Marxism-Leninism," *Rude Pravo* (Prague), July 8, 1952, wrote:

" . . . The popularity of our radio and its important tasks give radio workers a constantly increasing responsibility for every program and every word sent over the waves. New tasks reveal themselves. Numerous shortcomings . . . [which] were created mainly by incorrect working methods and the obsolete organization . . . must be abolished. Our programs showed insufficient contact with the masses of listeners . . . , lack of persuasiveness and fighting Bolshevik spirit. The programs did not depict the brilliant success of the work of our people and the great perspective for their future. . . ."

### Soviet Appointees

The change in Czechoslovakia's radio administrative apparatus slavishly follows the Soviet model: management by an editorial board, with predominant emphasis upon programming, rather than by a general manager and a board

of executives, as in other national enterprises. At the time of this reorganization in 1952, the editorial appointees were also probably Soviet-chosen. They included the former cultural attaché at the Czechoslovak Embassy in Moscow and former staff members of Radio Moscow's Czechoslovak Department.

Taking reorganizations into account, the Satellite radio committees are administered generally as follows: editorial management, which operates largely on a policy level, plans, organizes and executes programs. In conjunction with the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, which controls all transmission equipment, it plans construction of broadcasting stations, assigns wave lengths, determines and collects subscribers' fees, etc. Together with vice-chairmen and members, it is administered by a chairman appointed by and accountable to the Council of Ministers\*. Departments for central broadcasting, musical transmissions, local broadcasting (i.e., radio diffusion), and foreign transmissions, to mention only a few, have "editors" for various programs: children's, musical, educational, and so on. Subordinate departments of each editorship also are under the chairman's supervision. Minor units deal with financial matters, security, personnel and the like.

## II. CONTROLLED LISTENING

The Communist broadcasting apparatus, streamlined for propaganda, is strikingly different from that used in the early postwar years. As in most of Europe, all radio sets were equipped to receive three wave lengths: long, for close-range pickup; medium, on which most of Europe could be heard; and short, for picking up broadcasts from America or elsewhere outside Europe. While this high quality set was not the standard household item that a radio is in this country\*\*, it was commonplace among radio owners (largely urban). Its cost was approximately equivalent to an average worker's monthly wage; if the radio's shortwave pickup was especially good, or the set generally superior in quality, it might cost as much as two months' salary. The small, cheap, one-wave radios popular in this country were not sold on the European market.

Unlike American listeners, who are offered a wide variety of entirely local and locally rebroadcast national network programs but don't generally own radios with shortwave equipment, Central European radio audiences could pick up stations all over the world but were offered an extremely limited selection of local programs. Central broadcasting for nation-wide pickup transmitted at the most only one or two programs daily. Because broadcasting facilities were State owned rather than commercially financed, sub-

\* In Poland, the chairman is appointed by the President of the Republic; in Czechoslovakia, until this year, he was appointed by and responsible to the Ministry of Information. A January 31 decree abolished this Ministry and replaced it with the Ministry of Education and Enlightenment. Until April 27 of this year, Estonia's Administration of Radio Information was under the jurisdiction of the Council of Ministers; it is now supervised by the Ministry of Culture.

\*\* Hungary, according to its 1943 *Statistical Yearbook*, had 715,760 radio subscribers out of a total population of 9,300,000.



scribers paid a nominal quarterly fee through the Postal Ministry, which also managed all technical broadcasting equipment.\*

### The Vanishing Wireless

Under Communist control, these patterns of broadcasting and listening have been changed enormously. Because radio's effectiveness as a propaganda weapon depends vitally upon the exclusion of "enemy" wave lengths, the familiar shortwave wireless set capable of picking up foreign broadcasts is no longer manufactured for mass consumption, and is gradually being replaced by new, limited-reception sets of various types. A few wireless sets are still produced for "politically reliable" groups—Party officials, trade union leaders, or stakhanovites, who may earn them as prizes—but replacement parts for old sets have almost disappeared from the shops, and the general purchase of new ones is virtually prohibited by arbitrarily jacked-up prices and exorbitant subscription fees. In Poland, for example, a four-tube "Mazury" set is 1,150 *zloty* (about \$300.00, or more than twice an average worker's monthly wage). A one-wave "radio diffusion loudspeaker," on the other hand, costs only 180 *zloty*, including installation. The loudspeaker subscription fee is 7.5 *zloty* a month; the fee for a wireless is more than twice as much: 16.5 *zloty*. (Trade union members pay 2.4 *zloty* for a loudspeaker; 7.5 *zloty* for a wireless).

Assuming that a potential purchaser can afford a wireless set (which *prima facie* makes him suspect), ownership involves him in endless red tape. Chapter I of Romania decree No. 216 (published in *Buletinul Oficial* No. 32, May 23, 1949) reads:

*Article 15.* No one may install, keep, sell, operate or construct a receiver or loudspeaker for reception by coils and amplifying tubes [i.e., a wireless receiving set] without a written authorization from the Broadcasting Board. No one may deal in, construct, or repair electric radio equipment for commercial purposes without a written authorization from the Broadcasting Board. For the purposes of this law a receiver is defined as a receiving set, whether functioning or defective.

*Article 16.* Such authorization shall be obtained by the filing of a printed application blank, either directly with the Broadcasting Board or with the post office. The application must be accompanied by subscription fees listed in the schedule of postal rates for the category and use of the receiver in question. The term of subscription is for one year; the Broadcasting Board is authorized to collect the fee in two, three, or more installments per year.

*Article 17.* The authorization is personal and non-transferable. The subscriber is authorized to use the receiver or loudspeaker only at the place and for the purpose indicated and for the period covered by the fee paid. Any change in the domicile of the subscriber must be reported to the Broadcasting Board, either by registered letter or in the manner to be prescribed by the

Broadcasting Board. In cases where he intends to change the category or the use of the receiver or loudspeaker, the subscriber must in advance apply to the Broadcasting Board, either directly or through the local post office, and enclose the difference in subscription fees, in order to obtain a new authorization.

*Article 27.* The sale, resale, construction, repair and transfer in any manner whatever of radio sets or radio parts may only be made to buyers or beneficiaries in possession of the authorization prescribed in this decree.

*Article 33.* Any person not in possession of a legal authorization or in possession of an authorization issued to another person, or of an authorization which has expired for nonpayment of the subscription fee, or for notice of termination, who uses, installs, or keeps on his premises or anywhere else a radio receiving set, or uses a loudspeaker for listening in to broadcasts, shall be punished by an administrative fine of 30 times the listed fee and by confiscation of the receiver, both in favor of the Broadcasting Board. In every such case the offender will further have to pay to the Broadcasting Board an indemnity equivalent to twice the current annual subscription fee for the category of his receiver, as civil damages in every case."

Chapter II, Article 43, provided that "informers and tracers of infractions of the provisions of this decree may claim a joint reward amounting to not more than 30 percent of the amounts recovered by the Broadcasting Board. Such rewards will be distributed in conformity with regulations to be adopted by the Broadcasting Board."

### "Warmongering Western Broadcasts"

Because there are radio subscribers who can still pick up foreign broadcasts on old wireless sets, the Communists feel that they must prevent these owners from tuning in to such programs. As the Prague paper *Lidove Noviny* expressed it in its July 15, 1951 issue:

"We have already spoken of the spiteful atmosphere created in our country by the inciting foreign broadcasts. Listening to them is not prohibited by the law but there are certain moral rules which ought to be observed. The vicious voice incites to murder. Whoever listens to it places himself between the two camps and gets near to the camp of the warmongers. It is impossible to remain in the middle, the choice cannot be avoided. The mere passive listening to the Western lies affects the moral strength of the listener. Even if he swore a hundred times that he does not agree with everything that the imperialists and their servants do, be it in Korea or here in our country, the fact that he thinks their voice worthy to be listened to makes him one of them."

Rather than confiscating the "dangerous" sets, or making such listening a punishable offense, the Communist governments have preferred to use indirect methods which make foreign listening either technically difficult (by jamming) or morally dangerous. Vicious denunciations of VOA, BBC and RFE periodically appear in the Party press

\* In Czechoslovakia, this fee was equivalent to 50 cents yearly; in Estonia, to about an average day's wage.

(and on radio) in a continuous campaign against Western radio's popularity, attempting to counteract its influence. On March 25, after a conference of Polish press correspondents on the significance of jamming by journalism, the Warsaw paper *Zycie Warszawy* wrote, "Arguments written with nerve, accuracy and conviction play a great part in the fight against the influence of this inimical [foreign] propaganda." Newspaper attacks on Western broadcasts invariably include loaded comparisons between Western and Soviet radio. A May 7, 1952 *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia) editorial is typical: "While American and other capitalist radio stations are broadcasting savage, hateful and warmongering radio propaganda, the calm voices of Moscow, Kiev, Odessa, Leningrad, Vladivostok and other Soviet radio stations are describing Soviet progress and advocating peace and friendship. . . ."

Press and radio accounts of spy and sabotage trials (which generally cite foreign radio stations as accomplices to the anti-State activities in question) are similarly designed to act as veiled warnings that foreign listening may lead to heavy punishment. On August 28, 1951, the Czechoslovak paper *Straz Severu*, former organ of the Liberec Regional Communist Party Committee, reported that one Ing. Krousky was sentenced by the district court in Doksy to six years' imprisonment for ". . . plotting against the Republic by listening to and spreading slanderous and inciting reports of the Western broadcasts." *Rude Pravo* (Prague), October 28, 1952, wrote that a certain Kulhavy (who had killed a national security officer) "had justified his way of life at the radio receiving set tuned in to VOA and RFE . . . and from listening to these broadcasts had progressed to murder and to jail. . . ."

### Jamming Network

Perhaps the most fruitful method of limiting foreign broadcast listening is to jam Western programs. The Communist regimes have extensive equipment for this purpose, openly admit what they are doing, and justify their actions as being "in the cause of peace." RFE monitors report that jamming is concentrated in areas where the number of wireless sets is greatest and where Western stations have had the most success in penetrating Satellite wave lengths. In Czechoslovakia, where weak "radio diffusion" sets went on the market for the first time this July, the government's jamming program is far more intense than in Bulgaria, where wired radio virtually replaced the wireless shortwave set some years ago. A Polish refugee recently reported that Warsaw's jamming installations are located exclusively in the western part of the city; in the other areas, diffusion exchanges indirectly serve the purpose of excluding foreign radio. In early 1952, according to Polish refugee sources, Soviet technicians were ordered to Poland's main broadcasting stations in Warsaw, Cracow, Gdansk, Poznam and Szczecin. From these headquarters they carried out "checking operations" on privately owned wireless sets and, using mobile radio-monitoring units, investigated listening

conditions throughout the country. It was believed that jamming networks would subsequently be installed in the areas where foreign broadcast reception was best.

Isolated refugee reports of other government methods, e.g., arbitrary removal of shortwave bands from wireless sets, electricity turn-offs after 10 p.m. (when foreign reception is considered by most refugees to be best), indicate foreign listening is so prevalent that the Communists have had to resort to more direct methods. They have even gone to the rather comical extreme of "protesting" to Western governments. The Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs handed the US Ambassador in Prague a protest note against RFE on May 21, 1951, and Czechoslovak ministers and members of parliament made attacks against both American and British broadcasters in the March 1952 press.

There is little doubt that the Communists will continue to have difficulty in sealing off foreign programs, if only because the population continues to counteract regime measures. An escaped Romanian radio technician has testified that he and three other technicians in one section of Bucharest did a good deal of secret repair work on wireless sets. Other refugees tell of extensive black market dealings in wireless sets, and a Polish escapee has described the illegal sale of radio equipment by a group of Komsomol (Communist youth organization) members who had gotten hold of the equipment while working as radio propagandists. Batteries, antennae and tubes, which they were supposed to supply to diffusion exchanges, were actually smuggled across the border into Romania until the group was discovered by security police.

The Warsaw paper *Express Wieczorny* reported on August 20, 1951 that a considerable number of radio owners were refusing to admit ownership:

"... Controllers of the Polish Radio who check up on radio receiving sets report that monthly control reveals from 2000 to 3000 unregistered sets. . . . Negligence, or fear of difficulties in registration, are often causes of such laxity in fulfilling obligations toward the State."

The following refugee joke gives perhaps the best insight into the regime's listening-control problems:

"Did you hear that the radio fee will be increased next month to 251 koruny?"

"Why exactly 251 koruny?"

"Well, just count them up. 50 koruny for RFE, 50 koruny for VOA, 50 koruny for BBC, 50 koruny for Radio Canada, 50 koruny for Radio Paris, and 1 koruny for Radio Prague."

### A People's Radio Set

Along with attempts to seal off foreign broadcasts from their captive population, the Communists have mass-produced new types of low-priced radios with listening range limited to local, Party-controlled transmissions. These sets

include the outmoded battery-powered crystal set\* which requires earphones; one- or two-tube wireless sets with extremely limited reception (usually called a "people's radio"); and a radically new kind of set called a "telephonic radio," consisting of a transformer, loudspeaker, switch and volume control, all of which are wired to a "radio diffusion exchange." All three sets drastically limit the audience's choice of programs. The crystal sets and other wireless radios are only powerful enough to pick up nearby stations rebroadcasting regional programs. The telephonic radio is literally connected (exactly as telephones are—by overhead wire) to the local diffusion exchanges.

### Three-Level Transmission

Whereas radio broadcasting formerly operated on two geographical levels, central and regional, the Communist governments have added a third: the radio diffusion system. Its basic difference from the first two is that its transmission is not by aerial wave at all, but over a system of wires very much like a large public address system. Nor do its programs originate with the exchange: the central broadcaster, located in the capital city, transmits for national pickup, either directly or by means of network hook-ups with regional stations (similar to New York City's major networks). Regional stations rebroadcast (also by aerial wave and on their own wave lengths) programs received from the central station. When the regional broadcaster is directly linked in a network to the central broadcaster, transmission will be simultaneous; when operating independently, it will schedule central broadcasts as it wishes, and usually originate a few hours of local broadcasting in addition.

Depending upon their proximity to the transmitting station and the power they possess, wireless and crystal set owners can pick up both central and regional transmissions, and foreign transmissions as well if jamming does not interfere. None of these alternatives is open to owners of telephonic sets. The telephonic radio can receive only retransmitted material sent out by the diffusion exchange to which it is connected. While it is true that this material is virtually a replica of central and regional wireless broadcasts, live programs from which all other subscribers may select are given to telephonic radio listeners "canned" in carefully selected portions, coordinated to their specialized area or industrial "needs." This spoon-feeding technique operates much like a public address system. The exchange picks up broadcasts from central or regional stations (which are in fact transmitting identical programs for the larger part of the broadcast day), selects material best suited to its audi-

\*According to the July 16 Prague daily *Mlada Fronta*, Soviet scientists recently invented a "thermoelectrogenerator" which will prolong the life of batteries. "Now," *Mlada Fronta* wrote, "herdsmen in isolated regions, and lumberjacks and geologists working in virgin forests, will be able to listen to their radios because they will be equipped with this marvelous new invention." The thermoelectrogenerator allegedly converts the heat energy of oil into electricity, and, supplied with 60 grams of oil (about a quarter of an ounce), the gadget will service a 20-loudspeaker diffusion center, or is adaptable to certain types of battery sets.



— Другарю агроном, кога ще ни објасниш за наторувањето?  
— Как да ви објасна, кога тогаш председателот од сутрин до вечер  
заема радиоуредбата.

In many villages of the district of Pleven, the explanatory work of spring sowing is led exclusively by radio stations.

"Comrade Agronomer, when are you going to explain the fertilizing process to us?"

"How can I explain it to you when the President occupies the entire broadcasting schedule from morning to night?"

Sturshel (Sofia), February 20, 1953

ence of subscribers, and sends out over a system of wires a daily program consisting of the chosen material. The rudimentary nature of diffusion equipment (a receiver, amplifier and system of wires) enables the exchange to serve a maximum number of radio listeners without the expense of powerful aerial transmitting facilities. In some cases, the exchange may have a microphone through which it can speak directly to telephonic sets connected with its amplifiers. In the Estonian kolkhoz "J. V. Stalin," in Kilingi-Nomme district, all spring sowing was directed by the kolkhoz chairman through such a microphone.

### Growth of Radio Diffusion

It is difficult to determine from official Communist sources the actual number of individual telephonic radio owners, as statistics usually refer to "listeners" rather than to sets. The collective audiences who are served by diffusion loudspeakers in communal meeting rooms, public gathering places, city squares, factories and lunchrooms, as well as listeners to actual public address systems sending out local announcements and important speeches, or providing music for parades and meetings (and rarely transmitting radio broadcasts), may be included in the published radio data. The Warsaw paper *Glos Pracy*, for example, wrote on May 7 that the country had 1,119,262 wireless set owners, 1,092,171 "listeners receiving programs from loudspeakers," and 36,931 crystal set owners. Radio



Sofia broadcast on October 15 of last year that 5,517 houses had radio sets, but did not point out whether they were wireless, crystal or telephonic.

Irrespective of the type of set which any data on the number of radio subscribers represent, the Communists invariably claim that the data clearly show a marked increase over prewar days in the size of the radio audience, and that this growth is due solely to the government's deep interest in raising the cultural standard of "the toiling masses." On May 7, the Bucharest daily *Scanteia* wrote that the number of radio subscribers had increased five times over 1944; two days earlier, the Agerpress State News Agency termed the increase one of "more than 300 percent." Budapest's Radio Kossuth boasted on May 5 that "the cultural progress made by our working peasantry is indicated by the fact that formerly in the village of Lebeny only four kulaks had radio sets; today 123 families have radios. . . . The Lebeny toiling peasants know what they owe to the liberation and to our Party." Estonia's Radio Tallinn declared on May 7:

"... Conditions in Soviet Estonia show clearly the care of the Communist Party and the Soviet government for all-around development of radio techniques and radio diffusion of the entire country. Since the end of the war the number of radio broadcasting stations has increased three times, and the number of exchange centers served by these stations 3.5 times. The yearly increase in radio listeners is shown by the fact that the number of radio sets owned by individuals has grown to 11,714. . . ."

*Rude Pravo* (Prague), March 21, 1951, characteristically contrasted present progress in radio with that under a "capitalist" government:

"At the time of the capitalist republic, when the Czech and Slovak bourgeoisie jointly exploited the Slovak worker, a radio set owned by a worker's or farmer's family was quite exceptional. Today it is a simple matter of fact. On May 1, 1950 there were already 288,077 owners of radio sets in Slovakia, and this number was surpassed by far at the end of the year when the number of radio owners reached 319,432. This number increased by 20.3 percent within seven months. Every ninth citizen in Slovakia has a set. . . . This is indeed convincing proof of how quickly the workers' living standard in Slovakia is rising. . . ."

Echoing these words, Radio Bucharest said on March 19, 1952 that "through radio, science and culture are penetrating isolated areas which were kept backward under the old regimes, . . . where the blessings of civilization were the monopoly of a handful of exploiters. . . . For the first time, loudspeakers and mass-produced radio sets are being manufactured in the country. The Party and the government pay special attention to this question. . . ."

## The Working Man's Welfare

The Warsaw daily *Glos Pracy* wrote on May 7:

"Thanks to our radio's conscientious work, the best literary and musical works are now reaching the broad-

est masses of listeners, worker's community centers and village homes. Throughout the whole country, words of our most prominent writers and poets are heard; in thousands of towns and villages, workers and peasants have a chance to listen to the best musical compositions and folk songs. . . . In all its activities, the Polish radio remembers first of all the welfare of the working man, his universal political and cultural development. The closeness of the ties between our radio and its listeners may strikingly be seen in the tremendous number of letters written by listeners. . . ."

To back up its claims, the press prints "spontaneous" letters from listeners in which they praise telephonic radio, and as in the November 3, 1952 issue of *Szabad Nep*, Budapest, declaring that workers "demand the installation of telephonic radio throughout the country." Radio Tallinn on May 7 wrote that "the father of the Joosep Vinkel family tells us that radio has become a good comrade in his house, and that all members of the family listen. Joosep's young son tells us, 'Radio brings home to us all the achievements of our present-day Soviet reconstruction; educates us, gives us joy, and is our real teacher, helper and friend'."

## Radio Station Growth

Although the widely-publicized broadcasting network of stations which has sprung up under Communism amounts to little more than the development of radio diffusion and its relay exchanges, there are scattered examples of expansion in aerial broadcasting facilities. The Romanian News Agency, Agerpress, reported on May 5 that Bucharest's central broadcasting station (which was bombed during World War II) had been reconstructed, and also promised that three new regional stations would be built in 1953. *Glos Pracy* (Warsaw) May 7, wrote that since 1952, in addition to its existing central station and eight regional stations, 6 new branches had been built. In Hungary, since 1951, transmitters have been set up in 5 provincial towns.

However, the increased number of radio subscribers still excludes a wide segment of the population (Hungary's 887,000 serve a population of 9,500,000), and the increase in owners has not grown in proportion to population increases. The figures below (taken from issues of Hungary's *Statistical Yearbook* and from economic plan reports) show that Hungary's radio production did not reach the pre-Communist level until 1952:

	Subscribers	Population
1925	16,927	
1931	325,032	
1938	419,233	
1940	536,101	
1943	715,760	9,300,000
1945	178,312	
1946	282,228	
1947	322,810	
1949	496,600	
1950	584,000	
1952	701,000	
1953 (Jan. 1)	887,000	9,500,000

\*1,034,000 in 1937, 1,662,000 in 1946 for a population of about 12 million (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], September 23, 1950).

### Future Prospects

While it is likely that most telephonic radio listening is "collective" (in public squares, factories and the like), the number of individual telephonic radio owners has gradually increased. As existing wireless sets wear out and prospective radio buyers are forced to subscribe to diffusion exchanges in order to hear any program at all, individual subscribers to telephonic and weak wireless sets will grow in almost direct proportion. The Communist governments are eager to make the new substitutions. The press has reported that in some villages workers have "demanded" the removal of shortwave bands from their wireless sets in order to exclude the "warmongering" voice of foreign stations. Refugees tell of forced installation of the new telephonic sets, or report that new housing is equipped with telephonic radio in every flat. Generally, however, the regime uses more "persuasive" and subtle methods. Having arbitrarily priced the shortwave wireless set out of general reach, the regime followed up with inducements to purchase the new sets. The "people's radio" may be bought in installments, and telephonic radio, complete with installation, is very cheap. Subscription fees, too, are less. In Hungary, telephonic owners pay 6 *forints* a month; "people's" radio owners, 30 *forints*; wireless owners, 60 *forints*.

Declaring that telephonic radio permits "the most faithful full-scale reception of music," the Prague *Czechoslovak Economic Bulletin*, July 1, 1951, praised it as an outstanding achievement of Czechoslovakia's precision machine industry. The new product was shown at Prague's International Trade Fair, apparently only for purposes of exporting it to other Satellites, for it was not introduced in Czechoslovakia until this year. "This new product," the *Bulletin* wrote, "signifies an important contribution to mass listening-in to high-quality broadcast music, since it guarantees pure and true reception. . . . The only difference in the cabinet from that of a wireless set is that there is no scale and no control knob. . . ."

### Tactical Retreat

At this stage, neither the wireless, the "people's" radio, the crystal set nor the telephonic radio is used exclusively or consistently. While the Communists may have long-term plans to limit their captive populations to telephonic radio, many areas are at present not provided with the radio diffusion system, and portions of the population still own wireless sets. Existing radio equipment, therefore, services all four types, with aerial transmission very likely employed in areas where diffusion is not installed and a high proportion of wireless sets still exists. Crystal and telephonic sets are used primarily in rural areas where there were few radios at the time Communists gained control, and where government-approved radios are perhaps easier to impose. Hungary's June 1952 *Statistics Digest*, for example, wrote that rural areas accounted for 45.7 percent of the country's total radio sets.

Area-wise, the greatest number of telephonic sets are at present in Bulgaria and Romania, where Russian imposition has been greater, and in the Baltic republics of the

USSR. In Poland, the ratio of wireless to telephonic is about half and half. In Czechoslovakia, where prewar per-capita radio ownership was quite high and radio industry well developed, radio diffusion has been installed only since July of this year: in one small village, Unhost, about 30 miles west of Prague. The Prague paper *Svobodne Slovo* acclaimed the event on July 3, attempting to convince the population that radio diffusion would represent a great improvement over "ordinary" radio. "The residents received the new installation," *Svobodne Slovo* wrote, "with great satisfaction and reported that it enables the local and national Party committees to inform them of all important and interesting events."

A radio engineer who announced (over Radio Prague, July 9) the government's plan to introduce the diffusion exchange system in Czechoslovakia, described the technical and practical advantages of wired radio "as used in the Soviet Union."


"... Laymen might think that wired radio must be much more expensive than wireless transmission; this assumption is wrong. Both transmitters and receivers for wired radio are much simpler and cheaper than ordinary radio transmitters and receiving sets. Power consumption is only about one-tenth that of ordinary broadcasting. . . . During the last war wired radio proved its importance and usefulness in the USSR. Soviet citizens could be supplied with reliable news which hostile monitoring services were not able to intercept. In isolated regions of the Soviet Union, where no electricity was available, wired radio was used to a much greater extent than battery sets. Reception was much better, since there was no interference and no fading. The costs of installing a wired radio transmitter and of the simple receivers are only ten percent of those for the ordinary radio. No tuning or modulation of the receiver is necessary, and even inexperienced people are able to obtain perfect reception from their receivers. . . ."

### Television

Although Communist television industry is far behind planned schedule, its potential value as a propaganda "weapon" has never been overlooked. If television is ever perfected and produced on a mass scale, it will probably surpass radio as an educational medium. As predicted by the Prague paper *Pionyrské Noviny* on April 30: "Television will not only be used for cultural and other programs, but will be a great help in production, for the mass spreading and demonstration of working methods. Television will make it possible for our workers and technicians to see with their own eyes the details which cannot be described in words. [For these reasons], factory clubs will get television sets as soon as possible."

In a paragraph reminiscent of Orwell's 1984, the newspaper pointed out that television could become an effective "watchdog" over workers:

"In the future, television will also be used in machine industry, for the improvement of control and manage-



Televise v zdravotním klubu... Tu jsou na obrázku první šťastlivci, kteří se na tomto zázraku techniky mohou podílet

Television viewers at a factory club in one of Prague's hospitals. The screen is only 5½ by 7 inches, yet according to the July issue of *Klub*, the Prague magazine in which the photograph appeared, "15 to 20 persons can view the telecast."

ment of production. The reading dispatcher will be able to control from one point what is going on in important working places, and can determine also the quality of the goods being produced. . . ."

For the first time in many years of experimentation, Communist claims that television will be installed "in the near future" are within the realm of probability. Czechoslovakia's long-heralded television broadcasts appeared this year. Research began in early 1947, and exhibitions of receivers and transmitters, together with the first live broadcast, were shown in 1948.\* But it was not until May first of this year that television broadcasting actually began. According to escaped technicians, the years between were spent studying British and American sets. Yet the Prague paper *Mlada Fronta* wrote on May 1: "... Our television is superior to that in any capitalist state. . . . We are proud to have our own television. The times when we had to beg the capitalist countries are forever past; there is no problem which Czechoslovak technicians, in cooperation with Czechoslovak workers, cannot solve!" Radio Prague, on May 4, declared that while the British had spent two years completing their first transmitter, Czechoslovak technicians had achieved the same task in six months.

On May 2, *Rude Pravo* (Prague) pointed out that Czechoslovak television's superiority lay chiefly in the fact that it uses methods adopted from the Soviet example, which is "the best in the world." The newspaper admitted, however, that Czechoslovak receivers had not yet reached the level of those in the Soviet Union. "Our television is not faultless," *Rude Pravo* wrote, "but we can proudly present it to the public as the result of honest work." According to the July issue of *Klub*, the Prague magazine for factory clubs, telecasts were being transmitted three times a week: on Wednesday, Saturday and Sunday, from 8 to 9 p.m. The program, which opens with a test picture until the clearest reception is found, then shows an announcer (the only live part of the telecast) who presents the evening's filmed entertainment. The choice is

limited: a recital, a cartoon strip, scenes from the Prague-Berlin-Warsaw race, a play about a famous Czechoslovak artist, and some film shorts.

In November, *Klub* wrote, programs would be telecast daily, but mass viewing would not be possible for the present because of the small size of the screen. "At present, only model workers will have viewing privileges," the magazine pointed out. According to a July 14, 1953 Radio Prague broadcast, the small-screen sets had been put on the market, at ridiculously high prices: 4,000 *koruny* (\$571,000), plus an installation charge of 450 *koruny* (\$64.00). Prospective buyers were invited to inspect the receivers in salesrooms, where they could also obtain instructions on operating the sets and might view transmissions.

### A Sample Set on Stalin's Birthday

The Hungarian Communists promised television as early as 1951. The first sample set, to be delivered by Christmas of that year, was pledged for completion ahead of schedule, in honor of Stalin's birthday on December 21. "Mass production of sets," *Szabad Nep* wrote on November 21, 1951, "will begin soon after completion of the sample set." In May of 1953, according to the May 27 *Szabad Nep*, technicians were still working on "the setting up of the first Hungarian experimental station, which is slated to be in operation by May, 1954." The sample set which was to have been completed in 1951, would be ready "this year," the newspaper revealed. *Szabad Nep* pointed out that technicians were "racing against time and struggling with difficulties," but promised that assembly line production of five-by-seven inch sets would begin in 1955.

The Polish paper *Express Wieczorny* (Warsaw) wrote on November 13, 1952 that telecasts were being transmitted in Warsaw "several times a week," and that regular telecasts would begin at the end of that year, when "a series of tests and experiments would be completed." Since this announcement, however, no more information has appeared in the press, nor does it carry a television program schedule along with that for radio and films. At this stage, with the exception of Czechoslovakia, television is not available either in public meeting rooms or beside "comfortable armchairs" in workers' homes, as *Trybuna Ludu* promised last year. "When we open television cinemas, and . . . when we install television sets in our homes, then we shall be able to look at all the most important events of our social life from a quiet corner at the fireside. . . ."

### III. PARTY PROGRAMMING

Although all radio programs are designed to support Communist ideology and Party policy, a very small portion of them (in contrast to press columns) contain pure propaganda material. The amount of broadcast time devoted to newscasts, political commentary, important speeches and official announcements is minimal, even though this material has the important function of supplementing and supporting the same economic and political campaigns cur-

\* Experimental sets in these pre-coup years had 10-inch screens. Sets being produced in Communist Czechoslovakia have screens ranging from 4-by-6 inch size to 5½-by-7.



rently being popularized through press and other media. Ideological considerations are important even in the choice of musical selections prescribed for a fifteen-minute program, but their influence is both different and more subtle.

Whereas the press emphasizes the economic and political, radio emphasis is on culture. Consequently, each medium is manipulated somewhat differently. The press will devote two full columns to issues regarding Korea; the radio will carry a half hour of Chinese-Korean folksongs. While the political overtones in the latter case are unmistakable, they are nonetheless clothed in an "artistic" framework not employed by the press. Just as the press has its rare "lighter side" (theater and book reviews, resort news), radio has its political, serious side (news-casts, political "talks")—but only as supplementary, "continuity" material.

The programs\* broadcast daily by each Satellite capital's central stations, besides being directly accessible to all subscribers who have regular radio sets capable of picking up the frequency, are intended also for retransmission by regional stations and for diffusion by wired relay exchanges. Together, these two (or sometimes more) programs cover the period from 5 a.m. to midnight, and service a variety of wave lengths. Radio Warsaw, for example, transmits program number one over a long frequency of 1322 meters for a period of 17 hours, from 5 a.m. to 10:30. Program two, over a medium frequency of 367 meters, transmits from 6 a.m. to 8:55 a.m., with a break until 2:10 p.m.; its broadcast day ends at 11:32 p.m.

Bulgaria's three central transmitters provide a morning program on three medium wave lengths and one shortwave length; a noon program on four medium lengths; and two evening programs (beginning at 4 p.m.), one transmitted on three medium lengths, the second on two shortwave lengths and one medium.

### Centrally Directed Transmission

There is very little content difference in the two central programs. Both apparently attempt to reach the same kind of audience, but duplicate in order to assure area-wide coverage of every subscriber. Bulgaria's three central stations, for instance (Sofia, Stara Zagora and Stalin), are located in the western, central and eastern parts of the country. No one of them is powerful enough to reach the entire country as adequately as the government deems necessary. The only program variation which any subscriber can enjoy under the central-transmission system is through his regional or diffusional station, which is expected to originate a few hours of programming in order to give the proper "local flavor" and offer purely local news (usually concerning production or political events).

That there is monopolistic coordination of transmissions at all three broadcasting levels by the State Radio Council or Committee was revealed in an October, 1952 Radio Sofia broadcast outlining a new autumn and winter schedule. Introduced jointly by the Bulgarian Radio Informa-

tion Committee and the Council of Ministers, the new schedule called for identical programming (by shifts) of all three central stations, and ruled out the possibility of individual station choice in programming.

"... In the morning, the Khristo Botev National Radio Station [Sofia program number one] and the radio stations in Stara Zagora and Stalin [regional] will begin their transmissions at 5:55. The Kristo Botev Station will conclude broadcasting at 8 o'clock, after which the program will continue over Radio Sofia Two until 10:30. The radio stations in Stara Zagora and Stalin will end their transmissions at 11 p.m.

"The *Rabotnichesko Delo* editorial [organ of the Central Committee] will be broadcast at 7 a.m. At noon, the Kristo Botev National Radio Station will begin at 11:55 and will end at 3 p.m. The Stara Zagora and Stalin stations will broadcast until 3 p.m.

"In the evening, the Kristo Botev National Radio Station will broadcast from 4:55 p.m. until 2:20 a.m. on working days. On Sundays the station will operate from 3:55 until 2:20 a.m. The evening broadcasts of Radio Sofia Two and the radio stations in Stalin and Stara Zagora will end at 12 midnight.

"Broadcasts for children and school children of primary and secondary schools will be broadcast on working days at 5:30 p.m. and on Sundays at 6. Young people's broadcasts will begin at 6:30 p.m. Village Hours will be broadcast at 10 p.m. on working days and at 9:30 on Sundays. An information bulletin giving the latest news will be broadcast at 10:50 p.m. and 11:45 p.m. Morning radio gymnastics will be broadcast twice daily over the Kristo Botev National Radio Stations as of October 13. These broadcasts will go on the air every day at 6:20 a.m. and at 6:45 a.m., except on Sundays and holidays."

The joint communique also stipulated that diffusion exchanges would be obliged to relay the national program from 5:55 a.m. to 10:30, from 11:55 to 3 p.m., and from 4:55 to 11 p.m. daily; on Sundays, from 5:55 a.m. to 2:30 p.m., and from 5:55 p.m. to 11 p.m. They would be permitted, the announcement read, to broadcast local programs of their own for little more than one hour daily: "in the morning from 6:35 to 7; on Sundays from 7:20 to 7:40; at noon from 1:50 to 2 and on Sundays from 2:30 to 2:40; in the evening, from 5:15 to 5:30, and on Sundays until 6 p.m."

"In exceptional cases," the notice concluded, "radio relay exchanges may use the time from 6 p.m. to 6:30, provided they take into consideration the national program."

### Radio Moscow

In addition to their domestic transmissions, Satellite central stations regularly rebroadcast Radio Moscow material, just as regional and local stations rebroadcast central programs. Radio Moscow also beams directly to shortwave set owners throughout the Communist bloc, not in duplication of its own rebroadcasts over Satellite central stations but in an attempt to divert East European subscribers from Western broadcasts. Early this year, the Bulgarian daily *Otechestven Front* (Sofia) presented Radio Moscow's

\* Usually no more than two.

Bulgarian-language winter schedule: broadcasts for the youth every Wednesday, for workers on Thursday, for peasants on alternate Thursdays; concerts each Saturday and Sunday; letters from listeners on Friday, a music and literary review on Tuesday; "Soviet Week" on Sunday, and newscasts daily at 11 p.m. "Radio Moscow," the Sofia newspaper pointed out, "explains the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, whose purpose is to secure peace and security to nations. It clarifies the efforts of all peace fighters against war. . . . Through Radio Moscow you can hear classical music, new compositions of Soviet and people's democratic composers, folksongs and concerts requested by listeners. . . . Industrial and agricultural leaders, as well as scientists, artists, social workers and journalists, take part in Radio Moscow's broadcasts. . . ."

Central radio stations in the Baltic republics of the Soviet Union transmit Radio Moscow several hours daily, and about one third of all their newscasts are broadcast in the Russian language. Four months' monitoring by RFE personnel recently showed that 38.5 percent of Radio Vilnius' (Lithuania) daily transmissions were rebroadcasts from Radio Moscow, 29.5 percent of it being spoken material (sport news, announcements, newscasts, drama, literature); and only 9 percent of it music. Transmissions originating with the Vilnius station showed a similar ratio of spoken to musical material: 41 percent of the former, 20.5 percent of the latter. The musical programs contained folksongs from Russia as well as the Satellites.

### Cultural Broadcasting

The programs which fill the 19-hour broadcast day in Satellite Europe are static and unchanging. Music occupies about half the total radio time, approximately one-fourth is devoted to other "artistic" or educational programs (lectures on the arts, plays, readings from fiction or poetry, programs for school children). The remaining time is devoted largely to political and economic material, either directly—as in a newscast, production report or reading from the day's press; or indirectly—as in a politically-slanted women's program or children's program. Most central stations also present up to an hour of calisthenics early in the broadcast day, and carry speeches and on-the-spot news of parades and demonstrations.

Standard program makeup generally includes calisthenics; reading from the day's leading editorial; up to eight hours of music; a play or sketch; sports news; a lecture on science or the arts; a half dozen newscasts (usually followed with commentary); official announcements originating with the Party or a Ministry; a review of production results; a "peace" broadcast; a Russian lesson; an "exchange" program with one or more people's democracies or the USSR (which may be either music or news); answers to listener's letters; and from six to eight programs for special audiences: youth, army, village, women, preschool children, school children, parents. A particular country may have a standard feature not given in any other, such as Zdenek Nejedly's "Sunday Talk" on political and economic topics over Radio Prague.

### Hanglemezek felháborodott felvonulása a Rádió épülete előtt



### Indignant Procession of Records in Front of the Radio Building

The signs read from left to right: "We want to be heard!" "We too want to move in radio circles!" "Listen to us too!" "We protest against the cruelty toward four or five of our unfortunate record-comrades who are incessantly used on the programs of the Hungarian radio!"

Ludas Matyi (Budapest), February 1951

Most of these programs are daily features; some are bi- or tri-weekly, others weekly, but over a given 7-day period most will appear at one time or another. With the exception of music (which takes up a good half of the broadcast day) and newscasts or announcements (which may occupy as little time as five to ten minutes), the majority of programs are thirty minutes long.

While the choice of broadcast material remains constant, emphasis (gauged either by repetition or by length of program) changes in a kind of seasonal cycle. These cycles conform to periodically recurring national propaganda campaigns. "Peace" broadcasts may be stepped up in support of a general Party drive in that direction; a sudden increase in production news may forebode the announcement of economic plan results; village and agricultural news will be stepped up during periods of harvest, spring sowing or "Socialist competitions." These emphases are also reflected in the standard newscasts and announcements, which will deal primarily with the campaign in question, and in addition will carry spot announcements exhorting the population to fulfill norms, subscribe to a peace loan, or jump through whatever other hoop the regime happens to be holding up at the moment. Calendar events such as the anniversaries of important Communist leaders, or holidays such as May Day, will be emphasized as the date approaches. On the day itself, either the length of other programs will be decreased to make room for it or other programs will be dropped in its favor. The holiday theme itself will pervade all newscasts, commentaries and the like. Last year, in celebration of May Day, Radio Sofia broadcast special programs throughout the day. "Songs for the First of May" were scheduled five times, along with "Briefs from September 9 Place," "Revolutionary Songs," "The Fluttering Flag of the First of May" (a musical and

literary concert), "Hello, First of May" (a children's program), "First of May" (readings from a child's story called "The Bunny"), and a concert from the parade platform.

### Music

The light, popular varieties of music (operetta, folk-songs, dance music) get more play than classic and symphonic. There is a high proportion of Soviet music, as well as folksongs from other people's democracies. The country's own folk ensemble or choir will always be represented. National "classic" music is generally heard less frequently than folksongs, and religious music has long been excluded from all repertoires. Modern regime-approved composers are heard less frequently on radio than in concerts.

Often a musical program, regardless of its actual content, is given a political tone by its very title. On December 14, 1952, at the time of Bulgaria's elections, a musical-literary concert was called "Vulko Chervenkov is Leading Us." A selection of election songs, apparently prepared especially for this occasion, dealt with Bulgarian-Soviet friendship, Stalin and Dimitrov. On November 10, 1952, Budapest's two national stations broadcast the following musical programs, all having obvious political overtones:

Morning Music for Workers Preparing for Work  
Opera Highlights from Russia  
Hungarian and Soviet Military Songs  
Sing With Us (new workmen songs)  
Nice Music for Good Work (the Hungarian Radio's gift program to the young builders of Sztalinvaros and the Stalin Iron Works)  
Music of the People's Democratic Countries  
School Choirs Sing Folksongs  
Songs of the World Youth Convention  
The New Communist Song Soars Across Heaven and Earth  
Slovak Dances relayed from Radio Bratislava  
Free Peoples Film Music  
10 Days of Soviet Music (scheduled five times during the day: Soviet Youth's Songs on Peace, a Prokofieff children's suite, the Moscow Radio Orchestra, the Piatnyitzky Chorus, evening songs sung by Soviet choruses).

### Music for Stalin

During the period of Stalin's death, music programs over Satellite Radio, as well as Radio Moscow, made a noticeable departure from standard practice. There was a sudden predominance of symphonic music, especially the works of Tschiaikovsky, Chopin, Rachmaninoff, Beethoven and Brahms. Modern Russian composers—Shostakovich, Kat-chaturian *et al*—were infrequently played. Slow movements from secular symphonic works were used where religious music would have been appropriate in a similar Western program. Specific types of compositions may well have been ordered by Moscow, for after the second or third day of "musical mourning" some stations began repeating selections played earlier.

Hungary's Radio Kossuth, which announced the death on March 7 (the Premier supposedly died on March 5), substituted a musical program titled "The Great Stalin Leads Us to Communism," for a sports program previously announced in a weekly radio schedule. Similarly, a dance program was scuttled for a musical program called "Dear Stalin." Hungary's other national station, Radio Petofi, substituted a 7 p.m. dance program with "Russian Opera Highlights," but a 6:45 program of Negro songs was kept. From March 8 to 15, all the light music which normally fills musical broadcasts disappeared, and approximately 25-35 percent of the broadcast day was devoted to Stalin. On March 16, Satellite radio "returned to normalcy": light music reappeared.

### Drama

Radio theatre, so common in this country, is used on Satellite stations once a day at most. Radio Prague, for example, during one week in July, had 2 Czechoslovak classic plays, 2 Soviet plays, and one modern ideological satire on bourgeois morale. "Soap opera" is never presented, as drama must deal with the "important political issues of the day." Of Radio Sofia's theatre, *Otechestven Front* wrote on June 4: "Its main task is to introduce repertoire closely connected with projects of the Party and government. . . . Through its humorous broadcasts, radio theatre wages a struggle against irregularities [and] enemies of the State. . . ."

### Educational Programs

Such features as "Mirror of Culture," "Science and Life," "Radio University," or "Living Words," are standard psuedo-cultural programs on all Satellite stations. They are heavily loaded with ideology, and usually keyed to current propaganda campaigns or a particular "re-educational" topic. Poland's "School of the Air" was described by the Warsaw paper *Glos Pracy*, May 7, as "a teacher to large audiences of listeners concerning the principles of scientific outlook." Text books are printed in conjunction with the radio "School's" courses: one series of brochures includes "Study of the Polish People's Constitution"; "Development of the Human Community"; and "Agrobiology". Both texts and brochures are subscribed to by the listening "students," who pay through their post office. Cost is minimal, ranging from 15¢ to \$1.80.

Many of Radio Prague's "cultural" features are currently dealing with anti-Masaryk topics, in conjunction with the broad campaign by Czechoslovakia's Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge to wage a "merciless fight against all remnants of Masaryk's and Benes' ideology." Radio announcers recently began reading selections from a new book entitled *Documents on the Anti-National and Anti-Popular Politics of T. G. Masaryk*. Other topics for these "cultural" features are foreign politics, as in "Looking at the Map of the World;" or religion, as in "Reactionary Priests: The Traitors of the Struggle for Freedom."



## Programs for Special Groups

Youth, children, parents, women and the army are, among other groups, considered special audiences. Their programs usually include news, a lecture, an address by an official representing the group, a broadcast from a unit of the sector in question (school, factory or kolkhoz), or an example from a corresponding sector in the Soviet Union. The program concerns the particular sector's duties in relation to broader national campaigns. Sample programs from Radio Prague include "Pioneer Morning Star," "People's Administration Service" (for local and district Party committees), "The New Village," "The Doctor Speaks," "Young Readers," "Socialist Competition Weekly." Some of Radio Warsaw's educational features are entitled "Program for Pre-school Children," "Women Have the Voice," "Program for Parents," and "Interviews With an Enterprise."

## Newscasts and Political Commentary

News appears from six to eight times daily, and most program schedules in the daily press list these at the top of the column. Radio Kossuth, one of Budapest's central stations, has a standard program from 5 to 8 a.m. which includes almost two hours of news and commentary: a half hour of news and press summary, one hour's reading from *Szabad Nep's* leading editorial, and excerpts from the foreign press. Radio Prague carries a daily 7-7:30 a.m. news cast, followed by ten minutes of "international commentary," then a fifteen-minute reading from *Rude Pravo* and five minutes from material printed in the Soviet press the previous day. News reporting is considered an adjunct to the press, which is the source for almost all such programs. Radio time given to straight news is less than half that devoted to music and "cultural" material.

## News of Production

Although interviews with workers, reports on Socialist competitions, economic plan results, worker criticism and the like are generally handled on a local level (supplementary to central rebroadcasting), national stations must deal with this material to some extent. Last year Radio Kossuth introduced a program called "Dispatcher Service," which, according to a March 2, 1952 broadcast, "would give honest workers an opportunity to wage their struggle openly against backward, indolent workers, so that the whole country may know about it. They must fight against negligence and complacency of plants and factories which delay their work. Factory workers will turn with confidence to the Dispatcher Service." Again reminiscent of Orwell's *1984*, the program works very much as an "intercom" system does. On the morning of March 2, Comrade Ferenc Domrosi spoke from the Rakosi Works and asked, "Comrades in Ozd and Diosgyor, I ask you, why have you delivered only half of the material we needed last month?"

Local transmissions of this nature usually contain criti-

cism of local workers guilty of some anti-State offense, news from the life of the village, production reports, and news from local Communist organizations. Often Stakhanovites are interviewed in order to explain their work methods. Radio Bucharest, March 19, 1952, said that "local programs must be topical, varied, and linked to the central tasks confronting the working people. . . . They must contain facts in connection with the progress of local workers in the fight for an increase of production and labor productivity, the reduction of production costs, and they must popularize Stakhanovites and leading workers. . . ." The March 19 broadcast also pointed out:

" . . . At the same time, the broadcasts must give the working peasants advice about the specific characteristics of the region in connection with the present campaign. The peasants must be told about the importance of agrotechnical methods, and convincing lectures should be given concerning the increase in the number of associations and collective farms.

"The editorial committees of radio relay exchanges must have as many correspondents from among Stakhanovites, leading local workers, peasants and intellectuals as possible, and a close link must be established with the subscribers to relay exchanges. . . ."

The Sofia paper *Zemledelsko Zname* reported on May 7 that broadcasts dealing with progress in competition and harvesting had been transmitted to the fields in certain districts. "Thousands of workers and peasants," the newspaper wrote, "are improving their political and ideological education through the radio, which announces the successes of our peaceful labor. . . ."

## More Deviation for Stalin

The rigid program makeup which Satellite radio stations are obliged to follow was substantially altered during the days of mourning for Stalin. Again, the alterations were similar on all Satellite stations, which rebroadcast considerable official Moscow material and publicly accepted sympathy only from other countries in the Soviet bloc and a few trade union or youth groups in free countries.

Sofia's national station, for example, carried an All-Stalin program from March 6 through 9, and from the 10th to the 13th, programs dealing primarily with the dead premier. The death announcement was given at 5 a.m. on March 6, followed by a message from the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, a statement by the Bulgarian Central Committee, a message of sympathy from the Bulgarian Committee to the Soviet Committee, and talks throughout the day on Stalin's life and his contributions to Communism and all working people.

On March 7, funeral music was interspersed with lengthy spoken programs concerning the death: announcement of the Soviet Presidium's decree on the composition of the new government, a speech by Prime Minister Chervenkov, a special broadcast on Stalin for the Pioneer audience, readings from the Bulgarian press (also Stalin-filled). At noon (the second shift) the customary announcement of the afternoon's program and musical interlude were omitted and the

announcer immediately began to read Tass dispatches on Stalin, excerpts from the Bulgarian press, first "reactions" from different sections inside the country (pledges for increased work in honor of Stalin, suggestions on the re-naming of factories and farms in honor of Stalin, and so on), "reactions" from capitals of other Soviet countries, texts of sympathy messages to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, reports from sympathy meetings held in Bulgaria and the Soviet Union, text of the Soviet Central Committee's decree ordering a gunfire salute to Stalin, text of a message to the Soviet armed forces concerning Stalin, etc.

On March 8, 9 and 10, the broadcast day was again taken up with more meeting reports, telegrams, messages and "reactions." As the days progressed, programs included reports from neighboring Satellites as well as England, France, North Korea, India, Austria and Finland. In the final days, the broadcasters returned to Bulgarian and Russian reports and meetings. In addition to this material and long readings on Stalin's life and works, Malenkov's speech and an article by Mao Tse Tung dealing with Stalin, the final days carried some normally scheduled programs with a Stalin twist. A professor, for example, gave an "educational" lecture entitled "Stalin in the Service of Marxist-Leninist Theory." On March 10 a program made up of music and such special Stalin programs was announced for that morning, but never went on the air. Instead, fresh "reactions" from other corners of the globe were read.

On March 11 an article written for *Pravda* by East German Presidium chairman Pieck was read, as well as articles appearing in Chinese newspapers. The announcer reported an unscheduled meeting of the Latvian Academy of Science in honor of Stalin, and read the text of a message from the World Federation of Democratic Youth to the Soviet Komsomol. The only non-Stalin program given important coverage was the decoration of a member of Bulgaria's Academy of Science, for fifty years of service.

By March 12, Sofia's radio stations were almost back to normal, scheduling the usual programs. The Stalin touch lingered for a few more days: the program for highschool students was called "Deeds of Stalin," another entitled "Stalin Will Always Be Among Us," and a program for children called "Stories about Stalin." On March 12, when the Bulgarian government decorated a group of 40 Stakhanovites, Radio Sofia's announcer read excerpts from a speech Stalin had delivered in 1935, at the First All-Union meeting of Stakhanovites.

### Criticism and Self-Criticism

Radio Committee program directors can generally be sure that their national network material will be faithfully rebroadcast by local stations. To further insure "discipline," a network of local Party committees and organizations stand watch over Radio Committee "editors" just as they do over local newspaper editors. All Radio announcers are subject to political indoctrination courses, and

strict laws keep microphones out of the hands of all but licensed, government-authorized personnel. Despite these precautions, radio stations at regional and "diffusional" (telephonic relay) levels sometimes deviate from Committee programming policy. According to official criticism in the press and on radio, most deviations are general rather than specific: lack of political awareness; timidity in exercising criticism and self-criticism; dull, uninteresting material and presentation; failure to apply Soviet radio experience; failure to broadcast sufficient local material—or to broadcast too much of it, at the sacrifice of rebroadcasting the required amount of national programming; and failure to tie local material in with broader production problems.

On Radio Day, May 7, most Party newspapers took the opportunity to air these criticisms. After citing radio's "many achievements" (thanks to Party and government leadership and "keen interest"), the Romanian daily *Scanteia* (Bucharest) added that programs still contained long and boring material of no interest or significance; that there was still "confusion and error" in many broadcasts; that announcer style was "gray, unexpressive, nonemphatic, and unlike the speech of the working man." The attempt to serve conflicting interests (i.e., to broadcast material with a high political content, and at the same time speak at the peasant level) was apparently a difficult problem for most stations: "The microphone must convey the words of propagandists and of passionate agitators," *Scanteia* wrote, "but we must avoid uninteresting and monotonous broadcasts which only weary our listeners."

### Lack of Soviet Experience

Radio Sofia declared that Soviet radio experience was not being sufficiently applied in performing the "great tasks" which had been put before radio, and that "the war-mongering propaganda of the Voice of America and its branches is not being denounced with sufficient intensity." On June 4, *Trud* (Sofia), in one sweeping statement, accused rural radio exchanges of having no local programs, poorly prepared local programs, and ideologically incorrect local programs.

Party organizations were accused of disinterest in radio matters, taking no measures to control programs containing material "harmful to the people," and failing to organize meetings at which broadcasts of the central radio stations could be "discussed and learned from." Last year, in a March 19 broadcast, Radio Bucharest spoke at length on the indifference of people's councils toward the problems of radio. "They think," the announcer scolded, "that they have no further obligations, since the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, following the September 1951 decision of the Party and government, has taken over the maintenance of radio relay exchanges and the payment of their staffs."

Radio Bucharest then spoke of the poor attitude of some people's councils which had provided "totally unsuitable" buildings for radio broadcasting. In the town of Galati, the

radio complained, the people's council had requisitioned the exchange's loudspeaker, which served 1200 subscribers, in order to use it for public announcements in the town's square. In Prahova region, the people's council "erroneously" turned the radio studio into a store. "The regional and district Party committees," Radio Bucharest concluded, "must liquidate their attitude of indifference in these matters. They are responsible for the smooth functioning of radio relay exchanges and of the content of their programs. Further, radio committees must exert more efficient and regular control over all relay exchanges, systematically watch local staff activities and periodically analyze the content of programs."

## Diffusion Difficulties

Although Communist governments boast that radio diffusion is "rapidly expanding throughout the country," they also admit that in some places plans are behind schedule, and that many diffusion networks are in poor technical condition. The Bucharest daily *Scanteia* wrote on May 7 that "the plan drafted in 1952 has been insufficiently implemented because of the lack of attention on the part of the Ministry for Electric Energy. Relay equipment and spare parts are still not available. The Ministry of Telecommunications is to be blamed for the poor quality of material and installations."

The Sofia paper *Vecherni Novini* complained on March 11 that seventeen radio systems in Sofia were not being used because of their poor technical condition. *Rabotnichesko Delo* wrote on January 10 that many district radio broadcasters lacked new records, forcing workers to listen to the same songs and marches all the time, or (what

was worse) "decadent" jazz music, and that some radio systems were in disuse because they had no directors—despite the fact that a decision for their appointment had been approved by the Central Committee six months ago.

On March 19, 1952, Radio Bucharest urged the Radio Directorate of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications to speed up the building of repair shops, guide engineers and technicians in making constant technical improvements, and reward them with prizes when they kept their centers in good operating condition over long periods of time. The broadcast concluded:

"The meticulous realization of all the objectives contained in the decision of the Central Committee of the Party and the Council of Ministers will lead to a radical improvement in radio relay activities and will lend increased impetus to efforts to educate the people and raise the political and cultural level of the working masses in our Fatherland."

These recurring technical problems represent only one of the factors obstructing the rapid development of a Soviet-modelled, centrally-controlled radio apparatus in the Satellite area. Popular preference for wireless sets over the new wired, weak, diffusional radio; the people's voracious and persistent appetite for Western broadcasts, despite all regime attempts to cajole, threaten and jam; and, finally, Party laxity in controlling and eliminating all of these obstacles—taken together, all these factors account for Communism's failure to monopolize the ear of its captive people. While the Satellite leaders have had considerable success in staving off printed truth, they will continue to have difficulty in holding back the tide of aerial waves which daily floods across their borders from the free world.



# News Briefs

## Truth Unveiled

The Czechoslovak town of Zbraslav, on the Vltava River eight miles south of Prague, has a monument to the victims of the two World Wars; a huge rough stone, bearing the names of the local war dead and an appropriate inscription. After Stalin's death, the municipal authorities were instructed to erect a bust of the late Soviet Marshal on the top of the memorial. The bust was made and mounted. The stone was polished and its lettering touched up. But when the bust was unveiled and the Red flags removed, the inscription still read: "FROM YOUR DEATH—OUR FREEDOM."

## Cementing the Soviet Bloc

Until recently, passengers travelling between the Soviet Union and adjoining European countries were obliged to change trains at border stations, because of the narrower gauge of European railway tracks. Radio Warsaw, June 14, announced that this inconvenience to international travel has been removed. Special cars which can be adjusted to either gauge will now be attached to trains, enabling passengers to remain in the same car for the entire trip.

The Warsaw broadcast reported that these cars would start to operate June 16 on the Moscow-Budapest line. Direct railroad transportation between Moscow and Peiping—a train journey of nine days—will shortly be established.

## Wedding and Honeymoon in Five Hours

Authorities have clamped down on the granting of leave without pay for workers in Hungarian factories. Workers were alleged to be taking leave for the purpose of entering higher-paid employment outside the factory. Under a new decree, leave of absence is authorized on only two occasions: five hours may be taken off by a worker to get married, and 24 hours in the event of a death in the family.

## Soviets Remove Ban on Latvian Festival

In 1951 and 1952, all public observance of Ligo Day, traditional Latvian folk festival, was suppressed by the Communist rulers of Latvia (see August 1952 issue, p. 46). The festival had been part of the ethnic culture since before the 13th century. Christian crusaders, unable to abolish it, had altered its original pagan content by renaming it for John the Baptist, calling it St. John's Day. It was celebrated on the longest day of the year, June 24.

This year, in a Soviet policy reversal consistent with other measures, the festival was restored to the national calendar. Ligo Day was celebrated in all Latvian cities and on the collective farms. The Communist-controlled Radio Riga prepared special programs for the occasion. Many of the traditional songs were broadcast, and a number of new songs were introduced. Unlike the usual propaganda songs eulogizing Kremlin leaders, these glorified the work of the peasants on the kolkhozes.

### Savings Solicited

Even in the most ideologically advanced specimens of the "welfare state", the governments are now encouraging the one-time "bourgeois"-tainted virtues of thrift and frugality. According to Radio Sofia, June 11, the Bulgarian State Savings Bank has launched a country-wide campaign to attract workers' savings. Under this plan, sums are withheld from payrolls and deposited in the Savings Bank in the name of the worker, to be used for his urgent "material and cultural needs." Although these deposits are frozen for a certain period, exceptions are made to allow withdrawals without, at the same time, reducing the interest rate.

Withdrawals of up to 50 percent are authorized in case of marriage, birth and setting up of a household; up to 80 percent is permitted in case of illness. Aside from fixed monthly deposits, workers may make additional deposits which can be withdrawn at their convenience. It was announced that more than 80,000 employees, with total deposits of about 1,200,000 *leva*, had used the bank plan during the first five months of 1953.

### Get More Exercise

According to a recent decree by the Bulgarian Ministry of Health, all physicians must register their private automobiles with the State by August 1. The Ministry will then determine which doctors will be allowed to retain their cars for professional use.

Until now, physicians could own private automobiles provided they were needed professionally. Simultaneously with the publication of the decree, many newspapers carried severe attacks on private physicians, pointing out that it was "high time that these elements be deprived of their cars which they are using primarily for their own pleasure."

### Belated Discovery

Radio Warsaw, June 29, broadcast a talk on "Jan from Kolno, the Polish discoverer of America," in which it was claimed that Jan from Kolno, sailing under the Danish flag, had landed on American soil 15 years before Christopher Columbus. Jan from Kolno allegedly reached the American continent via Iceland and Labrador, as early as 1476. The broadcast added that Columbus knew about Jan from Kolno's feat and actually followed the same route on his own trip to America.

### Hungarian Actor Released

Ferencz Kiss, prominent actor and former President of the Theatrical Academy in Budapest, is reported to have recently been released from prison. Kiss was arrested by the Communist regime in 1945 and spent eight years in prison for having refused to participate in "progressive" plays which he considered of no artistic value. He is now employed as an unskilled worker by the "Wilhelm Pieck" machine and wagon factory at Gyor, and is not permitted to take up his old profession nor to visit Budapest.

### Man Overboard Stays Overboard

In a declaration made to interviewers in Germany, a Polish sailor revealed how years of Communist terror and intimidation in his homeland have affected the point of view of the average subject. Asked hypothetically what would happen if the crew of a Polish ship rescued a drowning man while sailing in Polish waters, the sailor replied: "They would have to throw him back into the sea . . ."

The sailor explained: "If the man were not on the list of the crew, everybody on the ship together with the rescued man would be jailed immediately upon arriving in [the Polish port] Gdynia. The crew would be charged with bringing in a spy and with having made the trip expressly for this purpose. And how could it be proved that this was not so?"

Asked what would happen if the man were not a spy but an individual who could prove his identity, the sailor declared: "He could not prove that he was not a spy. Why did he swim so far out into the sea? How did he get there? Nobody is allowed to swim farther than the line of buoys marking off the beach."

And if he had fallen from another boat? "If he had fallen from a Gdynia boat one would probably take the risk of bringing him in. If the boat were registered elsewhere, he would simply be thrown a line and towed to shore. If he were taken on board there would be so many interrogations and investigations in Gdynia that everyone would be frightened. It would mean weeks of trouble. . ."

### Communist Fix

KIK, the office for the nationalized Budapest apartment houses, has issued new regulations on maintenance and repair work. All repairs which tenants are not required to do themselves—such as plumbing or electric wiring repair work—are to be taken care of by the newly established "Apartment Maintenance Enterprise." Tenants must file a written request for repairs to their local KIK office. This office forwards the application to the main KIK office, which then commissions the Apartment Maintenance Enterprise to investigate the complaint. The Maintenance enterprise forwards the application to the appropriate local branch of its own office, which investigates the complaint and reports back to the main office. The report is sent to the KIK office, which then authorizes the Maintenance Enterprise to make the repairs.

As a result of this endless red tape, entire apartment houses must go without water, heating or electricity for weeks at a time.

### Party Pastimes

*Mlada Fronta* (Prague), June 16, reported: "On Saturday afternoon the [Moravian] town of Boskovice was the scene of gay festivities for members of the Youth League. At the Spartak stadium, they took part in a paramilitary competition . . . and in the evening a cultural event took place in the garden of the local castle. A symbol of REACTION was burned in effigy. . ."

### Apiarian Reform

According to Radio Budapest, June 22, the Hungarian Ministry of Agriculture has ordered the nationalization of all beehives. A new decree restricts private beehive owners to a maximum of 20 beehives and directs them to deliver 80 percent of the produced honey to the State. Violators of the decree face severe penalties for "endangering the public order." The honey-producing districts of Dunantul, Matra and Bukk are particularly affected by this new decree.

### The Telltale Microphone

In Communized countries, the cost of human indiscretion is prohibitively high. A case in point was reported by the Czechoslovak newspaper *Rovnost* (Brno), June 13:

"News commentator Jedlicka's voice could be heard daily coming from the *Destna* loudspeakers. When he was on the air, the citizens of *Destna* left their houses and ran to listen. If father or mother were too busy to hear the news, they would send 'Frank' or 'Mary.' One day Mary went to the porch; her father had told her to listen carefully to the news. The broadcast ended and Mary turned to go in. But suddenly she stopped. The loudspeaker was still emitting noises, and now Jedlicka's voice could be heard in heated discussion, saying: '*Even if the Communists in Destna were to stand on their heads, no kolkhoz will ever succeed here!*' The debate continued. It seems that Jedlicka had a visitor in the room at the local National Committee from which he broadcasts. Mister Jedlicka neglected just one thing when he began discussing the local situation with his friend. He forgot to switch off the microphone. Now the whole village knows Jedlicka's true colors. What the vigilance of the local Comrades failed to discern, the mischievous microphone has revealed. Mister Jedlicka has been unmasked. . . ."

### The Newest Profession

A new "enemy of the people" who, by hoarding and petty pilfering aggravates the shortage of consumer goods in Poland, has become a particular target of regime attack, partly to divert the attention of the public from the fundamental causes of these shortages. A story satirizing this new scapegoat was published in the June 7 issue of *Szpilki* (Warsaw):

"'You have a new neighbor,' my landlady said to me one day. 'He is a quiet fellow, and respectable. Not like my other tenants.'"

"Several days later Mrs. Karolowa brought me my mail. 'Have you seen Mr. Majewski, the new tenant?' she asked me. 'I am going to do his housekeeping.'"

"I expressed surprise. Until now, Mrs. Karolowa had resisted all requests for such service with utmost determination.

"'Why not?' she asked. 'He has a lovely room—like a jewel box. His furniture is elegant. The room is full of little objects, ashtrays, lamps, pots and pans, all made of pure copper. It takes two bottles of metal polish to clean them all.'"

"'He must be some kind of collector,' I said.

"'Don't be silly,' she replied. 'He isn't any collector. He is a man with a profession. He works in a copper plant. . . .'"

\* \* \*

"I now rarely saw Mrs. Karolowa, who was busy taking care of Majewski's room. So I was pleased when she visited me in my room one Sunday.

"'You don't care about yourself a bit,' she said. 'Your shoes are shamefully worn out. I noticed them yesterday.'"

"'Yes,' I admitted, 'it is about time I bought a new pair.'"

"'What! You want to buy them! They are expensive and worthless—manufactured shoes, I mean. You should have them hand-made from your own leather. I can sell you some. And very fine leather it is, too.'"

"I was shocked, and didn't know what to say.

"'Why do you hesitate? Take it when it's there for the asking. First class leather. Mr. Majewski wouldn't touch any old thing—he is an expert. . . .'"

"'I thought that Mr. Majewski was an expert on copper. . . .'"

"'He was and now he isn't. He is working now in a leather factory.'"

\* \* \*

"I was returning from a business appointment when I met Mrs. Karolowa on the stairs. 'Come into my room,' she said. 'Where have you been all this time?' She handed me a four-pound box of candy.

"'Thank you,' I said, taking a piece. "'It's delicious. Where did you get it?'"

"'Mr. Majewski gave it to me. He promised me more tomorrow. He asked me what kind you would like—he wants to give you some. You know, he is so nice. . . .'"

"'It is certainly very nice of Mr. Majewski,' I said. 'But why should he give me candy? Why should he spend his money. . . .'"

"'Spend his money?' Mrs. Karolowa was almost offended. 'He makes them himself. He is working now in a candy factory. It is a pity you don't know him. . . .'"

"'And then I met Mr. Majewski personally. It was in a streetcar, and he had forgotten his wallet. I lent him 50 groszy for his fare. At six o'clock the next morning I was wakened by a knock on the door.

"'Please excuse me for getting you up so early. I want to return your loan,' said Mr. Majewski, smiling.

"'Oh, it is only a trifle,' I said. 'You could return it any time.'"

"'No, no, no,' he said. 'A debt, my dear lady, is a matter of honor. I couldn't sleep peacefully. . . .'"

\* \* \*

"'How funny!' said Mrs. Karolowa later. 'You live under the same roof and you meet him in a streetcar. It is a pity you met him too late.'"

"'Why too late?' I asked, surprised.

"'Well, you see, Mr. Majewski will probably move out.'"

"'Why?'"

"'He has begun working in a brick factory. Just wait, he will build a nice house for himself. The man with a profession. . . .'"



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